Joseph Fetz makes a good point: "In the grand scheme, it is merely humans thinking like humans, and the dominant logic is most prevailing. Certainly the people 10 centuries from now will not think or reason exactly as we do today, and much of what we think is correct today will be proven (or thought) incorrect tomorrow (the figurative tomorrow). There is no measure but what measure we determine to be the measure today."
This reminds me of my discussion in this post from September on Feynman and the difference he notes between Babylonian and Greek reasoning.
People like Gene will often miss the mark by calling this stuff "relativism". It's not really relativism. Relativism implies that there's no standard of value at all except relative values. That's not the point. The point is that it's not foundationalism. Everyone's standard or perception of the standard is slightly different. But our standard for knowledge is all something like "what helps me navigate this universe" (of course, it's probably all a little different for different people). It's not foundationalist because we don't have any illusions about an "objective truth", but it's not really relativist either because we're all trying to achieve the same task (navigation of life) in the same surroundings (this universe).
That means nobody's logic is exactly the same and there's a certain degree of path dependence associated with our different logics, but they all seem to converge on similar themes.