Showing posts with label morals. Show all posts
Showing posts with label morals. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 7, 2010

Lovecraft on Race and Religion: Part 2


In an October 17th, 1933 letter to Miss Helen Sully, Lovecraft writes:

"Yes - I read George Moore in youth, and have always thought the Catholic system weak in its relation to individual character. Ironically, it is the least personally strengthening because it is the most purely religious. Theoretically - and as a matter of universal acceptance in pre-Reformation times - the function of religion is primarily to exalt and serve some mystical and intangible entity or group of entities outside mankind. It has relatively little to do with human conduct and character - hence in classical and pre-classical antiquity we find religion largely ritualistic and orgiastic, whilst conduct (based on reason) remained the province of the non-religious philosopher. Christianity - or rather, the Judaism on which it was based - was the first religion to take a primary interest in ethics and assume a responsibility for conduct and character. That was the unique contribution of the Semitic temperament to western civilization - a very doubtful gift, since it removed ethics so completely from the aesthetic and logical field, transferring it to the jurisdiction of a mythical belief, that order and good taste threaten to vanish upon the ultimate and inevitable decline of the mythology. It would have been far better if we had kept our classical conception of ethics as a matter of beauty, good sense, and taste - the province of the non-supernatural philosopher - for its survival would not then have been so imperilled by the decline of religion. As Aryans, lacking the almost savage ethical sense of the desert-bred Semite, we are vastly better adapted to the conception of character as related to beauty, reason, and pride, than to the notion of divine moral law. Meanwhile our dominant religion has always been torn between two tendancies - one to return to the Aryan concept and become a system of mystical adoration letting morals more or less slide or putting them on a bargaining and excusing basis, and the other to live up to the specifically Christian ideal and mould better and more harmonious characters in the immediate world around us. The first tendency breeds the Catholic psychology, and the second the Protestant. As a result, Catholics are more purely religious - since Protestants, being after all Aryans to whome the feverish Semitic religio-moralism is impossible save for brief periods (such as that of intensive and literal Puritanism in England and New England), tend to lay more and more stress on human character and good deeds as opposed to mystical adoration, and therefore exercise the functions of the classically conceived philosopher rather than the classically conceived priest."

The line of thought is reminiscent of a piece he wrote in a circular letter in April, 1921:

"Modern civilisation is the direct heir of Hellenic culture - all that we have is Greek. Since the transient Semitic importation of ascetic idealism has run its course, can we not recapture a trace of the old pagan lightheartedness that once sparked that Aegean? Surely we can think of life as having something of beauty, and only a glutton wants eternity".

I think these selections provide interesting background for Lovecraft's underlying and somewhat obscure anti-semitism. He doesn't see Jews as being biologically inferior - that idea he makes clear in the 1930s, mocks Hitler for, and demonstrates his commitment to when he marries a Jew (the marriage ended, but not because of anything having to do with his wife's Judaism). He mentions the cultural dominance of Jews and the way these cultural arbiters alter American tradition, but as I outlined in the last post he never seems to pull out anything as indulgent as a "Hitler in art school" move, blaming Jews for any failures of his own publications - this despite the fact that his stories were rejected by the very publishing house Lovecraft had at another time suggested was overrun by Jews. So while he certainly doesn't stop talking about this stuff, concrete objections on his part are quite illusive.

In this passage, though, he puts a finer point on the influence of Judaism which I think might underly some of his other concerns. Judaism, for Lovecraft, made the misstep of fusing morality and religion. What was once the realm of philosophers and ethicists merged in Judaism with the mysticism and erraticism of the priest-class. Mysticism for Lovecraft the atheist is actually quite acceptable - his fiction is nothing if not mystical. Mysticism serves an important purpose for the human species. But that purpose is not to provide moral guidance - morality should be governed by rational thought.

All of this can be taken in different ways. Lovecraft was not the only one to revel in the prospect of a pagan revival in the interwar period - it was an important feature of Nazism too. It could go that way. Of course, the decoupling of faith and morality has also been important for modern liberal secularists who constantly have to respond to the fairly odd, question begging inquiry of "but how would we know right from wrong without God?".

Elsewhere - I can't find the citation right now - Lovecraft remarked that "Christianity did not civilize Europe - Europe civilized Christianity". I'm of course just getting into this material, and I'm not even primarily interested in his views on race and religion - but I am getting the impression that this whole line of thought is an important driver of all that Lovecraft has to say in these fields. If Lovecraft uttered a word about the "inferiority" of the Jews I might think twice (he does of course attach this word to others), but he seems more often to be inverting the traditional anti-semitic formulation - it seems like the biggest thing he faults Judaism for is giving birth to Christianity (rather than killing Christ).

Of course all of this is tentative and based on a work in progress, let me know. He may turn out to be less nuanced than he first appears. The man is still a racist and an anti-semite, there's no doubt about that. And no veneer of sophistication excuses that. But I do think (1.) you need to engage what he thought about race and religion if you engage his social theory - even though the social theory isn't primarily based on his thoughts on race and religion, (2.) if you're going to do that you can't just throw him into one big monolithic "racist" pile, and (3.) as you read this stuff you do find interesting thought processes - for example, the sources of morality and the "classical philosopher" vs. "classical priest" point is interesting and worthy of exploration for anyone, regardless of these questions of racism or anti-semitism that it motivates in Lovecraft's particular case.

Monday, March 23, 2009

Risky Behavior and Morals

I spent the better part of the last three days in the Washington Plaza Hotel at a conference held by IZA, a German labor economics group, on the "economics of risky behavior".

The National Bureau of Economic Research held a similarly themed conference a couple years back. Broadly speaking, the conclusion of the NBER conference was "risk is rational". "Rational addiction models" were popular and common. People engaged in risky behaviors as a part of an explicit decision to maximize lifetime utility. It's not that crazy of a story - certainly we weigh the costs and benefits of some risks and choose a risky course of action. So I don't mean to belittle the NBER conclusions.

To a large extent, though, the IZA came to this conclusion too - but with more nuance and qualification. Empirical work on some risk behavior concluded that it was irrational some of the time. I also don't think this should be hard to accept for most economists, much less most people in general.

But one thing that occasionally came up that is talked about more often in other circles was the role of social norms and morals in risky behavior. The IZA conference covered lots of material, including infidelity, prostitution, murder, binge drinking, drug use, etc. etc. An outsider may have been surprised by the extent to which the group discussed these behaviors in very clinical, value-neutral terms. We talked about crack markets and sex markets as if they were markets for sandwiches or shoes. But occasionally, somebody brought up the constraining influence of morals.

I think economists could explore morals more thoroughly. Usually, economists think about maximizing something like utility or profit based on some decision set available to an actor. Morality could simply be understood as an institutional restriction on the available decision set, or perhaps excessively punitive costs associated certain decisions.

Another important question about the "optimality" of morals is to start to consider where morals come from. Let's assume for the moment that there are two types of morals: (1.) transcendent morals that universally restrict decision sets, and (2.) institutional rules that were created to minimize the costs and externalities of certain decisions. I include type 1 morals so that we don't have to argue about the most divisive and really the most important morals out there. By type 2 morals, I'm thinking about everything from the Jewish restrictions on pork to keep the Hebrews strong and healthy in the desert, to the myth of the evils of marijuana that was concocted in the 1930s. Insofar as type 1 morals are universally applicable and important, we're not especially concerned about any sub-optimality associated with them. If it is always excessively costly to the individual and society to murder, then the moral prohibition on murder that acts as a restriction on the decision set is always going to be optimal.

But what about those residual, type 2 morals that are inherited from the trade offs faced by bygone generations? These types of morals in all likelihood are forcing current generations into sub-optimal decisions.

My question is - if a sub-set of morals and norms really are just leftovers that distort the decision making process today, how do we deal with them? Are ethicists policing this at all? Is there a process for reevaluation? I think people naturally reevaluate morals in their own lives, but that process can be slow (not necessarily a bad thing).

I think it's nice to qualify the NBER assumption that risky behaviors are perfectly rational. Norms and morals do exist for humans, so they should exist in the science of human action. But the broader point of NBER rings true as well. We have rational faculties to weigh risky decisions. Morals inform those faculties. But if morals distort those faculties unnecessarily, what is to be done?