"Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking" - JMK
UPDATE: Take a look at Bob's comments. I think I've stated everywhere I mention this that Bob Murphy is not a problematically strict a priorist and while I think Graeber's critique of a priorism is dead on (which is why I originally linked it), his critique of Bob isn't. He uses evidence all the time, and he seems to me to have a very well calibrated balance between theory and data. Just to make that perfectly clear. As for the Graeber book itself - I haven't read it, and haven't thought much about the origin of money. I really don't have a dog in that fight. That I think Graeber made a good point about a priorism should not be confused with me thinking he's made a good point about (1.) Bob Murphy, or (2.) the origin of money. I'm agnostic on the latter, and I disagree with Graeber on the former.
- Gene corrects me on empiricism. Gene thinks a lot about this stuff from a more philosophical perspective. I've said in the past here that I don't think there's much use for epistemology - my approach to these questions is more practical. I'm an "empiricist" because of the value that I place on evidence, not because I reject rational arguments. Indeed, a lot of the stuff I talk about on here (like multipliers) isn't amenable to a clear empirical picture, and what you're forced to do is take all the scraps of evidence and just decide what coherent argument makes the most sense given those scraps of evidence (and then you still have to be cognizant of the fact that other things might be going on too - you haven't come up with a totalizing theory). That got me thinking, though, about ideal types of rationalists and empiricists. It's hard for me to imagine an empiricist that doesn't rely on rationalism at all. It's pretty clear that you need rationalism to organize your observation (which is why I treated that as implicit). It's also hard for me to imagine a strict rationalist, but at least in terms of scientific pursuits I think you're more likely to come across a strict rationalist than a strict empiricist (obviously in daily life a strict rationalist would be non-sensical - we all utilize sense data all the time). The ones that come closest in economics happen to cluster around Auburn, Alabama and perhaps Las Vegas, Nevada. And my main point on the irresponsibility of that disposition remains (and on that, I think, Gene would agree with me). Again, I'd like to restate that the irony of this all is that Bob Murphy is pretty good at whipping out (and accepting the discipline of) data. In fact it's amazing that that tendancy of his hasn't raised more eyebrows in Auburn. I think the reason it hasn't is that everyone - even there - intuitively knows how ridiculous a priorism is.
- Will Wilkinson has a good discussion here of how hard it is to nail down definitions for words like "liberty" and how ultimately we just make up definitions that suit us. I think this is basically right, but I think it's likely he has the causality reversed. He suggests we have a sense of what institutional arrangements we prefer, and then we develop understandings of "liberty" and "equality" that match that. That seems odd to me. Concepts like liberty and equality are appreciated and latched on to much earlier than a deep sense of institutional allegiance, so I would have thought that we develop our understandings of what it means to be "free" or "equal" early on, and that these are very amorphous words that can carry a lot of different implications, and that our politics can grow out of that later. Either way - it's precisely the indeterminancy of these words that makes Jan Helfeld's whole project look so ridiculous to interviewees and people that aren't already libertarian, and so compelling to people that are libertarian.*
- What do readers think of James Buchanan more generally? When I was in college, we read stuff of his on constitutions, and it made a big impact on me - I liked him a lot. Lately Don Boudreaux has been posting a lot of Buchanan on Keynes (here and here) that strike me as being deeply ignorant. Not just in the "I'm not a Keynesian so I'm going to make a critical comment" sense that I may disagree with, but which a reasonable person can say is informed. I have to say - the last several passages Don has put up have lead me to severely discount a guy that I used to have a ton of respect for. Granted - the passages have very little substance and the actual work he did to advance economics (the public choice theory work) is still is as good as it ever was. But it has been surprising to read. Does anyone have thoughts on Buchanan's relationship with Keynes? Maybe it just says something about the times in which he was writing - I don't know. We all have a tendancy to get swept around by the political winds.
*I debated Jan for over two hours last spring - the audio has yet to go up. He just went around in circles and didn't get anywhere, and the reason was that I did what all his other interviewees didn't think to do - I told him his definitions were fair enough as a first cut but I thought they were missing a lot and I wouldn't accept derivations from those definitions. That's ultimately why other interviewees balk at him. They just don't think to challenge him early on in the interview because on the face of it what he says sound OK. He seemed very bothered that I wouldn't play his game and that I offered counter-definitions that we could work from. At the end of the interview he told me that my mind was "poisoned" by "post-Kantianism" and that he felt sorry for me. I literally laughed out loud when he said that.
Saturday, September 17, 2011
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The irony to me, in all this, is that Graeber keeps getting away with his bogus characterization of the issue. It's almost as if you anti-Austrians have all decided that I must be clinging dogmatically to my views, no matter how much evidence I raise to the contrary...
ReplyDeleteDaniel, suppose an anthropologist says, "And then this tribe in 543 BC managed to fend off a much larger invasion force, through use of their perpetual motion machines." Is a physicist allowed to say that account makes no sense to him, and to stick his neck out and venture that actually the historical records etc. don't lead to that open-and-shut conclusion? Is Nick Rowe an a priorist because he at least understands what I'm saying in this debate?
Does it matter when we use data to test theories, that we correctly draw the inferences from those theories?
What Graeber has done, Daniel, is akin to me saying, "All modern Keynesians would say that the government in 1921 should have run a huge fiscal deficit to get out of that depression." After you pointed out to me that that is not as obvious as I thought (two years ago), I at least constantly link to your paper and tell people what they Keynesian side of things is. I sure as heck don't run around saying, "Daniel Kuehn is a halfwit on the internet! Ha ha! He's gotten his arms and legs chopped off but won't give up his religion! He must be getting money from Soros!"
(I've compiled the reactions to the Graeber-Murphy exchange offered by Gene and the thinkers at Crooked Timber.)
I can't control what people write in the comments on blogs. In terms of my position against Graeber, I'm not being a priori in the sense you mean at all. I'm saying yes, economic theory leads me to think people acted a certain way, and lo and behold, the actual story gets closer and closer to what we would have expected. Specifically, the "totally anti-Menger" scenario yielded the Temple authorities using silver (again, that's an amazing coincidence) and they copied this from merchants who engaged in spot barter trades with foreigners.
Now the only point left in the argument is whether the Temple authorities used market exchange ratios when setting their own "administrative" prices. I'm guessing they did, because otherwise there would be massive arbitrage opportunities and shortages/surpluses. But there I go again, pretending that economic theory might help me understand the world...
Oops forgot Nick Rowe's comment:
ReplyDeletehttp://blog.mises.org/18371/murphy-replies-to-david-graeber-on-menger-and-money/#comment-800335
I haven't read Graeber's book so I am less concerned about his argument specifically myself - so I agree when you say this: "The irony to me, in all this, is that Graeber keeps getting away with his bogus characterization of the issue. It's almost as if you anti-Austrians have all decided that I must be clinging dogmatically to my views, no matter how much evidence I raise to the contrary..." (and yes - I get the joke). It's why I've been trying to make a point of saying that you bring data to bear on problems all the time.
ReplyDeleteYou've got to admit, though, many of your Mises colleagues are more rabid a priorists.
I guess I'm more interested in the strong point (which I agree with) that a priorism is bad for science - and I'm certainly not taking Graeber's side against you on the specific point of the origin of money.
re: "I at least constantly link to your paper and tell people what they Keynesian side of things is. I sure as heck don't run around saying, "Daniel Kuehn is a halfwit on the internet! Ha ha! He's gotten his arms and legs chopped off but won't give up his religion! He must be getting money from Soros!""
Exactly. Which is again why I'm trying to make a point of defending you every time I mention this. But perhaps even that is giving Graeber too much and I shouldn't have even cited it.
I'd like to add to your assault of thoughts by plugging my link to Kevin Carson's essay here: http://pacificcresttrail.wordpress.com/2011/09/17/kevin-carsons-brilliant-essay/
ReplyDeleteI guess I'm more interested in the strong point (which I agree with) that a priorism is bad for science
ReplyDeleteIt depends on what kind of science. Would you consider mathematics a "science?" It is a developed discipline of learning about reality, after all.
Or do you mean "those fields that are best suited to study by the scientific method?" If that's what you mean, saying a priorism doesn't work is a meaningless tautology. Of course it won't work.
The question isn't whether a priorism is good for "science" but for whatever specific discipline you happen to be talking about. I happen to think apriorism is extremely helpful for economics (try getting law of diminishing marginal utility without logic) because economic behavior follows obvious rules that are open to deductive inquiries.
Logic and deduction are fine, but a priori reasoning simple won't get you very far without some gaping holes that need to be covered up.
ReplyDeleteOn Buchanan: I'd say you need to keep two things in mind:
Most of those quotes are probably quite old, so they might be a reaction to the intellectual climate.
Remember who picks the quotes. We only get to see the few sentences Don Boudreaux picks out of thousands.
But I have to say that there is an essence of truth in both quotes you linked to. One simply states the fact that old Keynesian economics lacks microfundations and was quite remote from the rest of economic theory and criticizes the supposedly hydraulic Keynesian establishment. Where's the ignorance? (Except in posting it today as an attack on Keynesians equipped with the tools of New Keynesianism.)
And given how hard Keynesian policymaking is and how problematic some ideas of Keynes (eg socialization of [the amount of] investment) become in the light of Buchanan's work, is the second quote a sign of ignorance?
Frustration about the state of applied macro and possible the ignorance of those macroeconomists regarding his work added to an essence of truth looks like a better explanation to me.
"But it has been surprising to read."
ReplyDeleteFor the sake of argument I'll take your account as accurate. Which leads to my question of, well, why? Brilliance in one part of a person's career doesn't guarantee any amount of brilliance in another part. Keynes was into eugenics until the day he died; Einstein buried himself until the day he died into a huge dead end; Boyle (of Boyle's law fame - the relationship between the pressure and volume of a gas is inversely proportional in a closed system) was obsessed with collecting data on the supernatural - which has been the pursuit of people at least since then - another huge dead end (so far at least); Justinian nearly destroyed the Byzantine empire by his efforts to retake Italy from the Ostrogoths; etc. etc. etc. We have to realize and reinforce that expertise, brilliance, etc. counts for far less than is generally understood and that while it has its importance and place it is generally inflated far beyond what it can actually deliver. This explains why the literature on this subject shows that "experts" are such bad predictors of the future (even in comparison to novices they do not perform much more than marginally better).
"...and what you're forced to do is take all the scraps of evidence and just decide what coherent argument makes the most sense given those scraps of evidence..."
ReplyDeleteYou're better off being an intellectual vagabond (like most historians and anthropologists tend to be) than ideologically certain. The thing is, I do not get the sense that most economists of any school or ideological stripe are intellectual vagabonds. That is particularly true when economists get into the whole, "trust me, I'm an expert" line of reasoning that is so often the case.
re: "For the sake of argument I'll take your account as accurate. Which leads to my question of, well, why? Brilliance in one part of a person's career doesn't guarantee any amount of brilliance in another part."
ReplyDeleteNo, it doesn't guarantee - but those seem like awfully close parts of a career. The Einstein example may still be relevant, of course.
But I can easily answer your question (why?): while it's obviously true that brilliance in one area is not a guarantee of brilliance elsewhere, it's also obviously true that brilliance in one area is not a guarantee of ignorance elsewhere. If we assume brilliance on close questions (say, on questions of political economy) ought to be somewhat correlated, my surprise shouldn't be all that surprising to you.
Out of curiosity - do you view yourself as anything like an intellectual vagabond, Gary?
ReplyDelete"That got me thinking, though, about ideal types of rationalists and empiricists. It's hard for me to imagine an empiricist that doesn't rely on rationalism at all."
ReplyDeleteA Popperian method for economics would explicitly rely on empirical and deductive methods:
http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2010/12/risk-and-uncertainty-in-post-keynesian.html
As for the extreme claims made for praxeology (that it is all certain) and that it escapes fundamental empirical and inductive reasoning, this is pure nonsense of highest order:
http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2011/08/prediction-and-economics.html
Daniel,
ReplyDeleteIt is certainly what I aim for (how far I fall short of it is really not for me to judge). Think of Isiah Berlin's classic "The Hedgehog and the Fox."
"...it's also obviously true that brilliance in one area is not a guarantee of ignorance elsewhere."
Actually, I think it makes it more likely. There's a great line from "Grand Canyon" (one of my favorite movies from the 1990s) where the Kevin Kline character asks "...why is it that when someone's successful in one field, they think they know about everything?"
Anyway, you assume that they are close; for others there may be a chasm between the two.
OK Daniel perhaps I misunderstood your point about irony. It seemed like you were endorsing the quote from Crooked Timber. So I thought you were saying, "It's ironic that Bob stepped into this hornet's nest, since usually he's more careful."
ReplyDeleteBut if instead you're saying, "It's ironic that Graeber and the Crooked Timber are accusing Bob of this mistake, since he never does it and they don't know what they're talking about," OK thanks, but that's not how it sounded. :)
Bob,
ReplyDeleteI forgot to mention that I liked your analogy (that referring to a tribe in the 540s BCE); it was a fairly busy decade, but no evidence perpetual motion machines has ever been found. :)
"Specifically, the 'totally anti-Menger' scenario yielded the Temple authorities using silver (again, that's an amazing coincidence) and they copied this from merchants who engaged in spot barter trades with foreigners."
ReplyDeleteNo, (from having read the relevant chapter in Graeber's book), there's no evidence for that.
If anything, the influence went the other way: merchants, in the markets near the temple, set their prices in silver, under the obvious influence of the latter. However, little silver actually changed hands: the merchants' actual transactions were invariably on credit.
In fact -- a point Graeber makes explicitly in his response to you -- the Sumerians, though they had the technology, never bothered to manufacture scales accurate-enough to weigh out the small amounts of silver necessary for typical market transactions.
"Now the only point left in the argument is whether the Temple authorities used market exchange ratios when setting their own "administrative" prices. I'm guessing they did, because otherwise there would be massive arbitrage opportunities and shortages/surpluses. But there I go again, pretending that economic theory might help"
'1 shekel = 60 portions of barley' does not sound like a market exchange rate to me.
In any case, in a predominantly non-monetary economy, there are practical impediments to exploiting even the most enticing of arbitrage opportunities.