Can there be anything sillier than trying to amass knowledge about knowledge? Methodology is one thing. You can talk about the way people go about trying to get what they think is knowledge. Trying to get knowledge about something is also OK. It might not be actual "knowledge" but at least it's not circular logic. There's some exchange between observation and your thoughts about what you observe.
But pursuing knowledge about knowledge itself? How would one know if one's got it? How can you even go about getting it if you don't know what knowledge is in the first place? How would you know about the quality of your knowledge of knowledge? Epistemology is an awfully silly endeavor, if you think about it.
But what do I know?
There's lots of philosophical literature on epistemology and modalities of knowledge that isn't "circular" logic. Methodology is the son of epistemology. You can't have an argument over methodology without grappling the epistemological questions that precede methodology.
ReplyDeleteIs empiricism the proper methodological channel to study economics? That requires a discussion on epistemology and the nature of knowledge as it relates to motivated actors in a world of uncertainty. That is an epistemological question that has relevance to how we even study economics - let alone which currently fashionable doctrine is correct or incorrect.
Hayek and Mises became famous for work they created by dipping their ankles into the epistemological problems of economics. Hayek's most famous essay that we study in grad and undergrad is The Use of Knowledge in Society, an essay examining the nature of knowledge as it relates to observable realities of price formation and information flows. That's epistemology in economics.
re: "Methodology is the son of epistemology. You can't have an argument over methodology without grappling the epistemological questions that precede methodology."
DeleteThat's nonsense. You don't have to grapple with epistemology any more than I have to grapple with sub-atomic physics before I do economics. Methodologists can do exactly what I do with physics: (1.) make uninformed assumptions about the nature of reality, (2.) wave my hands, (3.) ignore the nature of reality, (4.) don't fix what ain't broke (in other words, if #1, #2, and #3 don't seem to give me problems I don't worry about it).
re: "Is empiricism the proper methodological channel to study economics? That requires a discussion on epistemology and the nature of knowledge as it relates to motivated actors in a world of uncertainty."
Seems like a methodological question rather than an epistemological question to me.
re: "Hayek's most famous essay that we study in grad and undergrad is The Use of Knowledge in Society, an essay examining the nature of knowledge as it relates to observable realities of price formation and information flows."
That essay doesn't study "knowledge" in the way that epistemologists do, though. It doesn't explore what knowledge is or what constitutes it. I'd have to reread it to make sure this is true in all cases, but it probably could just as easily have been titled "The Uses of Belief in Society" or "The Uses of Opinion in Society", which are clearly not epistemological questions.
Just because the title has the word "knowledge" in it doesn't mean we're talking about the same sort of problems.
Hayek concerns himself with the stuff whizzing around in our brains.
Epistemology doesn't take for granted that the stuff whizzing around in our brains is "knowledge".
Hayek is relevant for economics. I have my doubts that epistemology is.
"You can't have an argument over methodology without grappling the epistemological questions that precede methodology."
DeleteThat's just not so. The methods of physics were well worked out without physicists really having any clue about how to epistemologically justify what they were doing. (I'm not anti-epistemology, by the way, I just don't think you need it to improve your methods in a science.)
I really wish philosophy came easier to you.
DeleteThe whole purpose of studying epistemology is to make more correct methodologies of study. We want to know how it is that we know things, the proper course of how to arrive at knowledge, and even what is knowledge (for instance, the "justified true belief" argument").
Naturally, there are many ways to study many subjects. History and language are not studied the same way as biology or astronomy. Why is there a different methodology for studying history as opposed to biology? For various methodological reasons pertaining to human events versus inanimate cell organelles, this is the case. But to understand these reasons one must incorporate an epistemological perspective.
(in other words, if #1, #2, and #3 don't seem to give me problems I don't worry about it).
You've always had this strange disassociation and reluctance to improve the methodological practice of economics in any way I can tell. Every conversation we've had with this topic generates some "hey its good enough" or "lets not nitpick" or "dont fix what aint broke" mentality. I don't understand it. In ANY science, it seems pretty damn important to me to know exactly why you know what you know. Scientific "certainty" is predicated on falsifiability and it's just intuitive to me that a truly scientific discipline should include questions of epistemology and metaphysics (In economics, what is utility? In law, what is an agent? In physics, what are the fundamental conditions necessary for observation?). You do yourself a disservice by this constant hand-waving. If you don't agree with the weirdos who think apriorism should rule, then argue it specifically and help us see where we got so wrong. Don't just dismiss all these concerns as silly, irrelevant chatter.
I'd have to reread it to make sure this is true in all cases, but it probably could just as easily have been titled "The Uses of Belief in Society" or "The Uses of Opinion in Society", which are clearly not epistemological questions.
That's demonstrably not true. Maybe you ought to reread it if that's what you took from it. It's an essay exploring the transmission of knowledge between agents and (here's the economics) how that connects to markets and price systems. There's lots of interesting things Hayek writes in there about non-reductive, subjective information that can be analyzed with a philosophy of mind lens. Mises does this too, especially when he writes on determinism and free will. I think we stand to lose a lot by shunting profound questions about the nature of our knowledge. It's not like we're adopting a medieval practice or anything.
That's just not so. The methods of physics were well worked out without physicists really having any clue about how to epistemologically justify what they were doing. (I'm not anti-epistemology, by the way, I just don't think you need it to improve your methods in a science.)
DeleteOkay, you're right.
I dont know, I think that its perfectly fine to study the various methods that we obtain information knowledge, even those that may be less reliable. I did not fully appreciate philosophy until I contrasted methodological approaches in science. It gets a little messy when we add in "faith" or "beliefs". I think that Epistemology is very relevant to economics- but I think I understand your concerns.
ReplyDeleteI would add that we might get to a point where "philosophers" have to acquire a high level of expertise in each field to be able to argue and contrast the approaches.. that may not be possible now (too much to "know")
Physicists are weenies, I think there are so many variables and level of analysis involved in human behavior, economics and so forth that physics is "easy" in that you can isolate variables in a way that you cant with people. Thats my two cents anyway.
I agree though - you dont have to understand epistimology to do research in your field. But understanding how other fields conduct research or "do science" makes you cooler.
ReplyDeleteim partially ribbing physicists btw
ReplyDeleteugh.. I would modify my first comment.. epistemology "can" be relevant.. as you say though you dont "have" to know epistemology. Sorry. This topic requires a bit of unpacking I think. I will let you respond :)
ReplyDelete"But pursuing knowledge about knowledge itself? How would one know if one's got it? How can you even go about getting it if you don't know what knowledge is in the first place? How would you know about the quality of your knowledge of knowledge? Epistemology is an awfully silly endeavor, if you think about it."
ReplyDeleteBut we disagree about what constitutes knowledge. So isn't the discussion about what knowledge is relevant?
Daniel, get this, there are apparently idiots out there writing books on grammar. I mean, how could you read a book about proper grammar, if you didn't already know it? The book would be gibberish to you, right?
ReplyDeleteBut grammar is like math. We can make that stuff up, make up rules out of it, and get something from it.
DeleteMetaphysics, epistemology, all that "what is really real" or "what is truth" stuff seems silly to me.
Gene has taken to calling me a materialist. Maybe. I'm not sure how you can have different options for this sort of thing. What is is. If there "is" something beyond the tangible that I can't get my head around then that "is" too. If materialist just means "tangible-ist" I don't have warrant to claim that.
All this plumbing the depths of reality stuff just seems like arguing over something we almost definitionally can't have access to (or if we did have access to it we wouldn't know we did).
Like arguing about how many leprechauns can dance on the head of a thumb-tack.
"Gene has taken to calling me a materialist"
DeleteThat's not so. I write posts about materialists sometimes, and in response to one of them *you* said "I guess I am a materialist."
Gene, I don't know why you keep trying to argue with someone who is just an ape with a keyboard.
DeleteDaniel wrote:
DeleteBut grammar is like math. We can make that stuff up, make up rules out of it, and get something from it.
These are epistemological claims--at least one of which is misleading.
Gene - I believe you've referred to me as that on one of Bob's posts, but I could be wrong. There was some adjective in front of "materialist" in one of your posts that I thought I could associate with.
Deletethis is a great topic daniel, but i think that you havent elaborated enough about what you object to. define wbat you mean by methology vs epistimology (sorry typing on iphone). i do think you are missing the point of the field, but we need to drill down more. would you agree that the study of how one pursues knowledge is important? ill post more tomorrow as well
ReplyDeletemath is a highly internally consistent language of logic. its a scaffold of logic. ( its not actually the language OF nature as some say.. its a system of logic we used to understand the world). its language we use to talk to each other.
ReplyDeletei think you are misusing/misunderstanding what "knowledge about knowledge" means. i woul suggests its more about the various methods we acquire knowledge, and knowing about the various ways one can research truth makes use better researchers in our own field
ReplyDeleteYeah, I think you're being rather too cavalier here, Daniel. I don't see why knowledge about knowledge is problematic... you seem to imply that its self-referentiality implies a vicious circle. I'm not sure why this needs to be the case.
ReplyDeleteWould "knowledge about knowing" be better? Or with more precedent - "thought thinking itself"? ...or the "being for whom Being is an issue"?
I don't see how one can so much as have self-consciousness and fail to do epistemology.
That said, one could still argue with the touched up xkcd... epistemology doesn't give you a store of knowledge from which the knowledge of other sciences follow. Kant's distinction between having a "canon" of pure reason and an "organon" of pure reason may be relevant here. What epistemology probably gives us is a canon for our faculties of thought rather than an organon of an extended set of knowledge.
DeleteI'm agreeing with you a lot today, Evan.
Delete"What epistemology probably gives us is a canon for our faculties of thought rather than an organon of an extended set of knowledge."
DeleteEpistemology does not give us an extended set of knowledge.
Yes, I certainly agree with that.
"I don't see how one can so much as have self-consciousness and fail to do epistemology."
We all have implicit assumptions that we work off of that one could call epistemological and metaphysical assumptions. I'm not sure you can say that means we're doing epistemology or metaphysics.
But these assumptions need to be an explicit part of your science. Lay them out on the table so we can challenge and refine them.
DeleteBut Mattheus, then you wouldn't be doing science anymore. You'd be philosophizing about something we probably can't get an answer to anyway.
DeleteYou can understand, I hope, why people who want to do science would not be interested in that. And it's not just a matter of interest - it doesn't seem productive or important or likely to provide any kind of result.
Now - if you make it relevant by showing why changing certain implicit metaphysical or epistemological assumptions might give us a better explanation for the phenomena we're interested in, then we'd have something to talk about.
To a philosopher these questions may have their own merits. Just talking about them may be all a philosopher wants or needs. To a scientist it seems like you need to demonstrate a little further why we should care that you have a different epistemology or metaphysics.
So far, Evan's comments are the ones with which I most agree:
Delete(A) I think he's right that the self-referential aspect here, has no oomph to it.
(B) I also think he's right that the person who added the philosopher holding up the whole spectrum, is being too flattering to the epistemologists.
The self-referentialism isn't the problem so much as the foundationalism, which is why I thought your "writing a grammar book" analogy fell pretty flat.
DeleteWe have a foundation for grammar: we make it up and that's what it is.
What foundation we have for true knowledge? None that I can think of. So how do we really have knowledge about knowledge?
epistemology is looking for nice ways to say that something said or written is bullshit
ReplyDeleteModern philosophy's obsession with epistemology grew out of the Age of Discovery and a whole lot of stuff turning up that either did not fit in with, or contradicted, the Scholastic edifice. So the notion that we had some direct connection to the structure of the universe (the form in the world = the form in your mind) fell by the wayside and philosophers kept trying to work out how we can know anything at all, what as the foundations of our knowledge. It has not proved to be a successful project. (One way at looking at postmodernism is it is when epistemology swallows metaphysics.)
ReplyDeleteIt does seem reasonable to say we have knowledge. So, the question becomes, what can we say about us having knowledge? What is the basis for us saying we have knowledge? If we keep the conversation about whether x is the case, that seems broadly fine. We have lots of broadly successful knowledge-finding mechanisms. But the search for foundations of knowledge; no, not notably successful. Which does raise legitimate questions about whether it is a sensible question in the first place.
In economics it's certainly acceptable to do epistemology -- a non-circular definition might be "thinking about knowledge". In fact I think that much more epistemological discussion should take place. Why? So much of what passes for economic knowledge has turned out to be questionable, largely as a result of the global economic crisis. Many economists are beginning to understand the difficulties with the knowledge that the mainstream of the discipline has produced (the prominent economists who've partially or fully recanted include Stiglitz, Krugman, DeLong, Wolf, Buiter, etc. etc.) It seems sensible to do things like thinking about how we achieved our knowledge and how to make the process of knowledge-generation better in future. This is part of healthy scientific endeavour. We should do much more methodology, too.
ReplyDelete