Vote-share bonds: "How can excessive public debt be avoided? This column proposes a novel solution: “vote-share bonds”. These government bonds are tied to the share of the vote that the adoption of the underlying deficit has received in parliament. A bond with a higher vote-share is considered senior. Vote-share bonds inspire fiscal responsibility, while retaining the flexibility to stabilise negative macroeconomic shocks."
The mess of a theory that is the "social contract" causes a lot of problems for democratic legitimacy. This may be one step in the right direction: make less collective decisions more expensive. It really cuts two ways - those who can only eke out a majority are also responsible for saddling the country with greater debt. More broadly appealing legislation is cheaper. At the same time, I think those who oppose a specific piece of legislation for purely partisan reasons could also legitimately be blamed for the high costs. If they had compromised or offered a compromise the other side accepts (or if their position had simply garnered a majority), costs would be lower.
If federal and state bonds were measured on the same standard, this could also make borrowing easier for states which might help make a more robust, progressive federalism. My impression is that state houses are usually either (1.) less partisan, or (2.) more dominated by one party than Congress is, which means that holding everything else equal, state bonds would be lower cost under this plan.
Thursday, November 18, 2010
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment
All anonymous comments will be deleted. Consistent pseudonyms are fine.