Tuesday, April 20, 2010

Past Fallacious Fallacies on F&OST

This morning, I described the "aggregation fallacy" as a "fallacious fallacy" - something that a lot of people wrongly point to as a fallacy. I think I'll try to highlight a couple more of these cases over the next couple weeks, mostly from economics.

In the meantime, since we've gotten a lot more readers lately, I wanted to highlight two past posts on fallacies on this blog that I thought were both pretty fun.

The first is a post by Evan on a fallacy that he enjoyed coining: the fallacy of gravity as a mechanism of consciousness. As Evan suggests, it probably already has a name, but it's more fun to give it a new name that enables you to reference Wile E. Coyote. The post is very good.

I also have one on the fallacy of teleological thinking when we talk about evolution and the environment.

Fallacious Fallacies and the Great Recession

Aggregate Demand and the Great Recession
On April 17th, the chair of Obama's Council of Economic Advisors chairwoman (and W&M alum) Christina Romer set off a firestorm in the economics blogosphere with a relatively benign rendering of mainstream economics through the medium of a shout out to 1990s political culture. Namely, that: "it's the aggregate demand, stupid". Romer's case is that aggregate demand is driving unemployment as opposed to unemployment insurance. The Economist provides a general overview of the question, while a paper prepared for a Brookings panel and a San Francisco Fed paper provide some empirical structure to the debate.

Bloggers have lined up on either side. Menzie Chinn, Michael Derby (WSJ), Mark Thoma (here and here), and Brad DeLong take Romer's side. Arnold Kling and Megan McArdle are opposed to her position. Tyler Cowen and Bryan Caplan are also opposed, but their posts go down this strange rabbit hole of nominal wage rigidities, which is very unusual because (1.) Romer never mentions nominal wage rigidities, and (2.) nominal wage rigidities have exactly zero to do with aggregate demand deficiencies, although some economists are fond of referencing them.

Fallacious Fallacies
Some of the more interesting posts on the issue get into alleged fallacies committed by the pro-Romer aggregate demand crowd. I'm going to call these "fallacious fallacies", because they miss the mark by a fair margin, they threaten clear thinking, but you hear them a lot because human beings (particularly bloggers) love to play "gotcha". So I'm gonna call "gotcha" on the "gotcha" guys. The fallacious fallacy in question is the "aggregation fallacy". While most economists content themselves with the fact that aggregate demand is real and job search intensity (which is lowered by generous UI benefits) is real, and we have to arbitrate between their relative importance, some economists flatly reject the validity of aggregating anything. Robert Higgs recently listed the "aggregation fallacy" first in his list of six alleged fallacies. The argument is that by aggregating a variable like income into a variable like GDP, or an individual price into an aggregate like the CPI, complex processes at a lower level of aggregation are glossed over. This critique can come in several varieties, but it's disconcerting for me that it is ever expressed in the all-encompassing way that Higgs presents it. Peter Boettke recently brought this aggregation debate into Romer's aggregate demand debate. In his comment section, after some debate on the question, Peter writes that he is "unpersuaded that aggregate concepts do much of anything to improve our understanding of an economic system".

The problem, as I see it, with this common "fallacious fallacy" is that it takes a kernel of truth and explodes it completely out of proportion, to the detriment of clear thinking. Of course haphazard aggregative thinking can lead to erroneous conclusions. But we already have a name for that: the ecological fallacy. Ecological fallacies are committed when you infer things about individuals based on the behavior of aggregates. That's an entirely valid thing to look out for, and it's something that macroeconomists who do trade in aggregates obviously have to take special care to watch out for. But Boettke and others, by taking the risk of committing an ecological fallacy to the extreme, themselves are at grave risk of a fallacy of composition. I would argue that the rejection of the paradox of thrift, the rejection of the prospect of a "general glut", or the rejection of the possibility of a wage-price spiral are all such fallacies of composition. If I were to commit a "fallacious fallacy" of my own, I would say that Boettke and others are committing a "disaggregation fallacy" (but I won't, because I have no methodological hang-ups about micro-data, which I personally use far more often than macro data).

Why do these fallacies persist? I'm not quite sure. A couple weeks ago I would have attributed it to the insularity of the Austrian school. Like Darwin's finches, eccentricities around something as mundane as an aggregate serve a function in the Austrian school (it's an easy to understand whipping boy for Keynesianism that is accessible to new initiates) that would not have evolved outside of that niche but can persist in that particular insular environment. Since transitioning from a few less illuminating Austrian blogs to more illuminating Austrian blogs, though, I have a much harder time making this argument. Then what is it? Why do smart guys with good things to say like Peter Boettke insist on peddling "fallacious fallacies" like the "aggregation fallacy"? Why is it so hard to see that there are two very real fallacies - the ecological fallacy and the fallacy of composition - that do apply in certain instances, but that you can't simply assume apply in all instances? I'm not sure - any ideas? I can't imagine how these people justify the co-existence of psychology and sociology, or organic chemistry and biology.

Quick Conclusion on UI, AD, and the GR
I want to point out that the empirical work I link to above shows that extended UI benefits have marginally increased unemployment (by 0.4 percentage points). We obviously don't have the data or the identification strategy to get an especially rigorous estimate, but that one seems to hold water with the Fed and the NBER. This suggests that Romer is right that UI benefits aren't a huge component of the story. But it also suggests that the economists who argue that the aggregate demand impact of the UI program in particular is a net positive are wrong. The argument goes that if you give unemployed workers more spending power it boosts aggregate demand, which helps the economy. A negative net impact of UI extensions - even a small negative impact - suggestst that any AD effect is swamped by the incentive effects. In other words, tentative, preliminary empirical evidence suggests that we're getting to the point where UI extensions may be justifiable on a humanitarian basis, but are getting harder and harder to justify on a stimulus basis. That does not mean that UI is keeping us in quasi-depressionary conditions. That doesn't even mean we shouldn't extend UI. And it certainly doesn't mean what Jerry O'Driscoll seemed to be implying: that you can't simultaneously say that AD and UI are important determinants of the unemployment rate, but that AD is more important than UI right now (as opposed to, say, the late 1990s when UI might have been a more important factor). What it means is we need to be careful about how we justify UI extensions, and seriously consider cutting off the extensions.


This has been fun. Future "fallacious fallacies" I might tackle are the Broken Window Fallacy, the accounting-identity-as-behavioral-law fallacy and reductio ad absurdum. Each of these, like the "fallacy of aggregation" has a kernel of truth that is habitually blown way out of proportion by zealous "gotcha" bloggers.

Monday, April 19, 2010

Lexington and Concord

Kate and I have a quite small, but growing, collection of nice (or at least meaningful) art. One of the less nice, but more meaningful pieces that I like a lot is a simple painting on a wood panel of Captain John Parker, of the Lexington militia, that used to belong to my grandparents. He stands at attention at one side of the bedroom door (on the other side is Daniel Morgan, the captain of a Virginia rifle company).

Concord Hymn
Ralph Waldo Emerson

By the rude bridge that arched the flood,
Their flag to April’s breeze unfurled,
Here once the embattled farmers stood,
And fired the shot heard round the world.

The foe long since in silence slept;
Alike the conqueror silent sleeps;
And Time the ruined bridge has swept
Down the dark stream which seaward creeps.

On this green bank, by this soft stream,
We set to-day a votive stone;
That memory may their deed redeem,
When, like our sires, our sons are gone.

Spirit, that made those heroes dare,
To die, and leave their children free,
Bid Time and Nature gently spare
The shaft we raise to them and thee.





My Working Paper on the 1920-21 Depression

President Harding's Conference on Unemployment, 1921

I'm very new to scholarly publishing, so I'm not quite sure about the etiquette of posting drafts online. I know journals demand original work, but enough working papers are floating around out there I assume that simply means unpublished work (more experienced scholars, please tell me if I'm making a mistake here!). Assuming it's fine, I wanted to share a paper I've been working on for several months now, called "A Critique of the Austrian School Interpretation of the 1920-21 Depression". The relatively unknown 1920-21 depression has gotten considerable attention in certain circles recently as an alleged successful test-case for non-interventionism. In this piece, I specifically engage a series of three shorter articles by Thomas Woods, Jim Powell, and Robert Murphy that make the non-interventionist argument. I think many readers will be familiar with these works, particularly that of Thomas Woods, which has been well publicized on Youtube. This topic has been covered extensively in the blogosphere (I know Brad DeLong, David Henderson, and Steve Horwitz have all blogged on it).

My conclusion is that fiscal intervention was indeed inappropriate in the 1920-21 downturn, and that markets were perfectly capable of self-adjustment, but that monetary policy was far more effective and commendable than just about any of the critics - Austrian or otherwise - give it credit for. Thomas Woods shockingly calls the Fed's actions "hardly noticeable," which for quite a while made me wonder whether he and I were discussing the same depression. In addition to these fundamentally historical points, I also make the analytic point that Keynesian policy recommendations aren't discredited at all by the 1920-21 downturn, and that Woods (2009), Powell (2009), and Murphy (2009) only argue that it is discredited because they misunderstand or ignore Keynes's ideas on (1.) nominal wage adjustments, (2.) the interest rate, and (3.) deflation. I hope I successfully make the point that Woodrow Wilson, Warren Harding, and Benjamin Strong did a commendable job in the post-war period, but that this episode isn't an appropriate test for falsifying Keynesianism.

If you have any comments, I'd very much appreciate them.
Benjamin Strong,
Governor of the New York Federal Reserve

Saturday, April 17, 2010

Charlottesville Musings


My wife Kate and I are leaving for Charlottesville this morning for the weekend to celebrate our dating anniversary and replenish our wine cellar. I had a couple Charlottesville related thoughts I wanted to share.

Jefferson and the Social Contract
One of the ideas I struggle with a lot is the social contract. In a lot of obvious ways, it's a very poorly thought out idea. Put simply, a social contract is a contract that in all likelihood many of the parties never consent to. Hence, it's not really a "contract" at all. It's not a new critique, but it's a nagging one, and it's a critique that inevitably leads to the conclusion that state authority itself is illegitimate. Nevertheless, all of us tacitly accept the social contract in practice, even if it's very common to reject it in theory. Even some of the most vocal critics of the idea do this. Libertarians most readily furnish the criticism I outlined, and yet it's rare to find a libertarian that doesn't think that a minimalist role for government is appropriate: enforcing contracts, providing national defense, etc. I'm not personally clear on why the social contract "works" in these situations, but not in other situations. Why is it legitimate to cite Rousseau's fallacies and the problems with the social contract when we're talking about health reform but not when we're talking about the recognition of contracts? The only position consistent with this (valid) critique of the social contract is anarchism. The rest of us are simply getting by on various versions of inconsistency.

I was recently reading Jefferson's 1813 letter to John Wayles Eppes (here's the Charlottesville connection), originally for the purposes of revisiting Jefferson's thoughts on banking. However, what I was struck by was his opening thoughts on the legitimacy of public debt. This is where he makes his famous suggestion for 19 year limits on constitutions and debt contracts. He acknowledges and attempts to circumvent the problems with the idea of the social contract in an interesting way:

"...But what limits, it will be asked, does this prescribe to their powers? What is to hinder them from creating a perpetual debt? The laws of nature, I answer. The earth belongs to the living, not to the dead. The will and the power of man expire with his life, by nature's law. Some societies give it an artificial continuance, for the encouragement of industry; some refuse it, as our aboriginal neighbors, whom we call barbarians. The generations of men may be considered as bodies or corporations. Each generation has the usufruct of the earth during the period of its continuance. When it ceases to exist, the usufruct passes on to the succeeding generation, free and unincumbered, and so on, successively, from one generation to another forever. We may consider each generation as a distinct nation, with a right, by the will of its majority, to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding generation, more than the inhabitants of another country."

One thing that leaps out at you is that Jefferson finds nothing wrong with the fundamental logic of the social contract, which isn't necessarily surprising. Groups of men are considered "as bodies or corporations" and "a distinct nation". What Jefferson has a problem with isn't the homogenization of the citizens into the state, but the perpetuation of that institution over time. In other words, the most disconcerting tyranny is the tyranny of the past over the future, and not of the present majority against the present minority. This is especially notable because he is writing it in 1813, very late in his life. In the heyday of the American Revolution and (for Jefferson) the French Revolution, the radicals were not particularly nervous about democracy. Many anti-federalists and Republicans were quite comfortable with the idea of a popular unicameral legislature (ie, the House of Representatives without the Senate). It was only after the excesses of the French Revolution and the waxing power of the Federalists that suspicion of democracy thoroughly took hold. And yet as late as 1813, long after these developments and long before the inauguration of Jacksonian democracy, Jefferson is not concerned at all with the traditional objection to the social contract - he is concerned with the question of time.

The problem of time has come into my own thinking about the social contract, but in a very different way. Jefferson sees the "usufruct of the earth" as passing from one generation to the next unhindered. He is specifically thinking in contractual and property-rights terms here when he addresses the ability of man to derive profit from the earth. The ability to exclusively enjoy the proceeds of an object is the defining characteristic of "property". This is where I split with Jefferson. It was common in the early 19th century to view land as a passive factor of production to be exploited. We know now, of course, that (1.) land is hardly the only or even the most important factor of production (most economic models don't even include land as a factor of production anymore), and (2.) to the extent that it is one, it certainly isn't inherited unhindered. The fact is, we impose on future generations - very often for the better, but sometimes for the worse.

I've come around to thinking about the social contract as a solution to a severely incomplete inter-generational contract. Imagine a situation where all past, present, and future generations could come together and write contracts. Inter-generational transfers could be worked out. Future generations could pay past generations to make certain investments. Past generations would be forced to compensate future generations for damages made. This is the "optimal" market solution. The problem, of course, is that in the long run we are all dead. We can't make these sorts of contracts. We can't even make contracts with our future selves, much less with future generations. Such is the tyranny of unidirectional time. Among other things, this leads to sub-optimally high private discount rates and high interest rates in general (Keynes's fundamental insight). But it also means that we are imposing on future generations (and we have been imposed upon by past generations) because we make decisions for them that they can't be a party to. Jefferson sees this problem and concludes that the solution is to ensure that our decisions aren't binding on the future. I think this is good; sunsetting is always healthy in government. But I don't think it gets at the more fundamental problem that Jefferson only begins to broach. In my mind, the government's interest in de-temporalized society, it's ability to think in terms of the long-run, the fact that it seems to naturally eschew high private discount rates, instead operating on the basis of low social discount rates, suggests that the government and the social contract has an important role to play in getting closer to an optimal nexus of inter-generational contracts; something that private contracting has no hope of achieving.

Slavery and History
Of course Jefferson doesn't only leave a legacy of enlightened self-government and liberty. He is also a part of the legacy of slavery. Virginia's slave society has been in the news a lot lately with Governor McDonnell's ham-fisted declaration of Confederate History Month, and it's something that I've written about here. I want to mention it briefly again here, because the legacy of slavery also has a lot to do with inter-generational contracts, and the imposition of past generations on future generations. An MIT economist writes of a similar process in Peru, where she found that colonial labor practices have an enormous impact on current poverty rates in different regions of the country. This is an example of what has been called "path dependence", and it's a process that is as relevant to American chattel slavery as it is to Peruvian miners.

The District of Columbia celebrated Emancipation Day yesterday (April 16th), the day in 1862 when Lincoln emancipated the city's 3,100 slaves in anticipation of the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation. Despite the festive atmosphere, slavery still shapes race relations, poverty, unemployment, and incarceration in America today. We act like this is old news, that it happened 150 years ago. But what we forget is that what happened 150 years ago powerfully shaped what happened 149 years ago. And what happened 149 years ago was an enormous determinant of what happened 148 years ago, and so on down to the present day. In one of the best books I've read on the subject, Durable Inequality, Charles Tilly describes the process by which inequalities are not necessarily dissipated, but can also be reinforced over time. Christopher Hitchens makes a similar argument when it comes to reparations for slavery (I've never been convinced by this position until listening to this short piece by Hitchens). Thinking about these issues is always hard. My earlier post (linked above) in which I criticize McDonnell's announcement is nevertheless peppered with hedging, caveats, and apologetics for the Confederacy. So I understand how tough it is to negotiate these questions. That's really the heart of the problem: it's very hard to determine what a just relation between past, present and future generations is when past generations are dead, when future generations haven't been born, and when the present generation is rife with externalities, imperfect property rights regimes, and incomplete contracting. It's very hard to think about, but we still need to think about how our contracting behavior is embedded in the expanse of time.

The Virginia School of Political Economy
Of course, there are obstacles to this too. In many ways government has a much longer time horizon than private interests, but at other times it has a much shorter horizon, stretching only to the next election cycle. This is a nice segue into another Charlottesville legacy: The Virginia School of Political Economy. The founder of this school of thought is generally recognized to be Nobel laureate James Buchanan, currently of George Mason University. Buchanan was once the chairman of the University of Virginia's department of economics. He moved from there to Virginia Tech, and then on to George Mason University. All of these schools now have strong public choice theory programs.

As I understand it, there are two main research areas in this school of thought: the analysis of constitutions, and the analysis of rent-seeking behavior. I've only read the constitutional literature casually, but enough to be impressed by it and influenced by it. Buchanan's work on constitutions really provides an analytic structure to what I think is a very fundamental understanding of constitutions shared by many Americans. As I often say on here, "I really should read more of this," because it's good stuff. I've been less impressed with the work of these economists on rent-seeking, not because I dispute their insights so much as I dispute their emphasis. Government introduces the prospect for rent-seeking and rent-seeking is bad. Government officials are as self-interested as any private actor. I'm not impressed with these sorts of points because they strike me as being so obvious. Nobody has really laid out the "constitutional phase" in the detail that Buchanan has. But how many people have made the rent-seeking observations that Tullock has? Lot's - we've known about it for centuries. It strikes me as emphasizing the most obvious points and neglecting the most interesting points.

Friday, April 16, 2010

Critical Rationalism Blog

Commenter Lee Kelly (and Rafe Champion as well, it looks like?) have a blog called Critical Rationalism that I'd like to share with readers. I've only recently discovered it, and it doesn't look that old anyway (posts start in January).

The blog describes "critical rationalism" as:

"A kind of evolving philosophical tradition concerning how we should approach knowledge. It is the Socratic method only with a little bit of modern awareness. While most philosophical traditions regard knowledge as something that has to be certain and justified, CR takes the view that we don’t have ultimate answers, but knowledge is nevertheless possible. Truth is an endless quest"

I'm not personally familiar with it, but it sounds interesting and I plan on keeping up with their posts. I am severely under-educated when it comes to philosophy. But I am educated enough to locate my general impressions and approach to knowledge within the broader landscape of philosophy. I am generally speaking an empiricist and have an innate skepticism of systems that strike me as being excessively reliant on deduction. I see that critical rationalism draws heavily on Karl Popper. What I know of Popper is his views on falsifiability and on determinism. I've always associated Popperian falsifiability with empiricism, and of course his critique of determinism and historicism as being especially damning for rationalists. So I'm not quite sure how Popper fits in with "critical rationalism". I suppose that's the whole point - that "critical rationalism" tempers the excesses of some other rationalisms? I just don't know - I'll have to read the blog on a regular basis, and probably read more Popper too!

Thoughts from Keynes and Kuehn on Unemployment Insurance

The President recently signed an extension of unemployment insurance, so I thought it was a good time to share a somewhat surprising view of John Maynard Keynes on this sort of program. In the General Theory (1936), he wrote:

"It is curious how common sense, wriggling for an escape from absurd conclusions, has been apt to reach a preference for wholly 'wasteful' forms of loan expenditure rather than for partly wasteful forms, which, because they are not wholly wasteful, tend to be judged on strict 'business' principles. For example, unemployment relief financed by loans is more readily accepted than the financing of improvements at a charge below the current rate of interest; whilst the form of digging holes in the ground known as gold-mining, which not only adds nothing whatever to the real wealth of the world but involves the disutility of labour, is the most acceptable solution of all."

Of course, Keynesians have since reconciled themselves to unemployment insurance, but I thought this was an interesting objection from Keynes. And a very insightful first couple sentences on the irrationality of politicians.

I've generally been in support of strengthening unemployment insurance, but I find the concern about its impact on the unemployment rate to be valid - and it's something that increasingly concerns me as we continue to extend the program. My all-time favorite sentiment on unemployment insurance is from Martin Baily, who wrote that "unemployment may increase as a result of UI, but it matters less". We have to look at the impact on the unemployment rate as a trade off. Unemployment may increase with more generous benefits, but the discussion can't stop there. How does quality of life change as a result of the benefits? How important are the benefits for counter-cyclical spending and macro-stabilization? I'm getting increasingly leery of all these extensions - American unemployment insurance is beginning to look like the European safety net. But we have to be careful about too heavily emphasizing the impact on unemployment rate when the hiring rate is so abysmal. If hiring were stronger, pointing to unemployment insurance as the culprit might be more convincing. For now, it's on my radar but it's hard to get too upset about it. But if I had the choice between another extension or a stronger infrastructure spending bill plus a hiring tax credit, I'd choose the latter over more extensions to UI in a heart-beat.

I also wanted to share this Wall Street Journal piece that makes an important point about the benefits of a robust UI program. In this job market, job seekers jump on any offer that's made to them, regardless of whether it's the right match long-term. That's what's best for them now, but it could be trouble down the road. We want the right employer-employee matches made, and this article suggests that unemployment insurance can help provide the breathing room to make that match. If those matches are made out of recessionary desperation, you could see what Austrians call "malinvestment" of human capital, and what Arnold Kling has called a "recalculation" down the road when the mistake is revealed.

Life is full of trade-offs, and the unemployment insurance program is no exception. Decisions around this program are tough at a time like this - particularly after it has already been repeatedly extended. It's important to be honest about all the costs and all the benefits.

Links on States, Localities, and Federalism

Longer-term readers know I have a deep interest in federalism and the role of the states in American society. Our federal organization provides the opportunity for a lot of experimentation ("laboratories of democracy"), decentralization of power, more responsive government, and the development of distinct regional identities that make our culture more robust. Unfortunately, these opportunities are often wasted.

One thing I've been concerned about is the role that state governments have played in aggravating the downturn. Balanced budget practices that cut spending dramatically at the state level when revenue is down have neutralized much of the federal stimulus. Analysts who don't take the time to look further than the federal budget insist that we've implemented massive fiscal stimulus. But the emphasis on the federal budget is meaningless. Total government spending in the U.S. - spending that includes the state and local governments - has been much less pronounced. That's a huge danger that many proponents of fiscal stimulus seem to be unaware of, and the many opponents of fiscal stimulus seem to ignore when they decry Keynesianism in America today. However, we do have some good news. The Wall Street Journal reports today that state tax revenue has started to stabilize, and since budget cuts have largely been a response to reductions in revenue, this is a good thing. It still probably won't add any deficit spending, but the cuts should stop. Recently, Megan McArdle blogged on state debt levels, although I think her treatment leans too heavily on the very real moral hazard concern and doesn't engage enough of the other important issues that need to be considered. Finally, Veronique de Rugy does an abysmal job engaging the issue of intergovernmental transfers and the stimulus, and draws a lot of misleading conclusions. Thankfully, it's been thoroughly covered and disputed, but it is unfortunate. The last thing politicians need is more sloppy research to work with.

More good news is shared by Coordination Problem. They link to a paper by Robert Nelson on sub-local government. Nelson argues that sub-local governance structures can operate more efficiently than state and federal governments, and should be created more freely. Peter Boettke, highlights the fact that as government gets bigger, it also may very well be getting more decentralized as a result of these sub-local governance structures. This reminds me of something I blogged about last summer: the work that my great-grandfather (H. Vernon Eney) did in the sixties writing a new constitution (which was never ratified) for the state of Maryland. Most of my blog post focuses on the role that the discourse surrounding "states' rights" played in the failure to ratify, but it's also worth pointing out that one of Eney's biggest goals was to make it easier to establish and adjust sub-state governance structures. He wasn't thinking of sub-local organizations in particular. My understanding is that he was thinking of more regional structures. But the idea is the same: local communities can govern themselves better, and hamstringing these governance structures by relying on a more rigid system of states and counties can be counter-productive. Eney always emphasized that states' rights does not have to be a reactionary position. It is a very reformist position. He thought that the federal government demonstrated that it was not up to the task of solving a lot of modern social problems. An effective reform movement would have to strengthen the states to accomplish anything.

I'd also highlight some posts that Evan has written in the past on localism that are somewhat related. More recently, he's written on "what localism should not be" (his answer: "a romantically quixotic attack on the very technologies that are good for it"). This post rightly denounces the tendancy of people to equate localism with primitivism. He's also written on localism, food production, and culture, and I responded with some agreement and some critique.

Thursday, April 15, 2010

What We're Reading

I've seen a few bloggers update their readers on what they've been reading. Seems like a good exercise, particularly if we're reading relatively obscure stuff.

Daniel

I just finished reading Bertrand Russell's Freedom vs. Organization, which is basically a history of Europe from 1815-1914. What I liked about it was that it combined intellectual history and more traditional history. The chapters were very thematic. Malthus, Ricardo, Owen, James Mill (not John Stuart, oddly), and Marx were covered in depth, with others making appearances. It was largely about the breakdown of the conservative order, the liberal and/or nationalist orders that emerged from that, and the impending breakdown of that world order with WWI.

I just started Mike Rapport's 1848: Year of Revolution, which should be self-explanatory. If it isn't clear, I'm trying to read up on my 19th century history. I read a lot from the late 18th and early 19th century, and I've recently read more about the 1920s and the depression, and I'm trying to fill in the gap. This is very good so far, although I'm not very far into it. Getting a great portrait of Metternich painted for me right now.

After this I'll read either J.R. Hicks's Value and Capital, which I've been meaning to read for a while, or the first volume of Joseph Dorfman's The Economic Mind in American Civilization (Dorfman, as I understand it, was Murray Rothbard's dissertation advisor). I wasn't aware of that when I got this three-volume set.

In terms of articles and other stuff, I've been reading some Orwell, Achebe, and Wittgenstein for a fleeting idea I had about language. May or may not return to it. I've also been reading up on aggregate labor supply issues (Hall, Prescott) for a new paper I'm working on about job creation tax credits.

Evan

During the past few weeks my reading has revolved around a course I'm taking in the history department at UChicago on structures of knowledge in modern Europe. Most of this has been selections rather than full books. I did work through all of Foucault's History of Sexuality v.1, however, and a sizable portion of Discipline and Punish, both written during his genealogical period (1976 and 1977, respectively). I'm sorry to say that this was my first real interaction with Foucault, but I was utterly impressed and do hope to get into some more of his work before too long. My interests have recently shifted much more to the sort of historicization of knowledge with which Foucault's projects are identified, and his work has been a real contribution to my current thinking on this process (I've discussed some of these issues at my other blog... this was written before I had any interaction with Foucault). I've also just finished part of Andrew Abbott's The System of Professions. Abbott is a Chicago sociologist and another writer worth your time; he's done a lot with questions of method and exploring academia from a sociological perspective. This book is his 1988 study that presents a theory of professional knowledge. His main concern is to counter previous professionalization theories that inadequately account for variation amongst the professions, and to present an account based on competition for jurisdictions of professional knowledge. Alongside Abbott, we read two essays by Pierre Bourdieu, again my first interaction. In both "Intellectual Field and Creative Project" and "The Field of Cultural Production", Bourdieu examines the structures of recognition and reception for cultural and artistic work. From all of these readings, I'm gaining an appreciation of the genuinely useful work of social theory, but also a frustration at the depth of the literature that needs to be engaged for any serious benefit of it. From the vantage point of my studies in theology, the task is daunting considering I have my own disciplinary literature to work with.

I also just recently finished Louis Menand's The Metaphysical Club, one of my few non-research related readings of late. My wife was shocked that I was actually reading a book with so many prizes and so much critical acclaim attached to it, and it's true that this isn't my normal material... usually I'm blissfully ignorant of what's on the wider cultural radar and sort of make my own way with the problems that I'm working on at the moment. Paths crossed in this case, however, as I'm trying to read more on pragmatism; this is the philosophical background of my doctoral adviser at Chicago and I've recently formed a strong interest in it through his influence. The book was a delight to read, covering important intellectual figures between the Civil War and World War I who were central to what's now called "pragmatism". One thing that struck me as I went along, however, was that Menand spoke much less explicitly about pragmatism than I would have expected. There were as many pages devoted to Darwinism or probability as there were to any straightforward account of pragmatism. I appreciated this approach, as it resisted any temptation to lump figures into a monochromatic school of thought. This was an account of biographies and intellectual trends forming a broad web of development during a pivotal time in American history, and the telling of it all was as seamless as it was diverse.

Wednesday, April 14, 2010

The "Internet Austrians": a Blog Review

One of both Evan and my interests is intellectual history, and I am specifically interested in the history of economic thought. As the spate of recent posts demonstrates, one of my particular fascinations is the Austrian school of economics. The Austrian school interests me because its very insularity has allowed for the growth of some very original thinking - a lot good in my opinion, and a lot bad. It is also very libertarian in character, and so it is well within the classical liberal tradition. Of course, this makes it a bit of an ally for me. But again, there's a contrast: I find that Austrian school thinking in a lot of ways threatens the prospect of self-government, which in my view is inextricably linked to the preservation of liberty (the most extreme example is Hans-Hermann Hoppe's political framework). So for me, the Austrian school is a study in contrasts. One feature of Austrian economists is that they are very active on the Internet. In an exchange I had with a Wikipedia editor, he called them "the Internet Austrians," and remarked on the somewhat frustrating task of ensuring that they don't completely dominate the economics entries in the online encyclopedia! Go to any Wikipedia entry on economics - you're bound to find an "Austrian position on X" appended to it, and they're usually quite thorough. Another outlet for Austrians has of course been blogs.

For a while, I've been wanting to write a post reviewing the Austrian blogs out there to help direct uninitiated readers to relevant bloggers, and perhaps to solicit reactions from readers who are familiar with these blogs that may be different from my reaction. Recently, I've had cause to write such a review post: I am taking Cafe Hayek, an Austrian blog I've followed for quite a while, off my blog roll. A string of posts has made me realize it's really not worth checking up on - and the best way to abstain is just to not get updates from them. When two professional economists, in one week, completely miscommunicate the concept of externalities, inflation, and stimulus/fiscal policy, I start to wonder why I even read it. The inflation post was especially disappointing - the author didn't even seem to be aware of elements of inflation that are explained in Concise Encyclopedia of Economics's entry on it - and this encyclopedia is maintained by his colleagues! Cafe Hayek does offer two things that might interest readers: politics-heavy posting with a strong libertarian emphasis, and a very active comment section. But a warning on both; the political posting is very light on actual economics (which is part of the reason I'm realizing I'm wasting my time). For example, in the recent stimulus post there's no attempt to explain the argument for stimulus or even provide an analytic counter-argument to stimulus. Instead, the author calls it "magic", dismisses it, and moves on. There's little substance. My caution on the comment section is that it's very hostile. Again, it's hard to carry on a substantive discussion because if you're out of their mainstream your thoughts are only occasionally engaged (and there are some very good commenters on there - don't get me wrong) - more often they're caricatured and dismissed with a lot of name-calling.

So that's a long review of what I've concluded is not a very constructive Austrian school blog. Now I want to run through some better ones.

Coordination Problem: It's really unfortunate that I discovered Coordination Problem so late. This is an excellent blog. Occasionally there are some ideological posts, but the vast majority of it is very substantive economics. And it's heavy-duty Austrian economics as well. We all know that governments can't plan economies and freedom is good. That's often as far as Cafe Hayek goes. Coordination Problem moves beyond these superficial insights and gets into Austrian epistemology, Austrian capital theory, and a lot of interesting material (namely, the stuff that makes Austrian economics unique - opposition to planning, the Austrian perspective on knowledge, the market as a discovery mechanism, etc. aren't really unique to the Austrian school, although they're certainly an integral part of it). When its authors dispute Keynes you get the impression that they really understand Keynes, which is refreshing. The comment section is also great. Much less hostile, and another thing I've noticed is that a lot of big-name economists comment on their blog, which is great. And when the authors comment it's to really engage the commenters. Hats off to Peter Boettke, Steve Horwitz, and everyone else at Coordination Problem.

Econlog: Econlog is run by several economists associated with George Mason. It's also very good. I'll step on a few toes and say that I very much enjoy reading Arnold Kling and Bryan Caplan, but I don't really prefer David Henderson. Henderson's posts can be more in the Cafe Hayek-style of over-simplifying his opponents and veering into political ideology heavy posts. Some readers may like that, it's just not what I prefer. Arnold Kling's "recalculation story" for recessions that he often shares is very interesting and important. I think he oversells it, but it's definitely a contributor to how I think about the business cycle. Bryan Caplan reminds me of the "Freakonomics" mentality in economics - he gets into a lot of interesting issues that aren't necessarily in economics proper. Some people call that disciplinary imperialism - I call it good reading. The comment section here is at a mid-point between Cafe Hayek and Coordination Problem. Medium-hostile and medium-substantive.

Mises.org: Although I think some people might resent me saying this, the Mises Institute is really the mothership of American Austrian economics. There are major Mises-Hayek and Mises-Rothbard rifts for some people, which is why I say some people might resent that. But all in all, the site is full of lots of good material. If you're interested in internicene disputes within the Austrian school (I'm generally not), this is a good blog for that. Comment section isn't that hostile. One concern I always have about the Mises posts is that they definitely fall into this trap of caricaturing positions they disagree with. It's hard to get anything out of that. I'm a Keynesian. How am I supposed to take a post seriously when it's refuting a dumbed down version of Keynes that I feel I have no relation to? I can't. So that can be an obstacle to really getting anything out of these posts. But the introspective posts can be interesting.

Economic Thought: I definitely recommend this blog, but it does have some bugs. It regularly fails at this problem of caricaturing alternative positions. It also comes across as being obsessed with countering every word that comes out of Paul Krugman's mouth (and again, usually by changing what he said). Nevertheless, I recommend it because like the Mises blog, it has some really good insights on the Austrian school itself. It's also written by some very well read, articulate, and energetic students out in California - and as a young, aspiring scholar myself I respect that. The comment section is a little sparse, but that's the curse of small blog that we understand well here at Facts and Other Stubborn Things. That's a reason to go read it and leave a comment - not to ignore it!

Monetary Freedom: Mostly monetary and macro Austrian blogging. Posting is occasional. I have to say I haven't been truly drawn into his posts, but I've enjoyed many of them. I'm not particularly familiar with this one.

ThinkMarkets: I think this needs to replace Cafe Hayek on my blogroll. Up until now I really haven't followed Mario Rizzo, but I have found my way to this blog on several occasions because people have linked to him, and I've been very impressed. Mario reminds me of the authors at Coordination Problem, insofar as he has an excellent command of Austrian theory and he writes substantive economics posts - not political ideology. He doesn't do the Road to Serfdom Lite kind of posts that you can get on Cafe Hayek or from David Henderson at Econlog. Rizzo is a meat-and-potatoes Austrian. He also doesn't caricature Keynes. In fact, I often feel like he has a better grasp of Keynes than many Keynesians do. He occasionally falls into this "if you're not an Austrian you don't like free markets" hooey, but nobody's perfect. I can't comment on his comment section - as I said, I don't really follow this one closely but I think that's going to have to change.

Not-really-Austrian/More Libertarian Blogs

Money Illusion: Not really an Austrian blog, but a lot of Austrians think well of Scott Sumner, as do I. He offers a very unique perspective on monetary policy. He has me half-convinced. His posts are always epic - I rarely get a chance to read the whole thing.

Megan McArdle: Another not-technically-Austrian. She's libertarian. She's always an excellent read. she's well thought of among many Austrians.

Others worth checking out

I don't know why, but I still don't follow Tyler Cowen. A lot of people rave about him - I really need to follow him. The Independent Institute might have a blog - they occasionally have interesting articles. I think The Freeman might have a blog. Will Wilkinson has a libertarian blog that's more politically focused (which is mostly why I haven't followed him). Cato has a blog that I don't follow. Reason has a blog I don't follow but that I've heard good things about. These all may be worth checking out if your interests lie on the libertarian side of things and not the substantive Austrian economics side of things (with the exception of Cowen, who definitely does substantive economics... although I'm not sure if he's technically an Austrian).