Monday, September 14, 2009

Culture, costs, and one critique

I think Evan's post is largely on the mark. First I'd definitely agree with him that visionary reworking of an entire system is usually the wrong way to go about change. The system that we have now is an emergent result of the decisions of millions of households and communities. While systemic institutional change is always important, we need to recognize that change will ultimately rest on the decisions of individual households. Even if you have a great degree of faith in top down institutional change (which sometimes isn't entirely unwarranted), you can expect a great deal of social strife if we don't adjust our expectations of normal life in concert with those changes. Evan and I often critique blind adherence to the idea of atomized individualism on this blog. I think this is an important place to point out the situations where we think individualism is appropriate, and where individual and family level decisions not only are the fulcrum of change - they are also intimately tied to real change at the level of the community or the collective.

I'd also like to highlight one economic efficiency benefit of taking a cultural approach to food, rather than just a commodity approach. When economists worry about "sustainability", they're often primarily worried about what are called "externalities", which can be either positive or negative. An externality is a cost or benefit which because of property rights arrangements are not factored into a market price. For example, the trees of the rain forest may belong to someone who can sell them to farmers who cut them down so that cattle can graze. But some of the benefits of the rain forest accrue to everyone - not just the owner of the trees and land. For example, they help to clean carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere. This is a very real, valid benefit. If the owner of the trees were trading away his air quality alone, then we would expect the free market to provide him with the best possible tradeoff between the money he could get from selling the rain forest and the quality of the air he breaths. But the owner of the rain forest is also trading away other people's air quality, and he has no incentive to efficiently trade that because it's not a benefit he enjoys. In this situation, a private market would cut down too much rain forest to grow beef for McDonald's. The market, because of the imperfect structure of property rights, is inefficient.

What does this have to do with culture? When we take cultural considerations into account, we are by definition considering costs and benefits beyond our own individual costs and benefits. This is obviously no guarantee of a perfect solution either, but it does help to more efficiently arbitrate between private preferences and the costs and benefits impacting society as a whole. Market exchange enforces a culture of reductionism that works wonders in efficiently distributing the many products that have only private costs and benefits. But we are fooling ourselves if we think that commodification is thus a universally applicable way of understanding our world. "Culture", however amorphous, is another perfectly acceptable prism through which we can view the world - particularly when we are concerned with something like food, which enmeshes us in a broad community not just of other human beings, but other species, which are all affected by our decisions, and yet don't always have a say in those decisions.


I'll end on a critique, though. Despite my insistence that commodification isn't always appropriate, I'm not about to suggest (and I don't think Evan was either) that food isn't to a large extent a commodity or that markets aren't an appropriate way to distribute food. It's also important to point out that aesthetic primitivsm on the part of the well off is dangerous if it is promoted as an ethic for the entire world. I'm reminded of this point after hearing news of the death of Norman Borlaug: botanist, Nobel Prize winner, and driving force behind the so called "Green Revolution". Borlaug worked to genetically modify plants to increase their yields. He was also a proponent of the use of pesticides, so long as they weren't deleterious to human health, and criticized environmentalists that opposed all pesticides and genetic engineering on principle. In doing so, Norman Borlaug broke the back of much of human starvation and allowed economies to develop beyond their rudimentary agrarian bases. To put it simply, Borlaug made food production very cheap. Now, I don't know enough about his work to know if his advances contributed to the problems that Evan's book describes. But he highlights the danger of pursuing primitivism for primitivism's sake. It's great that more people want to eat organic vegetables grown on small plots, or free range chickens. That's wonderful. But six billion people cannot survive on that form of production. Perhaps the relatively well off can buy everything at a local farmer's market. But when the relatively well off think about the wider food culture they really need to consider the people that can't buy there. We need to consider the tradeoffs and compromises we're willing to make. Maybe genetic modification by cross breeding to feed India is OK, but changes at the genetic level are too dangerous to rush forward with (note to readers: we already have rushed forward with those sorts of changes - this is just a hypothetical). Maybe instead of taking up lots of land with a free range chicken farm we should just decide to not eat chicken, or eat it far more rarely. There are very real reasons why men like Borlaug launched the Green Revolution. This seemingly corporatist venture was launched out of compassion, not concern for profits. As chic as primitivism is today, the human race hasn't historically enjoyed it's experiences in the vice of the Malthusian dilemma - and many of the strongest proponents of primitivism are the ones that are the farthest removed from their ancestral peasantry. But ultimately, an informed cultural (rather than commodified) approach to food will recognize this. It will recognize that family farms are valuable to the community, but that ample food supply is too. Indeed, I think taking a bird's-eye, cultural approach to these questions is the only thing that can strike the appropriate balance.

Thursday, August 13, 2009

Populism, Banking, and Why I like Ben Bernanke

Political pundits will point fingers in all sorts of directions when it comes to the recession. Many Democrats will tell you Obama saved the day with forceful stimulus. Republicans, of course, will suggest that things look like they might be bottoming out despite the stimulus (we only spent a small percent of it, don't you know?) rather than because of it. I find this differential blame and credit interesting, since most economists cite someone entirely different for - if not ending the recession, at least preventing a second Great Depression (and before we're done this may still be considered a depression, just not a "great" one). That man is Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board since 2006. Jack Welch has even gone as far as calling Bernanke a "national hero" for what he's been up to since last summer.

I won't go into detail here about what Bernanke did that people are so impressed with. I'll leave it at this: he did the opposite of what conservative and liberal economists alike said turned the stock market crash of 1929 into the Great Depression of 1931/32 - he expanded the money supply considerably in the early stages of the crisis.

What I would rather talk about is who Bernanke is as a person, and why that's very important, given the historical reaction to "banking" and central banking in particular in the United States. Banks have been given a bad reputation by Federalists ("Banks have done more injury to the religion, morality, tranquility, prosperity, and even wealth of the nation than they can have done or ever will do good" - John Adams), Democratic-Republicans ("I believe that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies" - Thomas Jefferson), and Jacksonian Democrats ("The bank, Mr. Van Buren, is trying to kill me, but I will kill it" - Andrew Jackson). Over time, of course, many politicians eventually came around to the Hamiltonian conclusion that a national or central bank to manage the money supply wasn't necessarily a bad thing; that it could do a great deal of good. Even James Madison, a contemporary of Hamilton and early opponent of central banking and bankers in general, relented and gave us our second national bank. But the early - and broad - opposition of the founders to banking interests stuck.

Ever since then, populist sentiment in America has been intimately tied to a general opposition to banking. William Jennings Bryan (pictured right), perhaps the most famous populist leader, was outspoken in his opposition to a central bank. What is ironic about Bryan's opposition is that he was also a strong advocate of what we would now call "expansionary monetary policy". He historically declared to his opposition that "you will not crucify mankind on a cross of gold" - an electrifying denunciation of the gold standard and "tight money" in general, which prevented farmers and factory workers from getting access to credit.

This is what I find to be so ironic about the ebb and flow of populism in America, specifically with respect to the populist position on central banking. In Jefferson and Bryan's time, the concern was that bankers were too tight-fisted, and that creating a central bank to help finance government deficits would allow private insiders to profit off of taxpayers. Today, you have the opposite concern. The Ron Pauls of the world think the opposite is true - that the Fed is creating too much money. Granted, Ron Paul's libertarianism - while not exactly the corporatism that Bryan decried - is also a far cry from populism. But it is a populist movement in it's deliberate "us vs. them", anti-establishment, pro-common man mentality. The collective memory of stagflation in the 1970s made impoverishment-by-central-bank-manipulation fear a new staple of American populism, which is why it meshes so well with libertarianism today. It is in this sense that the seemingly paradoxical blending of populism and libertarianism, while not necessarily internally consistent, is highly functional at the level of the political movement. A populist that doesn't like foreign intervention and wants to legalize marijuana is going to find the most solace and organization among the Ron Paul community (Dennis Kucinich would also give them solace, but not as much organization).

Now back to the purported enemy - the bankers.

What I like about Ben Bernanke is that in every respect he seems to be a "regular guy" banker. Certainly much of that sentiment is supported by superficial (read "tenuous") evidence, but it's something that I still believe to be true. Whoever Ben Bernanke "really is" he's clearly no Robert Rubin or Hank Paulson flying in from Citigroup or Goldman Sachs. One thing that's been truly unique about Bernanke (I mean besides the growth rate of the Fed balance sheet under his tenure) is the extent to which he has reached out to the public. Fed watchers were shocked when he appeared for a prime-time interview for 60-minutes, something that is rarely done by sitting chairman (I believe it was only ever done once before). He didn't stop there, he's taken questions from undergraduate students at Morehouse College (the only all-male historically black institution), and held a town hall meeting of his own in Kansas City, taking questions not from economists, bankers, and Congressmen, but from self-identified small business owners and mothers. He often speaks of his own humble beginnings in a small South Carolina town, and how the house he grew up in is now in foreclosure. He is also very open about what he describes as his "disgust" over the necessity of rescuing large banks at the height of the crisis. Can you imagine Greenspan expressing "disgust" at that sort of thing?

To truly get a grasp on how different this is, you have to understand the extent to which the Fed chair is a banker's banker. His job is to lend money to the money-changers, to make sure they have enough funds to stay in business from day to day. The press hangs on the Fed's every word, and global markets shift in response. Statements released from the clandestine Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings are scrutinized like papal encyclicals. For example, after Wednesday, August 12th's meeting, reporters made headlines with the fact that the language describing the pace of economic contraction changed from "slowing" (July's statement) to "leveling out" (August's statement). Chairman Greenspan was known as "the maestro", and during the Asian financial crisis he was on the "committee to save the world". As a presidential candidate, John McCain quipped that if Greenspan ever died he would put dark sunglasses on him and prop him up like a scene out of "Weekend at Bernie's". Such is the mystery, adoration, and power surrounding the Federal Reserve Board and the Fed chair.

My approval of Bernanke isn't just an image thing, either. It would be one thing if Bernanke put a friendlier face on the secretive Fed. But he's doing more than that - he's following an expansionary policy that priveleges debtors over creditors (a la William Jennings Bryan), and staves off a potential second Great Depression (a la Milton Friedman - not John Maynard Keynes, as many mistakenly suggest). The hope is that he is pursuing these goals with a realistic understanding of the risks posed by monetary expansion; that he is striking the right balance between avoiding paranoia about moderate inflation while staying mindful of the risk of excessive inflation. Bernanke has insisted to Congress that he can strike that balance.

I wouldn't predict that it's going to be easy street from here on out, but I think it will go as well as we can hope for. Job growth will be weak for years to come, but we'll avoid a Great Depression (which was an extremely real possibility this past Fall), and we'll avoid a dip into deflation or an excessive inflationary episode as well. For this reason, I think Bernanke will easily retain the respect that he has earned from economists.

But I hope he'll also earn respect for something else - I hope he can permanently sever the often contradictory relationship between American populism and mistrust of banks. Indeed, I hope he can communicate to the public how responsible monetary and fiscal policy can be a tool of the people. Economists often worry that popular pressure will lead to unsustainable inflationary episodes, and ideologues often worry that any active monetary or fiscal policy can threaten liberty by giving an inordinate amount of power to "the state". I don't see why we have to accept either interpretation. When good, intelligent people who are aware of their (very real) limitations make these policies in consultation with the public, there is no reason why the Federal Reserve Board can't be an instrument of prosperity and liberty.

Thursday, July 30, 2009

Think Tanks: The Lay of the Land

This is a very interesting post by Evan. I've heard a lot of good stuff about "Shop Class as Soul Craft", and I'm particularly interested in the role think tanks play in society - not just because I work at one, but because I have to interact with and react with other "think tanks" on a daily basis. Some of these interactions are positive, and some less so.

I think a lot about think tanks can be predicted based on how they're financed. In my policy think tank world, financing primarily comes from donations/endowments, private foundations, and the government. The "safest," most objective think tanks are actually those that rely largely on government funding. A lot of people may find this ironic, but it makes sense. Power in Washington shifts quite regularly, and despite the bad rap they get, the ubiquitous "bureaucracy" that manages these contracts is quite non-partisan and focused on very specific problems, which requires very specific research. Often the subject matter itself is dictated by political forces (i.e. - "home ownership" research replaced "low income housing tax credit" research during the Clinton-Bush transition), but the conclusions are not affected by changing political winds. Government contracts undergo a great deal of scrutiny - significantly more than grants from private foundations. If either the agency or the think tank involved in a contract were guilty of bias, it wouldn't take long at all for their competitors to identify that bias. These contracts also often require external panels and working groups to review the products before release to the public. Panels are usually composed of people from universities and other think tanks, and they also won't countenance a product that isn't objective.

Think tanks that operate using endowments and donations are ironically the least objective. These are organizations like the libertarian Cato, liberal Economic Policy Institute, or conservative Heritage Foundation. It's not that they produce bad analysis. They are simply more normative publications, and I feel that they regularly leave out important counter-arguments or findings. These sorts of "think tanks" are usually easy to identify because they regularly use ideological language (libertarian, "progressive", and conservative, respectively for those examples), and challenge or "call out" individual politicians. I think these groups are best thought of as advocacy groups that do research, rather than true research institutions.

A middle ground is funding by private foundations. Private foundations lie on a spectrum of ideological intensity. Usually, a think tank that is recognized as being objective isn't going to be budged by the ideological imperatives of a private foundation they get money from - and I'd say almost all of these types of grants give researchers final editorial sign off on content and conclusions.

The unfortunate thing is that the less objective a funding source is, the more interesting it is for researchers (because it usually means a freer hand). The government decides what questions get answered when they sign a contract with a think tank. Private institutes accept unsolicited proposals from think tanks, which provides somewhat greater freedom. Endowments provide complete freedom for researchers to pursue the questions they're interested in. So it's a mixed bag. I think a combination of these three funding sources is the best way to ensure that a think tank is objective, nimble, and can target research questions that are the most interesting to answer.

Think tanks have a range of missions. Some are pure government contractors - very objective, very focused and concrete, and very non-partisan. Others, like Urban, have a general goal of "understanding policies that support low income families", but because of their substantial government contracting, they approach these questions in a more or less non-partisan way. The final group, which I described above, are really just advocacy groups that publish research reports. They often employ smart people and put out interesting stuff - but I put about as much stock in them as I do other purely advocacy groups.

What's rarest is a think tank that blends practical and abstract/empirical and theoretical research the way a university department would, with considerable independence from government contract work, nevertheless maintaining a strong reputation for objectivity. That's a very hard balance to strike, and there are only a few that I think can do it. The Brookings Institution is one. The Council on Foreign Relations and the American Enterprise Institute are others (although AEI has a much clearer ideological bent than Brookings or CFR, but I don't think they "assume their own conclusions" the way Cato, EPI, or Heritage seem to). So is the Woodrow Wilson Center (although the Wilson Center does rely on government money, my understanding is that it is direct Congressional funding, not more constraining research contracts with executive agencies). Eventually I'd love to work at one of these types of organizations - essentially a university environment without the teaching or tenure, and strong connections to policymakers without being mere contractors. The Urban Institute comes quite close to this atmosphere, so I'm satisfied. But it's still somewhat of a Brookings Institution/government contractor hybrid.

Think tanks are very important for policy-makers. Universities are simply too insular and overburdened with teaching and academic research to be the sole source of policy research. But it's very important to understand what differentiates different policy shops. Heritage is no Abt Associates, and neither of these companies are comparable to Brookings. You just have to understand the lay of the land before you believe everything you read.

Thursday, July 9, 2009

A Non-Reactionary Case for States Rights

I recently finished reading Magnificent Failure, a book about the 1967 Maryland Constitutional Convention, which was chaired by my great-grandfather, H. Vernon Eney. The proposed constitution (which lost the ratification vote) had a variety of objectives, including stream-lining government, cleaning up the unwieldy incumbent document, reforming districting rules, and empowering the state government to meet the needs of an urbanizing and modernizing Maryland. Chairman Eney spoke often about the need for stronger state government in the face of the problems of urbanization and an expanding federal government. The report of the commission that was organized to study the need for a new constitution (which Eney also chaired) stated:

The most immediate threat to the welfare of the citizens of Maryland in the present age arises not from excessive power in their state government, but from a lack of power which prevents their state government from acting effectively... it must be recognized that... oppression can result as much from governmental
inaction, as it can from governmental action.
The commission (and later, the convention) position was that the growth of federal power was in part achieved by default, and attributable to the unwillingness of the states to use their inherent powers to meet the needs of their citizens. My personal view (and one that is very nearly expressed by Richard Homan, a Washington Post reporter who wrote about the convention at the time), is that this non-reactionary expression of states' rights - probably most forcefully held by Eney, of all the delegates - was doomed to failure given the charged climate of the late 1960s. Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated on April 4, 1968 - only weeks before the constitution would be voted on by Marylanders. Baltimore was one of many cities ravaged by looting and riots, following the news. Governor Spiro Agnew received national attention for calling out the National Guard to suppress the riot, and brow-beating leaders in the black community for not taking a stronger stand against the violence. This position catapulted Agnew onto the presidential ticket with Richard Nixon in the next election. In this charged environment, the idea of "states' rights" pushed by convention delegates was unfairly maligned as a neo-Confederate expression of white privilege. Juanita Jackson Mitchell, the president of the Maryland NAACP and a delegate to the convention, singled Eney out for criticism on this matter.

Since 1968, the very term "states' rights" has been presumed to be reactionary and even "code" for racism. Ronald Reagan famously declared his support for "states' rights" at the Neshoba County fair in 1980, which many critics have identified as a thinly veiled sympathy for segregation. While I don't have time to address the Reagan incident here, I will say that I think the idea that "states' rights" is code for racism is lazy analysis and deeply flawed. It's very easy to cut corners by arguing that something you don't have evidence for is some sort of secret code, which by definition there is no evidence for. This reaction against the very idea of "states' rights" has prevented the states from maturing and reforming themselves into institutions that can support and serve their citizens, forcing the federal government to step in and provide solutions.

I was finishing this history of the Maryland Constitutional Convention at the same time that the health reform debate in Washington really began to pick up steam. It made me think of two things; first, the success of the 1996 welfare reform beyond anybody's expectations, and second, the rush to a national health reform despite promising developments in certain states.

In 1996, with Newt Gingrich's Republicans in ascendancy, the Clinton administration angered many liberals by instituting a welfare reform that would cut benefits and tighten eligibility requirements generally, but provide the states with enormous latitude for implementing these and other reforms in the spirit of Brandeis's conception of the states as "laboratories of democracy". Policy analysts have thoroughly gleaned lessons from the success stories, and these lessons have subsequently been adopted in other states. Welfare rolls were reduced tremendously by the reform, and welfare is now able to target the families that need the most support. In contrast, most health reform plans we hear today are proposals for change at the federal level. This is occurring despite the fact that some of the most promising reforms (for example, by Mitt Romney, a Republican governor of Massachusetts) are already being implemented at the state level. Instead of betting on the best federal solution, why don't we learn the lesson that Clinton taught liberal Democrats in the 1990s: forcing the states to take responsibility for reform does not preclude reform - and if any reform must occur at the federal level, experimenting with various approaches at the state level can provide valuable insights before we bet the farm on a single solution.

I'm not terrified of an active federal government, like many are. And there are real problems with health care that may merit government intervention. But we need to look back to the Clinton administration and consider the possibility that there is a role for wider states rights in this reform process.

"States' rights" should not have a negative connotation in this country. For a lot of people, I don't think it does. But for some of the most reform-minded people, the idea of state power is still highly suspect. Historically speaking, I suppose I understand that impulse. But I still don't think it's right. The Maryland Constitution of 1968 was not eventually ratified, but its attempt to empower the state of Maryland to solve the problems of Maryland shouldn't be lost on us. Perhaps I'm biased because of my admiration for H. Vernon Eney, but I think we can still derive lessons from his relatively conservative, card-carrying Democratic, thoroughly reformist approach to states' rights today.

Thursday, June 18, 2009

Untangling the Popular and the Democratic in Iran

I think Evan is very good to caution us not to take a cookie-cutter Western approach to Iran, at the same time that we unequivocally support the protesters there. This is essentially the conclusion that I've come to as well.

When we address the issue of how America and Americans should be involved, I think we need to pay very close attention to history. In the U.S., 1979 is remembered as a black year for democracy in Iran. In that year, a theocrat overthrew the existing government, which was credited with modernizing Iran. Americans were held hostage until Ronald Reagan - the strong-man of Western liberalism - ensured their safe passage home. Since 1979, Iran has been perceived as an enemy force in the region; threatening Israel, funding terrorism, and opposing secular democracy. This is all true...
...and yet at the same time it really isn't.

Khomeini was a theocrat, with all the autocratic pronouncements of the old caliphate, and none of it's assimilating Oriental spectacle. Nevertheless, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a thoroughly popular revolution. Khomeini did not empower the Iranian people, but he did liberate them from what was popularly perceived to be a Western client state. This is no reason to laud the changes that occurred in 1979, but it should help us to understand that the protests happening now are an outgrowth of the 1979 revolution, not a repudiation of that revolution.

As Andrew Sullivan has pointed out (and, I should note, the Daily Dish has been offering absolutely exceptional coverage of the protests) the leaders of this current movement are not the "next generation" of democratic outsiders, rather "the leading faces speaking out — Mousavi, Rafsanjani, Montazeri — are figures who were among Khomeini’s inner circle in 1979". I think, to put it very roughly, we may be witnessing the transition from a popular regime to a democratic government. This is not the fall of the Berlin Wall, in other words, so much as it is the fraudulent, bloody, and haphazard transition of a long revolution.
I think a lot of people, out of rightful outrage at Ahmadinejad and the spawn of the 1979 revolution, are too quick to assume that those elements need to be forcibly replaced or challenged by an outside force. In my mind this would take us out of the frying pan and into the fire. In 1953 the Central Intelligence Agency, on the order of President Eisenhower, replaced the duly elected prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh, and allowed the Shah to consolidate his power and banish all prospects of a constitutional monarchy, which Mossadegh had been trying to establish.

More forceful American intervention right now wouldn't introduce a new Shah. But that really doesn't matter. The point is, from 1953 to 1979 American and British intelligence ultimately decided who would rule the Iranian people out of a fear that popular government would privilege the communists. In many ways, 1979 replaced one autocracy for another; nevertheless, it replaced an imperial autocracy with a popular autocracy. For those concerned with the advance of liberal democracy, that's small consolation. For the Iranian people, I imagine that is a much greater and more positive shift than the American public generally supposes. And clearly, the seismic changes occurring now are positive from both the American and the Iranian perspective, and we should support them. But we need to remember that this long march to democracy started in 1979, not 2009, and that it is certainly not a reassertion of some imagined liberal orientation that reigned in the fifties, sixties, and seventies, only to be repressed by the dark Khomeinian cowl.

Friday, June 5, 2009

Postmodern Scientific Inquiry

The world of the policy analyst doesn't often coincide with the world of broad trends in intellectual history. As such, words that I know appear overwrought to Evan - such as "postmodern" - can be quite exciting for me when I get the chance to re-engage them. It brings me back to the halcyon days of studying sociology at William and Mary, when I was able to put down the math and the economics and dive into "theory". Recently I ran into postmodernism twice in the same day: first, at the Postmodern Conservative blog, and second, in an old book on postmodern literary criticism I discovered at my mother in law's house, which had belonged to my late grandfather in law, a University of Chicago classicist. The postmodern conservative (pomocon) blog was a new application of postmodernism, for me. The use of postmodernism in literary criticism is obviously an old (the oldest?) endeavor.

It raised a question for me - and perhaps other people have already engaged this - about what "postmodern science" would look like. Postmodern humanities, literary criticism, and philosophy are quite clearly delineated. Certain social sciences have strong "postmodern" trends; in sociology this paradigm is more often referred to as "poststructuralism". But the natural sciences are grounded in empiricism and positivism, and therefore seem to me to be far more closely tied to modernism. It has been suggested that the future will increasingly privilege science, but is there an inherent contradiction if the future also continues to displace modernism with some variant of postmodernism? Will science survive in a postmodern future, or will it have to change to survive?

I suppose from a relatively sophomoric perspective on intellectual history (i.e. - mine), postmodernism is most starkly characterized by three qualities: (1.) self-referentialism, (2.) deconstruction, and (3.) a residual "skepticism of modernism" category. Instead of concluding that science is doomed to irrelevance in a postmodern future (and clearly, the future may not be postmodern at all), I want to assume that it will survive and highlight some ways in which the natural sciences are already adapting to the three foundational qualities of postmodern inquiry.


Self-referentialism


Postmodernism is often dismissed as "relativism" because of its insistence on the acknowledgement of self-referentialism: simply put, that our reality is often contextual. While this could clearly degenerate into a crass relativism, the value of a self-referential outlook is also obviously capable of illuminating individual biases. The application of self-referentialism to art and literary criticism is obvious; everyone enjoys these things differently. The application to the social sciences has also occurred smoothly (albeit somewhat later). Sociologists speak of the "social construction of reality" and the dependence of our interpretation of reality on the social environment in which we develop. While these versions of self-referentialism are clear, the existence of self-referentialism in the natural sciences may not be as evident. One development in physics that I've always found interesting is string theory, particularly M-theory, which predicts the existence of 11 dimensions of spacetime and the coexistence of multiple universes, each defined by the vibrations of sub-sub-atomic particles known as "strings". While TV shows treat multiple dimensions as paranormal, serious physicists understand that the existence of multi-dimensional spacetime opens the theoretical possibility of time travel, multiple dimensions, and parallel universes. The first link I provide is to a synopsis of the "Fringe" series on Fox, describe their foray into multidimensional reality in the season finale. It all sounds fantastic and fictional until you listen to the second link I provide to Dr. Michio Kaku of the City University of New York. His description of string theory is eerily similar to the fictional Dr. Walter Bishop, of "Fringe". As I understand it, string theory is definitive of physics today, in much the same way that evolution undergirds all of modern biology. String theory also forces us to acknowledge that our casual understanding of reality is inseparable from the fact that we are tied to four-dimensional spacetime and cannot conceive of other dimensions that define unknown worlds beyond our own. Sociologists can talk about how our social environment influences our understanding of reality, and art critics can talk about how an understanding of art is dependent on contexts, tastes, and personal experiences, but these sorts of self-referentialism pale in comparison to string theory's assertion that there are whole dimensions beyond the grasp of our minds.


Deconstruction


As I understand it, deconstructionism in postmodernism emerged with Heidegger's engagement of understandings of "being" prior to Plato, and is more famously associated with Derrida's method of textual criticism. Derrida's deconstructionism essentially sought to break out and understand a problem (or a text) in terms of it's constituent parts and foundational assumptions. These constituent parts are often inherently contradictory and may reveal an underlying instability or conflict in a superficially coherent text. Berger and Luckmann connect this method of understanding "knowledge" with the contextualism of self-referentialism by reversing Derrida's project and explaining how various social environments "construct" a fundamentally contingent reality that people experience as they develop. Deconstruction can therefore be understood as the skeptical unearthing of the contextual contingencies that were touched on, above.

Once again I feel that although on the surface the natural sciences seem adroitly tied to the superficially tangible "reality", they have actually been quite willing to deconstruct their understanding of phenomena. One example that stands out in my mind is Richard Dawkins's selfish gene theory, which has revolutionized "Darwinian" evolution by pointing out that reproduction by organisms is really a sideshow to the reproduction of genetic material that occurs considerably less visibly, not to mention less salaciously. The selfish gene fits Derrida's understanding of deconstructionism beautifully. Seeming contradictions such as intragenomic conflicts, "junk DNA", the sacrifices of a vast majority of a bee hive for the reproductive prospects of a single female, female cannibalism, etc. are all explained by gene-based rather than organism-based evolution. As far as we know, we can't take this process any further than the gene because genes are the most fundamental reproducing biological component.

I include a graphic of what is known as a Mandelbrot Set in this section as a teaser for further exploration of the relevance of complex adaptive systems for the practical application of deconstructionism in the natural (and social) sciences. Suffice it to say that complex adaptive systems research explores how the non-linear interaction of very, very simple processes can produce an "emergent" pattern that is not only surprisingly complex, but also surprisingly robust and ordered. Breaking down our complex reality into these (1.) non-linear interactions, and (2.) simple foundational processes certainly seems to me to be an endeavor of which Derrida would approve.

Skepticism of Modernism



I'm not entirely sure whether the renowned Kurt Godel would appreciate my inclusion of his visage in this section or not. Godel is famous for his "incompleteness theorem", which in a nutshell said that a finite set of axioms that are universally true cannot prove all theorems that are true, specifically theorems that incorporate more information than the set of axioms themselves. The incompleteness theorem has huge implications for both falsification in general (the foundational empirical paradigm of science under modernism), and also for "theories of everything" pursued by scientists like Hawking and Kaku (granted, they both know this of course!). The incompleteness theorem's relationship with falsification is probably best explored in the context of what's known as the "liar's paradox". I'll take the liberty of expanding on the basic liar's paradox to make it applicable to the problem of falsifiability, and hope that I don't jumble things too badly:

It is a trivial task to prove my evaluation of a random person on the street that "that man is a liar". We can investigate the congruence of the man's statements and reality and ascertain whether my statement about him was true, or false. The falsification criteria, presumably, is that if he has told no lies he is not a liar. Since he has certainly made only a finite number of statements over the course of his lifetime it is theoretically possible to catalogue and evaluate them and apply certain decision rules to determine whether my statement is true or false. This is an admittedly weird example of the every day task of science. But what if that man were to approach us and say "I am lying"? That statement cannot simultaneously be true and consistent with any of the decisions rules (axioms) that we have identified for the purpose of falsification. His statement can only be "true" if he is in fact lying. But if he is in fact lying, then it is not true that he is lying!


I personally haven't completely wrapped my mind around the implications of the incompleteness theorem, but I do know that it did irreparable damage to the strong claims of positivists like Russell to identifying complete systems of mathematical truth. While practical applications of the incompleteness theorem aren't presented here, it certainly raises doubts about the limits of falsification as a vehicle for scientific inquiry if indeed some theories cannot be falsified without revealing the axioms utilized for falsification to be inconsistent themselves. Falsification has already been challenged by Thomas Kuhn, and we may find that a postmodern science will have shed it's Popperian pretensions for a more Kuhnian outlook. As a statistician of sorts myself, I don't say this lightly, and I also don't think we'll totally abandon falsification - but the shortcomings may stand out in sharper relief. As a final note on the problems of modernity-as-a-system-of-positivist-falsification, I'd note that George Soros in finance (and certainly others in other fields) more explicitly connects the practice of self-referencing with the inherent incompleteness of any axioms used to explain a system that incorporates oneself. Indeed, the implications of Godel are probably going to be much broader in the social sciences (where the scientist is part and parcel of the object of analysis) than in the natural sciences. As Keynes has said: "The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else." But natural scientists can still be more circumspect about the validity of their methods of falsification, particularly when the theorem being falsified involves multidimensional space that our axioms may not be able to grapple with (Obviously it's trivial for our math to grapple with multidimensional space - students learn how to do that in middle school! But in the natural sciences, axioms of falsification involve broader empirical techniques than mathematics alone, and it is these that may not be up to the task).


Concluding Thoughts

Even over the course of writing this post I've become more optimistic, not only about the fact that the lessons of postmodernism are not lost on natural scientists, but that the future will provide an intriguing and fruitful synthesis of modern scientific foundations and postmodern deconstructions of those foundations. Indeed, many of the greatest discoveries of the past century have already embraced this synthesis.

A Happy Birthday Note

Facts and other stubborn things wishes to extend a warm Happy Birthday to the renowned economist, statesman, philosopher, and public intellectual John Maynard Keynes. It is probably safe to say the Keynes is second only to Adam Smith in his impact on the discipline, and even Adam Smith's contributions are better classified as synthesis of previous work and popularization, relative to the truly novel insights of Keynes.

I think Keynes would have appreciated the mission of Facts and other stubborn things. Keynes is both celebrated and derided for being a very speculative thinker. He would tinker with ideas even if he wasn't exactly sure where he fell on an issue. He felt free to muse - sometimes quite comically -about issues without cowering at the thought that some people might target and try to discredit him for those musings.

But we know that Keynes would have appreciated the work we do here, and we heartily agree with the old Cambridge don that:

"Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of
thoughts on the unthinking
".

-J.M. Keynes 15 July 1933

Thursday, May 7, 2009

Good news and bad news on the state of the news

Evan's critique of the consolidation of print media is both prescient and pedestrian - and I should say I don't intend that evaluation to be insulting to him at all. Indeed, I think the fact that it is both prescient and pedestrian is a positive sign. People are broadly aware of the problem, and there is a real grassroots constituency that is making exactly these points.



Actually, what I found most surprising about Evan's post was that it was decidedly more negative than the usual narrative you hear, and it is precisely this relatively negative outlook that I want to address. The more common storyline, I believe, is that local media and print media is dying at the same time that TV news is being dumbed down and sub-divided into ideological camps. Polarization in and of itself doesn't have to be bad, but the polarization we are seeing now seems to be contributing more heat than light to the debate. Keith Olbermann and Sean Hannity may personally be genuine in what they are reporting, but the market-segmenting arrangement between MSNBC and Fox itself is more akin to a cable-news Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, dividing the market in half, than it is to a meaningful debate between two differing perspectives). In the no-man's land that's left in the middle (I suppose this would be Warsaw if I were to continue the World War II analogy), we have CNN that increasingly descends into flashy gimmicks that avoid the ideological confrontations of Fox and MSNBC - and CNN (and other middle of the road sources) end up avoiding real reporting in the process.

A Cable News Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact


That's the downside of the "usual narrative".

The upside is "Web 2.0"; the democratization of media as a result of Youtube, blogs, and even Wikipedia. The story goes that while the print media is failing to adapt, and cable news is failing to deliver, the blogosphere is creating a network of private citizen-reporters prepared to keep the elites (both in positions of power and in the media itself) honest.

I see two problems with this "good news/bad news" story, which may help to buttress Evan's concerns. First, many blogs themselves rely on re-posting, re-analyzing, or simply aggregating the work done by the "mainstream media". Obviously this serves an important chastizing function, but it is unclear what the blogosphere would look like without the New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Fox, MSNBC, and CNN. Could they pick up the slack and create new news? The beauty of blogs is that anybody can create one, absorb information, and reorganize their own thoughts. We do this all the time. But that isn't necessarily conducive to uncovering new stories.

My second concern centers on what blogs don't allow us to do. What bloggers can't do (at least out of their blogging revenue - if they even have that) is buy a plane ticket to Mexico City to investigate swine flu, and then stop by Atlanta on the way back to the office to consult with the CDC about what all this really means. This is the work of real reporters - the very reporters that are being laid off or re-branded by newspapers and cable TV shows. Some of this investigating can be done through sites like Youtube. Indeed, in many cases the mainstream media is now using videos posted by private citizens as material for their own shows (the George Allen "macaca" incident, linked above, comes to mind here). But as a general rule, bloggers don't have the access that traditional reporters do, and they also don't have the same reporting standards. This isn't to say that there aren't objective and rigorous bloggers - but there isn't the same obligation to double-check sources and edit material. By the time some blog stories get debunked, the story itself is so thoroughly embedded that often it can't be dislodged (i.e. - that Obama is a Muslim).

What I'd like to emphasize is that neither of these burdens should be insurmountable. Bloggers can and already have started creating new content. You don't have to fly to Mexico City or Atlanta these days, because there are local bloggers in those locations that can be networked with. The CDC can be reached by email, as can the Mexican government. Pictures and videos to highlight the blog post are a Google search (and Photoshop session) away. As for standards, I think the question of how much reporting standards really help is an open one. They may prevent certain news from reaching us that we would have wanted to hear. The National Enquirer - a notoriously low standard publication - actually gets the story right a lot of the time, and is therefore able to break news long before the "mainstream media" feels comfortable reporting it. They proved that this past campaign season, when they were first to break the (quite accurate) story of John Edwards's affair with a staffer. Even if problems do occur, debunking things is practically an American past-time. We love doing it, and even if many people take the original story hook, line, and sinker, we practically can guarantee that it won't go unchallenged.

I think cautious optimism is the way to approach the restructuring of the news industry. Evan's concerns are completely valid, but I think it's important to recognize that what we are seeing is what Joseph Schumpeter called "creative destruction". Old industries are collapsing precisely because they are being made obsolete by new industries. My guess is the blogosphere will pick up the slack and we will be fine, and in fact we'll probably see the reemergence of many traditional news organizations in this new medium (as we have already seen with The Atlantic, whose website is more of a blogging network than it is an online magazine). The question is - what kind of sneaky stuff will those in power be able to slip by with while the blogosphere is still learning the ropes? If recent history is any indication, I'm happy to say that I think the answer is "not much".

Tuesday, April 28, 2009

Reform and Recovery - A Word of Caution from Keynes




From John Maynard Keynes's Open Letter to President Roosevelt

"You are engaged on a double task, Recovery and Reform;--recovery from the slump and the passage of those business and social reforms which are long overdue. For the first, speed and quick results are essential. The second may be urgent too; but haste will be injurious, and wisdom of long-range purpose is more necessary than immediate achievement. It will be through raising high the prestige of your administration by success in short-range Recovery, that you will have the driving force to accomplish long-range Reform. On the other hand, even wise and necessary Reform may, in some respects, impede and complicate Recovery. For it will upset the confidence of the business world and weaken their existing motives to action, before you have had time to put other motives in their place. It may over-task your bureaucratic machine, which the traditional individualism of the United States and the old "spoils system" have left none too strong. And it will confuse the thought and aim of yourself and your administration by giving you too much to think about all at once."

Health Reform and the Reconciliation Process

Washington was buzzing Friday with news that health care reform would likely be pushed through the Senate this Fall during the reconciliation process, making it immune to the risk of filibuster. Normally, the famously "collegial" Senate has sensibilities that are far too delicate to countenance interrupting a given Senator when he or she is speaking. To close debate on a bill, 60 out of 100 Senators must vote for cloture. The end result of this procedural rule is that any given bill actually needs 60 votes to pass, not 51, so long as some Senator cares enough to filibuster it*. Filibustering is good insofar as it requires Senators to produce a more bipartisan bill. However, it opens the possibility that the minority will be able to dictate to the majority in a variety of occasions. The House does not have this rule.

However, budget bills can be submitted as "reconciliation bills", which cannot be filibustered. A reconciliation budget will specify certain legislative committees that need to bring certain pieces of legislation into alignment with the budget bill. So for example, this year's budget bill may say "we will spend X amount of money on health care", and specify that the committee that deals with health care bring the law in line with the spending requirements. These changes in health care law will then be passed without the risk of filibuster as well. This means that health care reform may be passed this year with 51 votes (which the Democrats easily have), rather than 60 (which they can't count on). It may come as a surprise to most Americans that this is even a major piece of news - isn't the majority always supposed to rule? Yes... except in the United States Senate.

Republicans are predictably suggesting that this is heavy handed and inappropriate. Why is this response predictable? Because it's exactly how the Democrats responded when the Republicans used the reconciliation process to push through the Bush tax cuts.... and most of Clinton's budgets... and most of Reagan's budgets. The false outrage over the reconciliation process is old hat in Washington. I personally have no problem with the Democrats using the reconciliation process - I wouldn't mind seeing filibusters eliminated from the Senate entirely. They have some moderating benefits, but they are inherently undemocratic. Republicans shouldn't be ashamed for using them to pass tax cuts under Bush, and they shouldn't be outraged that Democrats are using them now. But let's get past all this... why do I start by quoting a note of caution that Keynes offered to Roosevelt in the 1930s?

Reform and Recovery

The reconciliation process essentially guarantees that we will see some sort of health care reform this year. It may be a monumental overhaul, or it may be a first step towards a monumental overhaul. Right now we don't know. Health care reform is desperately needed in this country, no matter what side of the aisle you're on. We pay far more for the care we receive than any other country, and tens of millions of Americans don't have any health insurance. Higher costs and lower coverage are an explosive combination. These rising health care costs are also a burden on U.S. businesses who provide most of the coverage in the U.S.. Whatever the failings of the health care systems of our peer nations, they have been more successful at keeping costs down, which means that their businesses can operate that much more efficiently than ours can. Health care reform is unambiguously an imperative right now.

But another imperative is recovery from the current recession. Despite the upbeat talk of President Obama and Fed Chair Bernanke recently, most analysts think that we have not bottomed out yet, and when we do the recovery will be drawn out, rather than rapid. The ubiquitous Depression analogies aren't made to scare people, but they are made for a reason - this downturn will end up being substantial, and like the Depression there is no real prospect that the recovery will be swift. Those who write off double digit unemployment are fooling themselves. The "real economy" hasn't even bottomed out yet, and unemployment won't stop rising until well after the "real economy" has reached it's trough and started climbing again for at least a couple quarters.

Many people see the problem as steering deftly between the Scylla of a broken health care system and the Charybdis of a once (more likely twice) in a lifetime economic downturn. I think this understanding of the situation is incorrect. Health care is obviously a problem in this country - but is it a problem that throws millions out of work in a matter of months? Is it a problem that destroys a third of a family's savings? Is it a problem that will grow exponentially worse if it is allowed to fester for another year or two or three? No. If we are still at the bottom of this hole in 2011 or 2012, history will remember this as the Second Great Depression, and the future prospects of capitalism will truly be in jeopardy. If we maintain the current health care system through 2011 or 2012, how will history remember us? Perhaps as lazy. Perhaps that we missed an opportunity. Perhaps even that we are uncaring and primitive. It will probably look at us the same way that we look back to the sluggish adoption of Social Security and unemployment insurance in this country; unnecessarily slow, but since the change was inevitable, the delay is ultimately just remembered as an artifact of history. We have had somewhere around 40 to 50 million uninsured for years. It is a burden and it is a crisis, but that crisis clearly lacks the immediacy or urgency of the economic crisis.

We did elect Obama for a double task: reform and recovery. But his mandate for reform and recovery doesn't mean that both need to be done within ten months of taking office.

What is to be done?

I, like the vast majority of Americans, am suspicious of what's called a "single payer", public health insurance system. Thankfully, Barack Obama and the United States Congress also seem to be wary of such a course. We know that the market is too efficient to completely abandon. But there are problems that public policy can help to address. While Americans shouldn't be required to purchase government health care, we can think about making some sort of subsidized public insurance available to the 50 million people who are uninsured. The externalities of public health may justify mandating health insurance coverage, either from a public or private source - much like many states already do with car insurance. We can think about eliminating the tax privileges currently afforded to employer provided health benefits, which encourage sub-optimal over-consumption of health care and hide the true costs of care. We can imagine the benefits of a system of electronic health records, and we can conceive a potential role for government in jump-starting this process. There is a lot we can potentially do, but there are no silver bullets. I think this suggests that we act, but also that we discuss and deliberate. The "experts" have discussed our options for years - at least since the aborted attempt at health care reform spearheaded by the current Secretary of State in 1993. But our elected representatives have not had a real debate on the finer points of health reform, probably since that debate on the Clinton plan fifteen years ago.

If we don't act immediately to address the economic crisis, we could easily slip into a cycle of deflation, rising debt burdens, rising unemployment, and further deflation. A moment of hesitation could make this recession much worse. Can we say the same for health reform? Of course not? A moment's hesitation - even a year's hesitation, or two year's hesitation will probably find us about where we are today: with a health care system that could be vastly improved on a number of measures, but that generally keeps Americans healthy. What would a rush to reform health care risk? It risks leaving us with an equally poorly conceived system that we're likely to be stuck with for years or even decades to come.

I will note, this is not meant to suggest that there is no risk associated with rushing a program of economic recovery. Hindsight will certainly show us that there were major problems with TARP, TALF, ARRA, and every other "rescue" that's been rolled out since the summer of 2008. We will pay a price for these problems. But I would argue that these problems are far outweighed by the problems that would have emerged if we had waited longer to do something. I think the risks are flipped when it comes to reforms in general, and health care reforms in particular. Prudence and careful consideration will pay off. Obama should not rush into this (nor should he rush into education reform, finance regulatory reform, etc. etc.).

*The Washington buzz of Tuesday, the 28th (which absolutely swamps the events of last Friday in overal buzziness) largely negates the buzz on reconciliation of Friday, the 24th. Republican Senator Arlen Specter announced that he is changing his affiliation to Democratic, virtually assuring that by the Fall (when Al Franken will in all likelihood be seated), the Democrats will have a filibuster-proof majority anyway.

Tuesday, April 21, 2009

Four Reasons Why the Torturers Must Be Prosecuted

I agree completely with Evan that the torturing of prisoners that went on during the Bush administration was unambiguously criminal, and that the Justice Department needs to charge somebody with these acts, even if the burden of proof may represent a steep uphill battle. The torture of a few al Qaeda operatives is important because it violates U.S. and international law, but it's not important for that reason alone. I'm confident that the law is violated all the time - sometimes flagrantly, sometimes accidentally - and not all of these infractions merit public indignation over whether the Justice Department decides to prosecute. So why this time?

- First, because this crime is uniquely heinous. As Christopher Hitchens has said, "It used to be in the press you remember people would say that it simulates the feeling of drowning. You've read that I'm sure. In fact it doesn't simulate it at all in fact you are being drowned." There is a reason that both the Republican and the Democratic candidate for president this Fall came out strongly against torture, and it had less to do with McCain's war experience than it did with the fundamental incongruity of torture with modern society.

- Second, because this is not just a legal violation - it as a constitutional violation as well. While some of the Bill of Rights protections of criminals arguably do not apply to prisoners of war, and those who are tried by military tribunals, the injunction against cruel and unusual punishments has no such distinction. The numerous protections guaranteed by the fifth amendment are qualified by a very vital loophole that the Bush administration has ably exploited: "No person shall be held to answer for any capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." The eighth amendment, for what should be obvious reasons, includes no such qualification: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."

- Third, and quite simply, the Bush administration has to be held accountable for something with respect to the prosecution of the war on terror and the Iraq War. History will judge the American people to be as complicit with the Bush as the American people were found to be with Jackson's Trail of Tears or FDR's internment camps if they do nothing to right this wrong. The specific points of the Patriot Act, the War on Terror, the Iraq War, the Plame Affair, extraditions, Guantanamo Bay, Abu Gharib, etc. can certainly be debated by reasonable people, and several of these cases have already been tried. Not all critiques may end up being legitimate critiques (I've agreed with the administration on a few of these concerns. For example, I'm a strong supporter of a vigorous War on Terror, and I don't think there's anything wrong with having a prison at Guantanamo, so long as the proceedings there are legal). This third point is therefore not meant to be a thoughtless, blanket indictment of the Bush administration. Instead, it is a recognition that life in America and abroad was radically different between September 11th, 2001, and January 20th, 2009. Some of it was handled quite well, and some of it was handled not as well. But we cannot abandon an evaluation of these years in an effort to "move forward". We can't move forward with confidence without knowing where we may have misstepped in the path. Obama's justification for failing to prosecute for these crimes is completely wrong-headed. If we don't grapple with what was done we have no road map with which we can move forward.

- Fourth, and by far the most important, we must prosecute as a defense against fascist tendencies. I have been enormously critical of news outlets that apply labels like "fascist" or "socialist" to President Obama. That kind of hyperbole is incredibly destructive. So why do I use this word now? It is because I'm concerned about letting the mindset of fascism take root in this country. Allow me to explain my distinction: it is my opinion that the Iraq War was aggressive and unprovoked - that we should have focused our energies on the War on Terror, which we actually had cause to prosecute. Despite my strong disagreement with Bush on the Iraq war, I don't think the war had any tendency towards fascism at all. Bush made a case to the people. He made a case to the international community. He had allies. He got the approval of Congress. A reasonable person could say that he didn't intentionally and recklessly abandon international law. In other words, the Iraq War may have been ill-advised, inappropriate, and perhaps even illegal: but it was done in broad daylight, it was not executed by personal fiat, and it was prosecuted in line with the Constitution. It was therefore not fascist. The same is true of the stimulus package and the TARP program. I'm infuriated when these things are called "fascist", not just because I agree with their necessity, but also because the critics ignore the clear consistency of the method of passing the stimulus package and the TARP with the liberal political tradition and democratic principles. No such consistency exists for these acts of torture, and while they may not be fascist themselves, they represent "fascist tendencies". Fascism is about method, not policy. A "benevolent dictator" could implement the same programs that any presidential administration in history has enacted, but they would still be fascist if they did so by will of the president, rather than by the will of the people, through the Constitutional apparatuses designed and assented to by the people. Likewise, democracies are capable of a great deal of misery, but poor or even ruthless decisions on the part of democracies are not "fascist" so long as they are implemented by a government limited by well defined constraints on it's power and the will of the people. I think this distinction is important to make, because we have flirted with fascism on more than a few occasions in our country's history. The bedrock fascist position is best stated by Nixon, probably the closest we have come to a president with a truly fascist mindset: "When the president does it, that means that it is not illegal." Nixon probably hurt his policital adversaries more than anyone else - his crime ultimately didn't result in much more of substance than a broad-based loss of innocence - but this man's very mindset was a fascist mindset. He was, and I think he will be remembered as, a fascist who held an official position in a democratic Republic for a number of years in the late twentieth century. Was Bush a fascist in this mold? Was Cheney? Prosecuting torturers won't answer that question, and we may never know. We probably won't have the benefit of a Frost interview for those men, like we had with Nixon. But the tortures reek of something terrible, in the same way that Watergate did. And even if the torture could be explained away in various ways (just like Watergate could have itself been explained away as quite insignificant), the entire endeavor is indicative of "fascist tendencies" in the Bush White House - a tendency to place the president above the law, rather than under it. We need that tendency to be scrutinized in the light of day. And perhaps I have it all wrong and the torturers will be found not guilty, and this whole post was all a big mistake - but I think the preponderance of evidence for enough people suggests that we need to shore up the value and strength of the law in America. We're likely to have very trying times ahead - we don't want a charismatic president like Obama to enter trying times without a firm message from the American people that fascist tendencies are not acceptable, regardless of the objective desirability of the program that the fascist is offering.