From "Phony Science Wars", The Atlantic, 1999:
"These alternating intuitions have been in play ever since Protagoras said "Man is the measure of all things" and Plato rejoined that the measure must instead be something nonhuman, unchanging, and capitalized -- something like The Good, or The Will of God, or The Intrinsic Nature of Physical Reality. Scientists who, like Steven Weinberg, have no doubt that reality has an eternal, unchanging, intrinsic structure which natural science will eventually discover are the heirs of Plato. Philosophers like Kuhn, Latour, and Hacking think that Protagoras had a point, and that the argument is not yet over.
The most vocal and inflamed participants in the so-called science wars are treating the latest version of this fine old philosophical controversy as a big deal. In the very long run, perhaps, it will prove to be one. Maybe someday the idea of human beings answering to an independent authority called How Things Are in Themselves will be obsolete. In a thoroughly de-Platonized, fully Protagorean culture the only answerability human beings would recognize would be to one another. It would never occur to them that "the objective" could mean more than "the agreed-upon upshot of argument." In such a culture we would have as little use for the idea of the intrinsic structure of physical reality as for that of the will of God. We would view both as unfortunate and obsolete social constructions.
But there is no hurry, no urgent need to bring this perpetual seesaw to rest. Scientists who agree with Kuhn are not about to do anything very different from what their colleagues who agree with Weinberg do. Their disagreements come up only in after-hours chat, not during the daily grind in the lab. Analogously, politicians who think that human rights are somehow built into the ahistorical structure of the human soul usually propose the same policies as those who think that human rights are an admirable recent invention. In the short term, philosophical differences just do not matter that much. In neither science nor politics is philosophical correctness, any more than theological correctness, a requirement for useful work."
Tuesday, October 25, 2011
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Yesterday the great computer scientist John McCarthy died. He once said... "Your denial of the importance of objectivity amounts to announcing your intention to lie to us. No-one should believe anything you say"
ReplyDeleteOK, but denying the importance of objectivity and making a claim about objectivity that some people don't like are two tremendously different things.
ReplyDeleteToo many people have accused Rorty, Kuhn and their ilk of being relativists and too many have been shot down over the last several decades to try to plausibly pull that one in 2011.
"a thoroughly de-Platonized, fully Protagorean culture"
ReplyDeleteIs one that has reached the bottom of the hill and will stop moving.
Relativism doesn't exist; it is invariably the case that a self-proclaimed relativist is always sneaking some objective standard under the table. Thus we might as well accept that we live in a world of proclaimed objective standards (some more important than others). From that I conclude, amongst other things, the following: (a) some objective standard probably exists, and (b) I may not have it right if it does exist. A world of open commerce, trade, etc. is one where these standards intermix the most, and that world is part of my objective standard (and that of a lot of people).
ReplyDeleteTo be humble I will note that you find much of the same way of thinking in the work of those who have influenced me the most: the moderate, humanist skeptics who I prattle on about so much.
Two observations Gary: (1.) you're sounding like me which is somewhat disturbing, and (2.) using the phrase "my objective standard" is strongly indicative that "objective" is probably not the best word for what it is you're talking about. But I know what you're getting at.
ReplyDeleteI think Boudreaux just called you a naif here:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.thefreemanonline.org/columns/thoughts-on-freedom/dangerous-political-naifs/?utm_source=The+Freeman&utm_campaign=c2dc02977a-Freeman_Jan2010_Issue&utm_medium=email
Isn't that a bit of old news?
ReplyDeleteI have time for a less snarky response...
ReplyDeleteRorty begins by making a comparison to an ancient greek controversy. As usual in these cases the ancient greek controversy isn't really about the same sort of thing.
Regardless, what Rorty is opposing is the idea that there is an unchanging and inhuman reality to be studied, an "objective" reality. I think at this stage in the study of the physical sciences this is a rather difficult argument to make. I suppose the argument is like "The Spiral Labyrinth" by Matt Hughes, where science functions for an era of a few thousand, then after that magic functions for a similar period of time.
That doesn't seem to be Rorty's argument though. He writes: "fully Protagorean culture the only answerability human beings would recognize would be to one another". Well, to me course humans are only answerable to each other, nobody ever said otherwise. I imagine to religious people they are answerable to God too, but that's a whole other discussion. Nobody is saying a person can be answerable to a concept (even religious people aren't saying that, to them God is much more than a concept).
Since science is a complex, large scale social endeavour people in it can do and say pretty much what they please, they are limited only by reputation. Humans are inevitably answerable to each other. But this doesn't mean that no such thing as an external world exists. It means that
we can't view it in any direct manner that avoids problems brought about by the social nature of science.
In his final paragraph Rorty talks about "scientists who believe in Kuhn", by which I think he means himself and Kuhn. He says they "are not about to do anything very different from what their colleagues who agree with Weinberg do". That's quite obviously wrong. If a scientist believes his only duty is towards relations with the scientific community then he will act very differently than one who believes it's his task to describe reality. A scientist who believes in Kuhn would have no quarms about ignoring the results of his investigations if he believes that it will allow science to "progress" towards what he believes progress is. Science becomes a process of negotiation and lobbying where everyone pretends that the outcome of experiments and studies has meaning, a game. That's John McCathy's point.
This seems so wrong I can't even quite understand why you are saying this: "A scientist who believes in Kuhn would have no quarms about ignoring the results of his investigations if he believes that it will allow science to "progress" towards what he believes progress is."
ReplyDeleteThis seems to me to be precisely the opposite of what a Kuhnian position on science would say.
This seems wrong too: "Regardless, what Rorty is opposing is the idea that there is an unchanging and inhuman reality to be studied, an "objective" reality."
The regular point with Rorty is not that there isn't an unchanging reality to be studied - it's that pinning down such a reality is not an achievable task. A pretense of justificationism is dangerous because it doesn't recognize that. Rorty has said that his point is not to argue that there's no such thing as truth so much as to argue that the question "what is true" (in the capital T, "objective reality" sense of the word) is not an interesting or feasible question.
ReplyDeleteThis seems so wrong I can't even quite understand why you are saying this: "A scientist who believes in Kuhn would have no quarms about ignoring the results of his investigations if he believes that it will allow science to "progress" towards what he believes progress is."
To be clear, I don't think this is really what Kuhn says. In this case I'm just pointing out the logical consequence of what Rorty is saying.
The regular point with Rorty is not that there isn't an unchanging reality to be studied - it's that pinning down such a reality is not an achievable task.
That's not what Rorty says here is it. Here he gives the debate only two sides, not three or four. He places on the one side those who believe in objective reality, the "Platoist" and on the other side those who don't, the "Protagorean". He doesn't differentiate between:
1) Those people who believe in the existence of objective reality and believe that they can observe it.
2) Those people who believe in the existence of objective reality and believe they can't satisfactorially observe it, but rather that science must be complex and social.
He is attacking *both* of these views. Because neither can accept the idea that "truth" is "the agreed upon upshot of an argument".
The regular point with Rorty is not that there isn't an unchanging reality to be studied - it's that pinning down such a reality is not an achievable task. A pretense of justificationism is dangerous because it doesn't recognize that. Rorty has said that his point is not to argue that there's no such thing as truth
Well, that's what you're arguing.
so much as to argue that the question "what is true" (in the capital T, "objective reality" sense of the word) is not an interesting or feasible question.
Well, what are we supposed to discuss then, the weather? What is a more feasible question?
1. I don't read anywhere where he says that the Protagoreans don't believe in the existence of an objective reality. I'm not sure why you are making this claim. The problem with your assertion about this is obvious when you describe them as: "Those people who believe in the existence of objective reality and believe they can't satisfactorially observe it". If they don't believe it exists, then what's the point of talking about satisfactorially observing what doesn't exist? Make up your mind - do they believe objective reality doesn't exist or do they believe that it is likely to and that it just can't satisfactorially observe it? It doesn't make sense to make both claims, Current.
ReplyDelete2. This passage presents two foils - you may be interested in the article, which earlier does discuss three positions.
3. re: "What is a more feasible question?". A feasible question is to ask what set of beliefs explains the way we experience the world and seems to be useful in getting around in the world. This is why in practice Platonists and Protagoreans don't act all that differently. The practice that answers each of their questions is probably pretty similar.
I don't read anywhere where he says that the Protagoreans don't believe in the existence of an objective reality. I'm not sure why you are making this claim.
ReplyDeleteHe doesn't say that directly, but that's what he infers. Just as you've recently been inferring that public choice is just a vehicle to encourage libertarian politics. You've both been careful enough to avoid directly saying it.
If they don't believe it exists, then what's the point of talking about satisfactorially observing what doesn't exist? Make up your mind - do they believe objective reality doesn't exist or do they believe that it is likely to and that it just can't satisfactorially observe it? It doesn't make sense to make both claims, Current.
The two classes of people I label 1) & 2) above are both "platoists" according to our critics. Those who don't believe objective reality exists fall into another class.
I'll have a read of the article when I have time.
3. re: "What is a more feasible question?". A feasible question is to ask what set of beliefs explains the way we experience the world and seems to be useful in getting around in the world. This is why in practice Platonists and Protagoreans don't act all that differently. The practice that answers each of their questions is probably pretty similar.
I think that "seems useful" hides a lot here.
To give a practical example.... I'm currently testing the performance of a set of prototype oscillators. I have found out that they don't work very well. I have already chosen what I believe about these oscillators. I could have made different decisions though, I could have chosen to believe that they work well. Which would have been more useful for me? Well, that's difficult to judge. If I wanted to claim that the oscillators work well then I may be more convincing if I thought they did. Alternatively, I may be more convincing at claiming they work well if I actually understand that they don't and prepare to field difficult question later. But assuming you accept that objective reality exists what does all this have to do with it?
Notice that nobody can say what "seems useful" to society.
quarm: a qualm about the existence of quarks.
ReplyDeleteProtagoras represented the death spasms of the civilization of the polis, when it had reached the point where the Athenians could cheerfully slaughter the Melians, since, after all, they were the measure of all things. Within a generation that civilization decayed to the point where Phillip could conquer the entire peninsula while suffering only a few scratches. Sophists like Protagoras and Rorty always show up when a civilization is having its last few twitches.
That sounds like "Athenians are the measure of all things" not "man is the measure of all things".
ReplyDeleteI'm not endorsing Protagoras himself - I'm endorsing Rorty and the neo-pragmatists. If Rorty's Protagoras is a cleaned-up foil, then that's what he is.
All he's saying, Gene, is what Oakeshott has said about Plato: "shadows are not forgeries"
Current - all I can say is you're clearly inferring things that I am not. If I am misreading him then I agree more with you. You have not convinced me I'm misreading him.
ReplyDeletePart of the problem in these kind of discussions is the idea of "advancing the argument" and saying "things that are useful".
ReplyDeleteI think quite a lot of this comes from physical sciences. I'm an engineer and I think Gene is a computer programmer, so we've both encountered this sort of thing. It doesn't really mean what Rorty and co think is means.
Let's say I'm describing a simple oscillator. I could say "We can think of this as composed of a perfect negative resistor in series with a perfect capacitor and a perfect inductor". I can then derive and equation to describe the oscillator which is "useful", and "advances my argument". I can then say how perfect capacitors and inductors don't exist, and how negative resistors certainly don't exist. Then I propose a refinement of the circuit using a transistor circuit instead of a "negative resistance". Further refinements are possible, ad infinitum.
This explanatory strategy doesn't mean that we can stop at statements being useful. We have to reach an end conclusion about how we think those statements relate to nature. It's quite permissible (according to we "Platoists") to stop at the first model and say "this is as far as I've got, it doesn't describe everything". But what we would condemn is not admitting that.
When we say "useful" we normally mean "useful for preliminary explanation". That doesn't mean that it's useful to "humanity" or "scientific progress" or even self-interest, or even "useful to not give the full explanation". We mean it's useful to not give the full explanation *yet*. It also doesn't mean that we "platoists" intend to publish papers that say things we don't think are true because they are useful.
re: "It's quite permissible (according to we "Platoists") to stop at the first model and say "this is as far as I've got, it doesn't describe everything". But what we would condemn is not admitting that."
ReplyDeleteThen I really don't know what your concern is. This is all I've ever known Rorty to say. What he adds is a condemnation of the idea that we can ever be in a position where we don't have to admit that.
Anyway - like I said - you're inferring a very strange sort of relativism which I don't think is wrong. If you're right on that inference (and I don't think you're reading it right), it doesn't take an engineer to see the problems with that view (I'm not sure what the engineering background was meant to bring to the table anyway).
ReplyDeleteThen I really don't know what your concern is. This is all I've ever known Rorty to say. What he adds is a condemnation of the idea that we can ever be in a position where we don't have to admit that.
I think it's a bit more tricky than that. If you have no evidence that your model is wrong in any case then you can't be sure that it is. Caveats are only appropriate if you already have contradictory evidence. Everyone know if you don't that it's very likely to come up in the future, there's no need to say that.
You seem to be claiming that Rorty is very close to agreeing with what I've said here. I don't agree with you here, because my view is quite close to those that Rorty is attacking in the article you link to, that is to Sokal and co's view.
In these debates nobody is saying that scientists can directly observe nature in simple way. Nobody is saying that final answers to wide-ranging scientific questions are possible at this time in history. Everyone accepts that there are sequences of theories that attempt to describe nature, some better and some worse. (I don't understand what Rorty thinks the difference is between "nature" and "objective reality").
The real argument is about whether it's necessary to go further than that in a relativist direction. That's what Rorty is trying to do here, by abandoning "objective reality". He's arguing that "the objective" should mean "the agreed-upon upshot of argument", which is totally different from what I've written above.
I used an engineering example because you once talked about your maths professor calling things "useful", and because it avoids the trouble of disagreeing about some theory of economics.
Rorty is quite right that the "Science Wars" of the 90s were overblown at times.
No that's not what he's trying to do Current. I wouldn't press this point so hard if it weren't for the fact that he and Kuhn have both on numerous cases pointed out emphatically that they are not pushing things in a relativist direction. If you want to tell them they think something other than they claim to think, be my guest but understand that's what you're proposing.
ReplyDeleteGene,
ReplyDeleteI just want to note that the life of the polis and Hellenic life generally went on for hundreds of years following invasion of Philip; and of course, Greece heavily influenced the Empire that would eventually conquer it - namely the Romans. To write off the Greeks following the Peloponnesian War is I think wrong, though it is generally what was done for a long time in the historiography. Instead following the invasion you have a flowering and expansion of Hellenistic culture - this is illustrated in the creation of the most famous version of the Argonautica by Apollonius (which went on to influence Virgil). This is only one example of the gifts which the Hellenistic world in the centuries following Macedonian invasion granted the larger world.
Rorty can claim he isn't a relativist all he likes, he's still supporting relativist ideas.
ReplyDeleteOK, well if we all agree relativism is not the way to go, I suppose that's all that needs to be said here.
ReplyDeleteThe common factor with Rorty is not that there isn't an constant simple fact to be researched - it's that pinning down such a simple fact is not an possible process. A pretense of justificationism is risky because it doesn't identify that. Rorty has said that his factor is not to dispute that there's no such element as fact so much as to dispute that the problem "what is true" (in the investment finance T, "objective reality" feeling of the word) is not an exciting or possible problem. 英文seo
ReplyDeleteIsn't that a bit of old news?saç ekimi öncesi ve sonrasi
ReplyDelete