Posts
Regression to the mean
3 months ago
Saturday, January 15, 2011
Tyler Cowen is better than this...
He asks "when will people move away from pure AD theories of unemployment?", and my response is much like [Mayor] Bill Woolsey's: "who has a pure AD theory of unemployment?" (emphasis his, but I concur). Nothing will get me to discount the value of your criticism faster than saying something like "all you ever talk about is deficient demand, and you don't even explain that".
Friday, January 14, 2011
John Taylor on Unemployment
My opinion of John Taylor has cratered since I began following his blog. This post is another travesty. The data are fine. The interpretation is atrocious.
Thursday, January 13, 2011
The Explicit as the Enemy of the Meaningful
I was first introduced to Gogol Bordello several years ago on a road trip to Boston. It would have been shortly after graduating from college - 2006 or 2007. I was driving Kate and a friend of ours up to a wedding, and our friend put on the unforgettable Start Wearing Purple, and it continued from there. Great stuff - not the sort of thing I listen to every day, but really great stuff.
Gogol Bordello has a strong underlying social message. It's very clear they've got gypsy/immigrant sympathies and a general affinity for the dispossessed. They also reject stodgy decorum and embrace a more "wanderlust" approach to life. OK - great. Good stuff all around - and different stuff. And simply entertaining stuff.
I searched for them on YouTube recently - hadn't listened to them in a while - and turned this new song up:
Gogol Bordello has a strong underlying social message. It's very clear they've got gypsy/immigrant sympathies and a general affinity for the dispossessed. They also reject stodgy decorum and embrace a more "wanderlust" approach to life. OK - great. Good stuff all around - and different stuff. And simply entertaining stuff.
I searched for them on YouTube recently - hadn't listened to them in a while - and turned this new song up:
What an incredible disappointment. The edge and the weirdness is completely gone. But worst of all, everything that just kind of floated around as subtext was made painfully explicit. We knew you sympathized with the immigrant experience - and not just sympathized with, but championed and flaunted the immigrant experience. Was this really necessary? Silhouettes of the countries of origin of a bunch of music video characters? Lyrics that basically lay everything out that everybody got loud and clear before. I don't know, there's something in how explicit this is that makes it a lot less genuine.
Anyone can express a thought explicitly. There are two ways to really distinguish yourself when you express a thought. You either:
1. Make the thought explicit and analytically deep: contribute a really significant original idea and contribute it explicitly. This is the goal of quality non-fiction. Or, you,
2. Express or critique a possibly common thought or feeling in a subtle, implicit, or unexpected way. This is art.
Gogol Bordello used to produce good art. Now - at least with this song - they took a pretty basic message and made it ridiculously explicit. And for some reason I'm finding that very disappointing. Spelling it out to your audience dilutes your message.
Two things I've been Meaning to Post On
1. Arnold Kling and Technological Unemployment
I've warmed to Arnold Kling more recently because he's had a series of interesting posts on technological unemployment, even to the point of constructing a model. Previously, Kling has talked more in terms of what might be called "mismatch". The refrain from a lot of Keynesians has been "yes, mismatch happens all the time but that doesn't do much to explain spikes in unemployment". Kling has started to push basic mismatch ideas (which he's oddly been discussing as if they were novel) to think about why a creative destruction/mismatch scenario might result in depression conditions. He's achieved this by moving from mismatch to overproductionism and technological unemployment (and he's called it that explicitly). Here's one incredible line from him:
"I wonder if the real public policy issue is not restoring full employment but coming up with a fair distribution of leisure. That is because with high levels of productivity, it is arithmetically possible to sustain a high ratio of dependents to workers. However, this is not easy to come to terms with politically. The dependents may suffer from low self-esteem. The workers may feel resentment. I would expect that advances in productivity will increase leisure."
This sounds very familiar. This is Keynes (1930), Bertrand Russell, Samuel Chase - H.P. Lovecraft for that matter! - and any number of other overproductionists in the 1930s. Kling's posts are here, here, here, here.
I wish I had more to say than that, but I don't at this point. I just think people underappreciate (1.) the value of overproductionist thought, (2.) the role of overproductionism as a precursor to Keynesianism, and (3.) that we've been here before. Does Kling know he's advancing perhaps the single most popular explanation of the Great Depression? I don't know.
2. Tyler Cowen and Michel Foucault
Tyler Cowen has had two interesting posts on Foucault, although he generally downplays the value of Foucault. He doubts that he will even be much read fifty years from now. Still, I've always been intrigued by Foucault and simply interested in learning more. He talks about power relations in a way that is very similar to how Dewey talks about coercion - and Dewey has influenced me on this point, which understandably makes me wonder if I oughta get more familiar with Foucault. Occassionally when I mention Dewey on here I mention Foucault too.
In his second post, Cowen talks about Foucault and methodological individualism. In this post he also talks about the macrofoundations of microeconomics - something I am a strong proponent of as well.
Anyway, Cowen's post inspired me to read up on some Foucault. Here is a fascinating discussion of the mercantilist view of money in The Order of Things:
"The usual attitude towards what it has been agreed to call 'mercantilism' is doubly unjust: either it is denounced for comprising a notion it continually criticized (the intrinsic value of precious metal as the principle of wealth), or it is revealed as a series of immediate contradictions: it is accused of defining money in its pure function as a sign while insisting upon its accumulation as a commodity; of recognizing the importance of quantitative fluctuations in specie, while misunderstanding their action upon prices; of being protectionist while basing its mechanism for the increase of wealth upon exchange. In fact, these contradictions or hesitations exist only if one confronts mercantilism with a dilemma that could have no meaning for it: that of money as commodity or as sign. For Classical thought in its formative phase, money is that which permits wealth to be represented. Without such signs, wealth would remain immobile, useless, and as it were silent; in this sense, gold and silver are the creators of all that man can covet. But in order to play this role as representation, money must offer properties (physical and not economic ones) that render it adequate to its task, and in consequence precious. It is in its quality as a universal sign that it becomes a rare and unequally distributed commodity: 'The rate and value imposed upon all money is its true intrinsic goodness'. Just as in the order of representations the signs that replace and analyse them must also be representations themselves, so money cannot signify wealth without itself being wealth. But it becomes wealth because it is a sign; whereas a representation must first be represented in order subsequently to become a sign. Hence the apparent contradictions between the principles of accumulation and the rules of circulation."
Foucault understood what the mercantilists had right and classical economics had wrong, and he put it beautifully. To be honest, this surprised and impressed me.
I've warmed to Arnold Kling more recently because he's had a series of interesting posts on technological unemployment, even to the point of constructing a model. Previously, Kling has talked more in terms of what might be called "mismatch". The refrain from a lot of Keynesians has been "yes, mismatch happens all the time but that doesn't do much to explain spikes in unemployment". Kling has started to push basic mismatch ideas (which he's oddly been discussing as if they were novel) to think about why a creative destruction/mismatch scenario might result in depression conditions. He's achieved this by moving from mismatch to overproductionism and technological unemployment (and he's called it that explicitly). Here's one incredible line from him:
"I wonder if the real public policy issue is not restoring full employment but coming up with a fair distribution of leisure. That is because with high levels of productivity, it is arithmetically possible to sustain a high ratio of dependents to workers. However, this is not easy to come to terms with politically. The dependents may suffer from low self-esteem. The workers may feel resentment. I would expect that advances in productivity will increase leisure."
This sounds very familiar. This is Keynes (1930), Bertrand Russell, Samuel Chase - H.P. Lovecraft for that matter! - and any number of other overproductionists in the 1930s. Kling's posts are here, here, here, here.
I wish I had more to say than that, but I don't at this point. I just think people underappreciate (1.) the value of overproductionist thought, (2.) the role of overproductionism as a precursor to Keynesianism, and (3.) that we've been here before. Does Kling know he's advancing perhaps the single most popular explanation of the Great Depression? I don't know.
*****
2. Tyler Cowen and Michel Foucault
Tyler Cowen has had two interesting posts on Foucault, although he generally downplays the value of Foucault. He doubts that he will even be much read fifty years from now. Still, I've always been intrigued by Foucault and simply interested in learning more. He talks about power relations in a way that is very similar to how Dewey talks about coercion - and Dewey has influenced me on this point, which understandably makes me wonder if I oughta get more familiar with Foucault. Occassionally when I mention Dewey on here I mention Foucault too.
In his second post, Cowen talks about Foucault and methodological individualism. In this post he also talks about the macrofoundations of microeconomics - something I am a strong proponent of as well.
Anyway, Cowen's post inspired me to read up on some Foucault. Here is a fascinating discussion of the mercantilist view of money in The Order of Things:
"The usual attitude towards what it has been agreed to call 'mercantilism' is doubly unjust: either it is denounced for comprising a notion it continually criticized (the intrinsic value of precious metal as the principle of wealth), or it is revealed as a series of immediate contradictions: it is accused of defining money in its pure function as a sign while insisting upon its accumulation as a commodity; of recognizing the importance of quantitative fluctuations in specie, while misunderstanding their action upon prices; of being protectionist while basing its mechanism for the increase of wealth upon exchange. In fact, these contradictions or hesitations exist only if one confronts mercantilism with a dilemma that could have no meaning for it: that of money as commodity or as sign. For Classical thought in its formative phase, money is that which permits wealth to be represented. Without such signs, wealth would remain immobile, useless, and as it were silent; in this sense, gold and silver are the creators of all that man can covet. But in order to play this role as representation, money must offer properties (physical and not economic ones) that render it adequate to its task, and in consequence precious. It is in its quality as a universal sign that it becomes a rare and unequally distributed commodity: 'The rate and value imposed upon all money is its true intrinsic goodness'. Just as in the order of representations the signs that replace and analyse them must also be representations themselves, so money cannot signify wealth without itself being wealth. But it becomes wealth because it is a sign; whereas a representation must first be represented in order subsequently to become a sign. Hence the apparent contradictions between the principles of accumulation and the rules of circulation."Foucault understood what the mercantilists had right and classical economics had wrong, and he put it beautifully. To be honest, this surprised and impressed me.
Stewart and Pawlenty
"My premise is that the right is very upset about a slip into tyranny and socialism... It's not that they're angrier than they [leftist during Bush administration] were before. It's that their particular complaint seems specious"
I don't know why this is so hard for people to get when we raise concerns about the "rhetoric".
| The Daily Show With Jon Stewart | Mon - Thurs 11p / 10c | |||
| Exclusive - Tim Pawlenty Extended Interview | ||||
| ||||
Pawlenty cites the "tension" between libery, equality, and efficiency which has been expressed by a lot of people in a lot of different ways. The mere ability to mention these three things as acceptable goals is in itself fantastic to hear. Unfortunately, I don't think these three things are as distinct as Pawlenty seems to think they are (which is precisely why it's so dangerous to express the liberal tradition as if they are distinct or even opposing).
One of the other things I like that Jon Stewart says (around 14:00) is "It seems like in the conservative movement its all about protecting liberty and freedom, which is I think admirable, but I think what they always seem to say is that more government always means less liberty, and I would just disagree with that. I guess what I'm saying is everything is situational and up for grabs and these sort of more dogmatic ideologies tend to get in the way of solving real problems because they tend to be very rigid."
There is this constant assumption that "government" as a social institution is somehow alien or artificial. That allows for a very convenient rhetorical juxtaposition between "government" and "society". I'm not sure what the origin of this idea is, but I agree with Stewart that it's simply wrong. I once again go back to what my great-grandad said when he presided over the Maryland constitutional convention in 1968:
"The most immediate threat to the welfare of the citizens of Maryland in the present age arises not from excessive power in their state government, but from a lack of power which prevents their state government from acting effectively... it must be recognized that... oppression can result as much from governmentalinaction, as it can from governmental action. "
Anyway - the video is very good. Stewart has a groupie-fan-following that I think makes it easy to dismiss praise of his insights - but he truly is an insightful guy. I can think of very few traditional commenters that contribute anywhere near the value-added that he does.
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Wendy Kaminer on "Freedom for Speech We Fear and Freedom to Fear It"
Ever since the shooting I've been struggling with how to express the fact that we oughta talk about violent rhetoric without people getting up in arms thinking I'm suggesting the rhetoric is causal. So far, it feels like I've missed the mark (or perhaps I've been fine and they've just been hyper-sensitive). The closest to my views I've seen out there are Andrew Sullivan and Jon Stewart - not that surprising, as they usually have sensible commentary.
This one perhaps comes the closest yet - it's Wendy Kaminer at the Atlantic:
"In the past few days, I've been asked repeatedly how a liberal free speech advocate reacts to the debate about violent, extremist far-right rhetoric. At first, I instinctively engage in self-censorship, having learned over the years that you cannot criticize inflammatory speech, or worry publicly about its possible consequences, without unintentionally lending support to censorship campaigns. You can't speculate about the possible anti-social effects of anti-social speech without being applauded or condemned for drawing a straight line from violent rhetoric to violent action (which I do not do) and endorsing legal limits on insurrectionary rhetoric (which I vehemently oppose). As a practical political matter, it's very difficult, practically impossible, to question the merits of speech without lending credence to proposals prohibiting it. Still, it's worth noting that news of the shooting left many of us shocked but not surprised, and also worth asking why.
Ma Nishtana. Why is this moment in our political history (and I hope it's only a moment) different from so many others? There was violent, right-wing extremism in the '90s (reflected in the Oklahoma City bombing) but it hadn't yet been mainstreamed. The radical left indulged in comparably extremist rhetoric as well as actual violence in the 1960s, but, while it helped shape popular political movements, left-wing extremism in the '60s did not take possession of the Democratic Party. Indeed, Hubert Humphrey went down in the 1968 election partly because he stood side by side with Chicago Mayor Richard Daley while police split the heads of protesters outside. Today, the Republican Party is driving under the influence of extremism: some fear offending the base, which others represent. As many have pointed out, Fox News, Limbaugh and other talk radio demagogues have mainstreamed rhetoric that used to prevail mostly on the fringe.
This doesn't mean that we can directly link violent rhetoric to violent action, or that we should restrict speech in the hope of restricting action. Laws against inciting violence should be very narrowly drawn, as the Supreme Court ruled in 1969: Speech is actionable as incitement when it is intended to cause imminent violence and is likely to succeed in doing so. Virtually none of the violent, insurrectionary, right-wing rhetoric I've heard would or should be actionable under this standard. You have a fundamental right to exhort people at a political rally to water the tree of liberty, even if they're legally bearing arms. What you lack is the right to exhort a mob over which you have some influence to engage in a riot, right now.
But I reserve the right to worry about the possible, indirect effects of speech that I recognize and vigorously defend as constitutionally protected. This is the right that conservative libertarian Glenn Reynolds would unselfconsciously condemn me for exercising -- a right at the core of a commitment to free speech. In his view, when I criticize right-wing rhetoric I am either directly blaming it for violent action or simply trying to score cheap political points. There are apparently no other explanations or justifications for any political critiques of political rhetoric. Excoriating us for expressing concerns about arguably inflammatory speech, Reynolds implicitly derides the fundamental libertarian tenet of freedom for speech you disdain. He effectively demands that we extend the freedom at the expense of expressing the disdain.
No thanks. I worry about the effects of far-right rhetoric today, partly because it's often utterly irrational and fact free. It should not be presumed to incite violence, but it can plausibly be blamed for inciting idiocy; and we live in dangerously idiotic, dysfunctionally anxious times. Demagoguery is legal but not admirable or necessarily harmless, especially in the context of profound economic dislocation, a nasty battle over immigration, a pervasive subtext of fear stirred up by a repressive war on terror, and an aggressive, politically powerful pro-gun movement that has succeeded in legalizing the easy availability and public display of automatic weapons. Moreover, this movement has long projected a revolutionary self-image, demanding unmitigated firearm freedoms in the interests of a natural right and obligation to resist government tyranny, as well as a right of self-defense against crime. If only gun rights advocates and other right wing activists would resist the real bipartisan threats and acts of tyranny that comprise the bipartisan war on terror.
Their opponents on the left, liberals and moderate Democrats contemplating the awful state of our union in the wake of the Arizona shooting, should consider how the repressive post 9/11 shadow government created by Bush and extended by Obama greatly complicates efforts to control the availability of firearms, much less protect against actual threats of violence. (Read Glenn Greenwald's account of the dangers posed to citizens by our government.) In theory for example, it's hard to oppose laws that would restrict the availability of automatic weapons to the mentally ill. In fact, given the unaccountable dictatorial powers exercised by the federal government, it's hard not to worry that laws depriving people of rights if they're labeled mentally ill would not be used against whistleblowers and other dissidents targeted by the security state.
I'll defend the First (and Second) Amendments freedoms enjoyed by Beck, Palin, and other right-wing firebrands. Why won't they defend the freedom to engage in peaceful political advocacy that the Supreme Court recently denied to human rights activists, in Holder v Humanitarian Law Project? Ironically, it's the right-wing Supreme Court -- not left-wing critics of the Tea Party -- that has legalized and constitutionalized the criminalization of political rhetoric."
This one perhaps comes the closest yet - it's Wendy Kaminer at the Atlantic:
"In the past few days, I've been asked repeatedly how a liberal free speech advocate reacts to the debate about violent, extremist far-right rhetoric. At first, I instinctively engage in self-censorship, having learned over the years that you cannot criticize inflammatory speech, or worry publicly about its possible consequences, without unintentionally lending support to censorship campaigns. You can't speculate about the possible anti-social effects of anti-social speech without being applauded or condemned for drawing a straight line from violent rhetoric to violent action (which I do not do) and endorsing legal limits on insurrectionary rhetoric (which I vehemently oppose). As a practical political matter, it's very difficult, practically impossible, to question the merits of speech without lending credence to proposals prohibiting it. Still, it's worth noting that news of the shooting left many of us shocked but not surprised, and also worth asking why.
Ma Nishtana. Why is this moment in our political history (and I hope it's only a moment) different from so many others? There was violent, right-wing extremism in the '90s (reflected in the Oklahoma City bombing) but it hadn't yet been mainstreamed. The radical left indulged in comparably extremist rhetoric as well as actual violence in the 1960s, but, while it helped shape popular political movements, left-wing extremism in the '60s did not take possession of the Democratic Party. Indeed, Hubert Humphrey went down in the 1968 election partly because he stood side by side with Chicago Mayor Richard Daley while police split the heads of protesters outside. Today, the Republican Party is driving under the influence of extremism: some fear offending the base, which others represent. As many have pointed out, Fox News, Limbaugh and other talk radio demagogues have mainstreamed rhetoric that used to prevail mostly on the fringe.
This doesn't mean that we can directly link violent rhetoric to violent action, or that we should restrict speech in the hope of restricting action. Laws against inciting violence should be very narrowly drawn, as the Supreme Court ruled in 1969: Speech is actionable as incitement when it is intended to cause imminent violence and is likely to succeed in doing so. Virtually none of the violent, insurrectionary, right-wing rhetoric I've heard would or should be actionable under this standard. You have a fundamental right to exhort people at a political rally to water the tree of liberty, even if they're legally bearing arms. What you lack is the right to exhort a mob over which you have some influence to engage in a riot, right now.
But I reserve the right to worry about the possible, indirect effects of speech that I recognize and vigorously defend as constitutionally protected. This is the right that conservative libertarian Glenn Reynolds would unselfconsciously condemn me for exercising -- a right at the core of a commitment to free speech. In his view, when I criticize right-wing rhetoric I am either directly blaming it for violent action or simply trying to score cheap political points. There are apparently no other explanations or justifications for any political critiques of political rhetoric. Excoriating us for expressing concerns about arguably inflammatory speech, Reynolds implicitly derides the fundamental libertarian tenet of freedom for speech you disdain. He effectively demands that we extend the freedom at the expense of expressing the disdain.
No thanks. I worry about the effects of far-right rhetoric today, partly because it's often utterly irrational and fact free. It should not be presumed to incite violence, but it can plausibly be blamed for inciting idiocy; and we live in dangerously idiotic, dysfunctionally anxious times. Demagoguery is legal but not admirable or necessarily harmless, especially in the context of profound economic dislocation, a nasty battle over immigration, a pervasive subtext of fear stirred up by a repressive war on terror, and an aggressive, politically powerful pro-gun movement that has succeeded in legalizing the easy availability and public display of automatic weapons. Moreover, this movement has long projected a revolutionary self-image, demanding unmitigated firearm freedoms in the interests of a natural right and obligation to resist government tyranny, as well as a right of self-defense against crime. If only gun rights advocates and other right wing activists would resist the real bipartisan threats and acts of tyranny that comprise the bipartisan war on terror.
Their opponents on the left, liberals and moderate Democrats contemplating the awful state of our union in the wake of the Arizona shooting, should consider how the repressive post 9/11 shadow government created by Bush and extended by Obama greatly complicates efforts to control the availability of firearms, much less protect against actual threats of violence. (Read Glenn Greenwald's account of the dangers posed to citizens by our government.) In theory for example, it's hard to oppose laws that would restrict the availability of automatic weapons to the mentally ill. In fact, given the unaccountable dictatorial powers exercised by the federal government, it's hard not to worry that laws depriving people of rights if they're labeled mentally ill would not be used against whistleblowers and other dissidents targeted by the security state.
I'll defend the First (and Second) Amendments freedoms enjoyed by Beck, Palin, and other right-wing firebrands. Why won't they defend the freedom to engage in peaceful political advocacy that the Supreme Court recently denied to human rights activists, in Holder v Humanitarian Law Project? Ironically, it's the right-wing Supreme Court -- not left-wing critics of the Tea Party -- that has legalized and constitutionalized the criminalization of political rhetoric."
And this was cool too...
... I'm putting off polishing off my final personal statements (all applications should be in by Friday!)
The world's oldest known winery was discovered in Armenia - 6,000 years old.
The world's oldest known winery was discovered in Armenia - 6,000 years old.
Hans Hoppe on the Economics of the Nazis, and a Couple Other Thoughts
I think a lot about the economics of the interwar period - usually of the early twenties. I'm working on a short comment right now on the Hoover administration, which has had me thinking more about the early Depression than usual. And then this morning my post about Mein Kampf got me thinking about the economics of Nazism.
There are a lot of interesting things to be said about economics and Nazism. A lot of drama and good history going on with the war debts and the havoc that that wreaked on monetary policy. The fundamentally Keynesian employment program of the Nazis raises stimulating questions. A third, more gruesome issue I've been interested in is the economic logic of the doctrine of Lebensraum to maintain the agrarian character of German society, and put off the concentration and proletarianization of the population. The analysis - as I understand it - is quite similar to Jefferson's attitude toward the western frontier. Obviously the execution and the racial beliefs underlying the Lebensraum idea are more macabre and offensive, but the logic - and the logic of overproductionism - is quite similar. Given the popularity of this sort of overproductionist thinking in the interwar period, I've always found that intriguing and have been a little curious about where Hitler derived those ideas.
Anyway, so I put a little thought into these ideas again, and came across this fascinating talk on Nazi economics by Hans Hoppe. He's impressively objective given his subject matter, and even draws a few parallels between Hitler's economics and Austrian economics. Enjoy the ever-intriguing (if no always embracable) Hans Hoppe*:
There are a lot of interesting things to be said about economics and Nazism. A lot of drama and good history going on with the war debts and the havoc that that wreaked on monetary policy. The fundamentally Keynesian employment program of the Nazis raises stimulating questions. A third, more gruesome issue I've been interested in is the economic logic of the doctrine of Lebensraum to maintain the agrarian character of German society, and put off the concentration and proletarianization of the population. The analysis - as I understand it - is quite similar to Jefferson's attitude toward the western frontier. Obviously the execution and the racial beliefs underlying the Lebensraum idea are more macabre and offensive, but the logic - and the logic of overproductionism - is quite similar. Given the popularity of this sort of overproductionist thinking in the interwar period, I've always found that intriguing and have been a little curious about where Hitler derived those ideas.
Anyway, so I put a little thought into these ideas again, and came across this fascinating talk on Nazi economics by Hans Hoppe. He's impressively objective given his subject matter, and even draws a few parallels between Hitler's economics and Austrian economics. Enjoy the ever-intriguing (if no always embracable) Hans Hoppe*:
*Jonathan has a critique of Hoppe's views on an entirely different issue here. I largely agree with him and have actually blogged about it in the past - see my comment on Jonathan's post for that link.
Three comments on comments
1. For some reason blogger has been identifying a lot of comments as spam recently. I'm trying to move those back into the comment threads. If your comment doesn't come up, you're not being censored - just let me know in another comment and I'll fix it as soon as possible. I think we've only deleted comments from a really nasty troll once on here.
2. A lot of anonymous posting too on here recently - please stop that. Identify yourself with a pseudonym at least. Them's the (laxly enforced) house rules.
3. Also a lot of one line dismissals - usually comments here are more of the substantive variety and less of the smack-down variety. It's not a rule or anything, but I usually like the quality of the commentary - let's try to keep it meaty.
2. A lot of anonymous posting too on here recently - please stop that. Identify yourself with a pseudonym at least. Them's the (laxly enforced) house rules.
3. Also a lot of one line dismissals - usually comments here are more of the substantive variety and less of the smack-down variety. It's not a rule or anything, but I usually like the quality of the commentary - let's try to keep it meaty.
What does it mean to own Mein Kampf?
So one of the things that's been interesting is to hear reactions to Loughner's reading list, particularly the Communist Manifesto and Mein Kampf duo. There have been some interesting reactions ranging from "those two don't make sense together" to "of course they do - they're all socialism so he's a left-winger".
I own the Communist Manifesto, all three volumes of Capital, and several other Marx and Engels volumes, as well as one old philosophical volume by Lenin that I picked up at a library book sale. Marxist books, for some reason, are pretty easy to own and buy, and nobody would see Marx on my shelf and assume I'm a communist (those who would assume that probably already thought I was a communist when they saw Keynes on my shelf... I keep my Keynes much more accessible and within arms reach than my Marx).
But Mein Kampf is different. People don't just have Mein Kampf lying around, you know? But that introduces a very interesting question - what would or should one think if they saw Mein Kampf sitting on someone's shelf? I think it would be somewhat surprising and something of a novelty, but I don't think most people would assume you're a closet neo-Nazi. There's kind of a weird taboo about that one, although it's never completely beyond the pale. And yet when we see it on Loughner's list, the assumption is he had it because he agreed with it. Is that true at all? Who knows. It's doubtful anyone will forcefully probe the issue.
I, for one, have been interested in buying Mein Kampf before from the bookstore, but I couldn't quite bring myself to getting it. I was especially interested in picking it up after reading Adam Tooze's book on the Nazi economy, but I never managed to get it to the checkout line. There's something weird about buying that book. And yet it offers a window into the mind of one of the most destructive and important figures of the twentieth century. It should be a book that people want to objectively devour, just like non-communists will familiarize themselves with Capital. I'm not sure there's anything else to say about the matter except that "Nazis are different".
Do any readers own Mein Kampf? Has anyone read any substantial portion of it? What about the Zweites Buch? How did you acquire it? Did you just waltz into the Barnes and Noble and unflinchingly bring it to the check-out?
I own the Communist Manifesto, all three volumes of Capital, and several other Marx and Engels volumes, as well as one old philosophical volume by Lenin that I picked up at a library book sale. Marxist books, for some reason, are pretty easy to own and buy, and nobody would see Marx on my shelf and assume I'm a communist (those who would assume that probably already thought I was a communist when they saw Keynes on my shelf... I keep my Keynes much more accessible and within arms reach than my Marx).
But Mein Kampf is different. People don't just have Mein Kampf lying around, you know? But that introduces a very interesting question - what would or should one think if they saw Mein Kampf sitting on someone's shelf? I think it would be somewhat surprising and something of a novelty, but I don't think most people would assume you're a closet neo-Nazi. There's kind of a weird taboo about that one, although it's never completely beyond the pale. And yet when we see it on Loughner's list, the assumption is he had it because he agreed with it. Is that true at all? Who knows. It's doubtful anyone will forcefully probe the issue.
I, for one, have been interested in buying Mein Kampf before from the bookstore, but I couldn't quite bring myself to getting it. I was especially interested in picking it up after reading Adam Tooze's book on the Nazi economy, but I never managed to get it to the checkout line. There's something weird about buying that book. And yet it offers a window into the mind of one of the most destructive and important figures of the twentieth century. It should be a book that people want to objectively devour, just like non-communists will familiarize themselves with Capital. I'm not sure there's anything else to say about the matter except that "Nazis are different".
Do any readers own Mein Kampf? Has anyone read any substantial portion of it? What about the Zweites Buch? How did you acquire it? Did you just waltz into the Barnes and Noble and unflinchingly bring it to the check-out?
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