An interesting exercise, partaken in by Cowen, Caplan, and Murphy...
... and now Kuehn:
1. I am an optimist about constitutional democracy. Everyone knows the pit-falls of democratic governance and likes to harp on them, but constitutional democracy has performed remarkably well. Most constitutional democracy pessimists lament the absence of their preferred constitutional order, which to me seems to completely miss the point of constitutional democracy. Constitutional democracy is strong where it exists and every decade it is making inroads elsewhere.
2. I am an optimist about what Bryan Caplan calls “overall political culture”. Nationalism, tribalism, racism, and sexism are on the decline. These changes reveal frictions and spark conflicts with resistant tribalists but that’s because they are reacting to a move towards cosmopolitanism. Caplan also laments “social democracy”. I see social democracy as a necessary consequence of constitutional democracy and growth. As we get richer we want to sacrifice efficiency for the socialization of goods. If we want this, we ought to be free to obtain this democratically. I am not a European social democrat, but I recognize these choices as choices that we should have the freedom of making if we have the luxury of making. What drives my optimism on this point is that socialization today usually doesn’t come with the dew-eyed innocence that it did one hundred years ago – we are much more cognizant of the trade-offs, and we should be free to make those trade-offs.
3. I am optimistic about growth. Short-term fluctuations are important because they cause a great deal of hardship, but we have every reason to expect secular, continual growth. The only threat to economic growth is that we won’t want to consume anymore or that we won’t have anything else to invest in. We seem to be insatiable on the former, and always seem driven to expand our horizons. On the latter, the record suggests that technological innovation will make sure the door to new investments are always open. Demography, human nature, and science will ensure continued growth.
4. I am optimistic about markets. The superiority of free markets over planned economies is a given. It will increasingly be the case in the future that any allocation not performed by markets will be conducted outside of markets because free men and women chose to do things that way. This will be the case for many allocative decisions, nevertheless we are unlikely to have our demand for the efficiency that markets can provide satiated. Markets have a bright future.
5. I am optimistic about broad acknowledgement of externalities (at least on some level). The decreased tribalism I noted on point #2 will contribute to an increased recognition of the impact of our decisions more broadly, outside the particular party or narrow tribe that we may be transacting or consulting with. Markets will become more efficient by the increased recognition of these externalized costs.
6. I am pessimistic about climate change. I think we could converge on doing something, but even if tomorrow we had a sea change in public opinion and an increased precision in climate science (neither of which are likely), it’s unclear how much we could really do. My expectation is that I will die in a world that is considerably warmer (unless I’m lucky enough to die on Mars), but…
7. I am an optimist about human adaptation. This means that I think we’ll be living in a warmer world (with the dramatic changes that would entail), and inevitably we will adapt to that world. Certain populations will suffer, but hopefully we will have the wealth and will to help them, and the technology to provide a comfortable existence for ourselves.
8. I’m an optimist about global government. I hope we have one before I die, and I imagine we will.
9. I’m a guarded optimist about war. I’m guessing warfare will decline as we globalize, however as supranational institutions develop there’s always the chance of friction.
10. I’m a pessimist about inter-stellar colonization. The technology seems too far off. If we manage it, it will be a truly unpredictable breakthrough.
11. I’m an optimist about inter-planetary colonization. I expect to see a thriving, albeit small permanent human settlement on Mars before I die, probably some bases on the moon, substantial mining of the asteroid belt, and lots and lots of robots flying around everywhere.
12. I am an optimist about people. People are basically good, and most of the conflict that comes up in our lives comes through misunderstandings, uncharitable interpretations, or reactions to perceived threats. People are basically good and as we have a greater opportunity to interact with people not like us, they’ll realize this. Civility will thrive and differing points of view will synthesize.
Wednesday, September 21, 2011
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I'm optimistic that 99.9% of the stuff people worry about is overblown and will not come to pass.
ReplyDeleteI'm optimistic that most of what we think of as enlightened approaches today will be thought of as barbarisms a hundred years from now.
I'm optimistic that most of the predictions I make are dead wrong.
One should always treat the future with a great deal of humility; very few people do - including experts (which explains why experts are basically as good at predicting the future as non-experts). In the year 1,000 CE if you had looked at Europe you would have thought that the folks running the Kingdom of Germany were going to be the future of Europe, whereas the Kingdom of France (which had splintered into tiny pieces) was headed toward oblivion. Of course, that's not what happened; France didn't disentegrate, in fact, by the 1200s CE it had recovered and was dominate.
By the way, about your cosmopolitanism, how do you feel about certain people who see a nasty, elitist agenda in global government?
ReplyDeleteMisguided, or concerned about the right flaws for wrong reasons?
re: "which explains why experts are basically as good at predicting the future as non-experts"
ReplyDeleteThis is a claim that needs to be severely qualified. The winter 2010 issue of Critical Review has criticisms of this thesis (as well as arguments in support). It seems to me the evidence that this is true: (1.) is primarily about political eventualities, like you state - it's unsurprising that we aren't good at predicting those, and (2.) required the "experts" to predict without statistical models... which seems strange to me. That's an important tool of experts.
Anyway - in certain cases I'm sure that's true (for example, predicting the unification or dissolution of specific countries far into the future), but I wouldn't just accept it as a general statement.
Prateek -
ReplyDeleteProbably a little of both, right? There are clearly people who react like this because they are just suspicious of their fellow man and completely detached from the real world, preferring their own fantasies. Some people see cooperation as centralization, though. While I think that equation can be very misleading, obviously the two do go hand in hand sometimes, in which case I suppose the instinctual reaction against "global elites" (whoever "they" are) is rooted in something healthy.
The reason why we are seeing supranational and international coordination is the same as why we've had community, regional, and national coordination in the past: our decisions have broad consequences, and since we have the ability to deliberate and plan some of these decisions would benefit from social governance (whether that requires government or not obviously depends on the case). I see nothing inherently centralizing about that. Pollution is always the easy example to go back to, and I'm sure it gets old, but I'll still reference it: it's not clear to me that getting told by multinationals that my air will be polluted is "less centralized" a world than the world where international governance bodies say that multinationals aren't allowed to pollute my air. Decisions are imposed on me in either case. If I'm substantially impacted then I (and everyone else) ought to feel some right to deliberate over it.
"This is a claim that needs to be severely qualified."
ReplyDeleteNot really. The evidence that it is the case comes from broad surveys of "experts" from across numerous fields. And it isn't specifically about politics; we're talking about wide ranging fields of human life here.
"The reason why we are seeing supranational and international coordination is the same as why we've had community, regional, and national coordination in the past: our decisions have broad consequences..."
So the reason the Roman Empire invaded Britain under Claudius was due to the "broad consequences" of the decisions of whom exactly? The process (and genesis) of state formation is far, far more complex than the way you describe it. Indeed, the very way that the U.N. works illustrates my point - why are notoriously bad actors put on human rights related councils? Because there is a lot more going on than some concern over externalities.
"...it's not clear to me that getting told by multinationals that my air will be polluted is 'less centralized' a world than the world where international governance bodies say that multinationals aren't allowed to pollute my air."
Last time I checked, I was never told by a multi-national to pollute the air. Now I do make all kinds of choices to pollute the air, and so do lots and lots of other people. And they do so because it increases the quality of their lives in significant ways (and the lives of their children, their extended family, their friends, etc.). Thus it isn't the least bit surprising that when that quality of life seems threatened by environmental legislation, people react negatively. So if anyone is "imposing" anything on you re: air pollution, it really isn't multi-nationals per se.
re: "Not really. The evidence that it is the case comes from broad surveys of "experts" from across numerous fields"
ReplyDeleteRight. And I am telling you that those surveys have been criticized and while the results apparently have something to them they are sensitive to exactly what you're looking at.
re: "So the reason the Roman Empire invaded Britain under Claudius was due to the "broad consequences" of the decisions of whom exactly?"
Are you under the impression there is a simple linear causal mechanism determining the construction of supranational entities? If you are saying that, I think you're wrong. If you're not saying that, then what is the point of this question?
re: "Last time I checked, I was never told by a multi-national to pollute the air"
Right. Nobody said you were.
Do you read my posts before you respond? I really don't know where you're getting these points about the Romans, people telling you to pollute, etc.
Daniel,
ReplyDeleteThe point of the question is that your description of social change, why states form, etc. is quite naive.
"I really don't know where you're getting these points about the Romans, people telling you to pollute, etc."
From the language that you use obviously.
Gary you've sufficiently convinced me you have no idea of what I think about social change and why states form. You've done what you do repeatedly - take one process I identify and assume I'm saying that's a totalizing explanation of all factors involved. When has that leap of faith ever served you well in talking with others? When has it ever been a fair interpretation? When have I ever expressed the opinion on here that social processes are unidimensional? When did I say that in this particular blog post?
ReplyDeleteI don't understand why you continue to do this. It's the same argument over and over and over again. You are much less intelligent than you first appear to people if you think that is reading me right. And if you're intelligent enough to know that that's not reading me right, then you're just being bothersome and combative. Either way, it's not a particularly positive contribution to the comment thread.
"Gary you've sufficiently convinced me you have no idea of what I think about social change and why states form."
ReplyDeleteI just see what you write, and what you write is comments like this:
"The reason why we are seeing supranational and international coordination is the same as why we've had community, regional, and national coordination in the past: our decisions have broad consequences..."
Not, one of the reasons why, or partly why, or anything like that. Just, the reason why. When your language lacks qualifiers like that I take you at your word. I don't make other assumptions about what you may think. I try to look at what is in black and white on my computer screen and I react to it. That seems to be most fair IMO.
"When has that leap of faith ever served you well in talking with others?"
I don't really have to deal with this issue from others; most other people say, hey, yeah, my language was too strong. Well, your language is too strong and it really doesn't hold up to analysis.
This gets back to my main criticism of economists generally - the lack of thick description.
One more thing about your cosmopolitanism.
ReplyDeleteBaron Skidelsky believes that American conspiring caused the fall of the British Empire. J. Bradford DeLong disagrees and has written blog posts giving his counterpoints.
Do you think that, with even some British still suspecting Americans of having worked to undermine their economy and power during and between the World Wars, there will be some suspicion that an American wanting cosmopolitan government is just a Trojan horse for American hegemony in the world?
All I can say, Prateek, is that it's shameful that our secret got out in the first place and I'm glad Brad had the thoughtfulness to sweep it back under the rug.
ReplyDelete