Friday, April 9, 2010

Appomattox

One hundred and forty five years ago today, General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered to General Grant in Appomattox, Virginia. It's an interesting time for this anniversary, given the flurry of responses to Governor McDonnell's recent declaration of Confederate History Month in Virginia. Without going into too much detail (the discussion is getting wearying), I personally think that it's not unreasonable to commemorate the Confederacy, but that it needs to be done in a very open and honest way. Governor McDonnell was wrong to not even mention the role that slavery played in the war, initially. He has since retreated from that position, which is good.

It is very bad history to anthropomorphize institutions. Institutions are complex, and they are composed of individuals with all manner of interests and goals. Too many people in this discussion have tried to apply adjectives like "racist" or "pro-slavery" to the Confederacy as an institution. It's a very hard charge to deny, considering the fact that secession would have been practically inconceivable without slavery. But I think we have a very impoverished view of the Confederacy if we end the discussion there. We have an especially impoverished view of Virginia's role in the Confederacy if we leave it there. When secession was primarily about slavery, Virginia voted against secession, as did many border states. This isn't to say that Virginians at the time were abolitionists; for the most part they and most Americans obviously weren't abolitionists. It's simply to say that the simple reactionary racism that many people attribute to the Confederacy doesn't seem to apply to Virginia in quite the same way that it applies to South Carolina or Georgia, who were among the first to secede before any army was raised in the North. And of course this doesn't even begin to engage the point that the interests and goals of the elite who spearheaded secession were not necessarily in line with the interests and goals of rank and file Confederates.

In other words, I think we make a mistake if we demonize Virginia and the Confederacy by reducing the entire society to a single dimension, like slavery, just as it would be a mistake to reduce other eminent slave owners like Washington and Jefferson to that single dimension. That's not a call to ignore slavery, of course. While I think it would be a mistake to demonize Virginia and the Confederacy, it would be both a mistake and an insult to deify the Confederacy and whitewash the slavery issue the way McDonnell's original proclamation effectively did.

Maybe I'm hedging too much, but I don't think I am. I'm not trying to deny the role of slavery, and I'm not defending secession. I just feel like people are overcompensating in their response to a truly thoughtless declaration by McDonnell. I've heard a lot of Nazi Germany comparisons, which I think are utterly indefensible. What justifies these comparisons? That the Confederacy was unapologetically a slave society? If that's the case then the antebellum United States itself could equally be compared to Nazi Germany, as could any of the numerous slave societies throughout history. I'm not quite sure this comparison is meaningful or helpful. It's one thing to say that for too long the South clung to an immoral institution that pervaded human society for much of its history. That is certainly true. But we have to be able to differentiate people who happened to have been born into this appalling institutional arrangement near the time of its death throes (like the Confederate secessionists) from people who invented wholly new terrors, hatreds, and immoralities and forcefully imposed them on a previously liberal, free, and democratic society (like the Nazis did). How different, really, was Robert E. Lee from General Washington? If nothing but their birthdays had been switched we would be honoring Lee and denouncing Washington. And if both these men were born in twentieth century Virginia, would either of them be advocating for the fresh imposition of chattel slavery the way Hitler advocated a fresh imposition of genocide on German society? Of course they wouldn't. Nothing in the historical record indicates they would even conceive of that. They knew what they were doing was wrong, but the inertia of the institution itself was too much for them to resist. So they refused to resist the institution of slavery. That isn't admirable, but it is different from what the Nazis did.

These are devastating human failures to think about. It's part of the reason why I largely stay away from Civil War history, and why I primarily read the history of the early Republic. The stain of the sin of slavery is still there in the early Republic, but somehow it's less distressing precisely because it hasn't yet come to the fore. And maybe that's a failure on my part - a failure to engage the hard issues.

But I suppose in the end that's my point. I take issue with some of the criticisms, which I think are hyperbolic to the point of obscuring the real suffering under slavery. But even more than taking issue with those people, who at least see the problem as a problem, I take issue with the people who would whitewash history of any problems. Not every tragic period of history is comparable to the Nazis; but what kind of mindset actually closes its eyes to the very deepest tragedy that is still influencing our society today - the tragedy of slavery? I don't know what motivates that sort of practiced ignorance. Nothing good motivates it.

The End of Science

Recently I was engaging in a very important task: honing one of my Pandora stations. Anyway, "Dodo", by Dave Matthews, came up and I was really struck by the lyrics:

"Once upon a time
When the world was just a pancake
Fears would arise
That if you went too far, you'd fall

But with the
Passage of time
It all became more of a ball
We're as sure of that
As we all once were when the world was flat

So I wonder this
As life billows smoke inside my head
This little game
Where nothing is sure
"

It reminded me of a tendency that laypeople have when they argue about contentious science. It comes up especially in discussions of evolution or climate change. Someone will inevitably say something like "well they used to think the world was flat - so you're being really foolish to embrace evolution [climate change] now because someday science could completely revolutionize what we think". A flat earth can just as easily be replaced by a geocentric solar system or any number of other things.

I think this is a very misleading way of thinking about science that completely ignores the historical context in which we live. In terms of the stretch of human history - and the time that it's taken to build up our institutions, traditions, and dogmas - empirical science is a very recent phenomenon. We could date it to the "scientific revolution", but that even overstates the case, because it's taken even longer for science to get the right tools, critical mass of funding and personnel, and theoretical infrastructure to really do empirical science well. You had your Newtons and your Copernicuses, but they were few and far between. The result is that we've seen a lot of revolutionary ideas in science in relatively recent history, and I think this gives the false impression that science will continue to revise our understanding of the world.

If there is some ontological consistency to this universe, we shouldn't continually revise our understanding of our world, at least not radically. And if there's not this ontological consistency, then we really have no business doing empirical science in the first place! I think this has important implications for science over the next several centuries, and I'll outline them below:

1. Major discoveries that alter the way we think about the world will eventually end. We evolved from lower life forms. Our planet revolves around a star. The universe started in a massive explosion and it's expanding at a reasonably predictable rate. The earth has tectonic plates. These things aren't going to be revised. They may be refined, but the insights are probably here to stay. It is in this sense that I speak of the "end of science" in the title - the big exciting discoveries are going to start to reach a stasis.

2. Science will of course continue - and we'll probably have more scientists in the future. But the scientists of the future will more likely be catalogers and engineers. Just because we're going to develop a stable framework of how we view the universe doesn't mean that there won't be new things to learn. For example, we may have the broad strokes of evolution worked out and understood, but we'll never run out of work tracing out the history of individual species. We also will start to place more emphasis on applied science. In the future, we may even be able to start directing evolution - you will hear about "evolutionary engineers". But of course this won't change the theory of evolution substantially. It will be an application of the theory.

3. Some fields will not reach a stasis and will continue to be marked by contention and new discovery for quite a while - string theory and highly theoretical physics that may escape easy empirical confirmation, neuroscience, etc., have subject matters that are so complex they may continue to be fruitful when it comes to new discoveries.

4. Social science will increasingly be recognized as a science, which unfortunately it hasn't in all quarters. People will realize that it's ridiculous to think of studies of the social behavior of birds and apes as "science", but somehow not consider the study of the social behavior of humans "science". In many cases, the study of human society has been far more methodologically rigorous than the study of sociality in other animals. This will dawn on people and social science will gain new respect. As with neuroscience, the complexity and the feedback loops in human society will mean that fruitful new discoveries will persist for quite a while.

5. And finally, my hedge: of course some area that is now considered pseudo-science could end up being real and a lot of new discoveries and fruitful work will happen. It probably won't happen, but it always could. In a similar vein, someone could establish that previously nebulous ideas like the soul or spirit are subject to some sort of empirical verification (think in terms of the metachlorion in Star Wars that gave The Force to the Jedi). If somebody stumbled on a material basis for what was previously considered a spiritual phenomenon, of course that would open whole new vistas in empirical science. Unlike my previous four forecasts, though, there's absolutely no way foreseeing this sort of thing. My first four forecasts are fairly standard - this one gets into Kuhnian paradigm shift territory that is less tractable.

Of course my title is a reference to Francis Fukuyama's famous piece on "The End of History", which promptly crashed and burned. I use the reference intentionally - projecting far into the future and situating ourselves in time is always a fun thought experiment, but you always have to recognize the risks as well. It could all be wrong.

Good Thoughts from Peter Boettke

Facts and Other Stubborn Things got mentioned by Peter Boettke at Coordination Problem recently, discussing my post on the potential for a Keynesian-Austrian synthesis. I'm grateful that Boettke was so gracious, given the tone I can take when I talk about the Austrian School sometimes. I suppose the moral of the story is, if you're less shrill than Krugman, you get somewhat of a pass. In seriousness, though, Boettke offers a very thoughtful point:

"To me the issue is that what Austrians and Keynesians share is neither methodology nor analytic, but instead the recognition of the complex problem situation within which individuals find themselves in making their economic decisions. The "dark forces of time and ignorance" ensnare us, but the guiding role of relative prices and the discipline of profit and loss (and other institutions that undergird the market economy) work to coordinate economic plans and realize the mutual gains of trade and social cooperation under the division of labor. Coordination problems result when the price signals of the market get distorted and the discipline of profit and loss get softened by government actions. As Roger Garrison has situated the Austrian theory, when money is viewed as a tight joint (as in the New Classical theory) there are no macroeconomic problems, and when money is viewed as a broken joint (as in the Keynesian theory) there is no market solution to the problems of business cycles. But in the Austrian theory, money is viewed as a loose joint, and thus disturbances in a nominal variable can have real effects."

I think this frames it very well. I would push back a little on his loose vs. broken joint point. Lawrence Klein once wrote:

"It is wrong to think that Keynes’ system fails if it cannot predict pessimistic results. The pessimism is not inherent in this system; instead the determinants behind the system make it operate either pessimistically or optimistically, depending on the current state of affairs in economic and non-economic life."

The point is, Keynes's liquidity preference theory provided him with a great deal of flexibility in his models. This is what really justified calling it a "general" theory, because he could specify cases in which monetary policy held no power at all, and cases in which money worked as you'd expect it to in a classical system. So in that sense, I think Boettke is wrong to pigeonhole Keynes. But his review of the outlook and the problems that the two schools are grappling with is prescient.

That said, commenter Rafe Champion raises another good point:

"Trying to make a big deal out of agreement between Austrians and Keynesians on the problem of uncertainty is a no brainer because everything depends on where you go from that point."

Of course, there's nothing particularly insightful about that. The question for me isn't "where does the somewhat common Keynesian and Austrian starting point leave us?" - the question for me is "does where they go from that point really conflict so much that it can't be integrated? Do they both have good ideas on 'where to go from there' that aren't contradictory, just different?". My standard line on Austrian Business Cycle Theory is that it is "necessary but not sufficient". I buy almost every word of what you would think of as traditional Austrian business cycle theory. I simply don't think it fully explains the dynamics that contribute to downturns, and I think there are many downturns it doesn't help explain at all. But it is exactly on target, when it's applicable. I don't see why ABCT can't be used by a Keynesian.

Wednesday, April 7, 2010

The Austrian Problem

Yes, another post on the Austrian School. The catalyst is an initial post on what's wrong with Austrian economics by Martin Wolf, with responses by Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman.

Martin Wolf essentially solicits reactions to the Austrian School - it looks like there's been a lively exchange in the comment section, but I haven't reviewed it yet. DeLong gives eight alleged tenets of the Austrian School, and ends up giving the thumbs up to one of them but a thumbs down to all the others. I think he could probably qualify a few of his thumbs downs, but he's largely on target. Krugman, as usual, has some very prescient insights.

The first is the fundamental asymmetry of the Austrian argument about the business cycle:

"In practice, Austrians seem to be Keynesians during booms without knowing it; they realize that high demand produces a boom, but don’t realize that this contradicts their own theory of slumps."

His point is that if Austrians had a more consistent position on human action, they'd recognize that the very processes that they abhor in an artificial, sub-optimal boom can also cause an artificial, sub-optimal depression. Simply recognizing that would bring the Austrians considerably closer to reality. So why don't they recognize it? Krugman suggests:

"And the key to all this, I believe, is that the Austrian abhorrence of explicit models, even for the purposes of clarifying thought, leaves them unaware of the holes in their account."

Austrians actually take pride in their methodological dogmatism and backwardness, but it prevents them from really scrutinizing their own ideas. The result is that you still have Austrians today quoting Hayek and von Mises. There is very little (some, but little) innovation, precisely because there is no introspection. And where innovation does occur, it's largely political/philosophical/ideological innovation. Austrians are happy to highlight the disagreements between "left Rothbardians", "minarchists", or denizens of the anti-democratic Hans-Hermann Hoppe. If you throw the more traditional libertarians and Randians into the mix, it is a quite interesting intellectual stew. But the point is, it's mostly political philosophy: their economics is stagnant pond water. One of the few exceptions to this is Roger Garrison's macroeconomics, but even he simply formalizes Hayek. I don't know him too well, so I want to be careful about passing judgement too harshly, but he doesn't really seem to add anything new to Hayek's Pure Theory of Capital. Moreover, there's nothing in Hayek or Garrison that really refutes Keynesian macroeconomics - it simply presents another view. And I think that view is valuable. Austrian ideas on capital structure are interesting. But it's not really a response to what other people are saying - it's just sort of floating out there on its own.

Anyway, I've been thinking about this "Austrian problem" for awhile now. There's a lot of energy there. There are a couple genuinely interesting insights that would be useful to incorporate into more mainstream econoimcs. But as a whole, it doesn't really measure up because it isn't really introspective in any meaningful way, and it habitually caricatures and distorts what the other side of the argument is saying. A good example is Jonathan Finegold Catalan, who writes for Economic Thought, and occassionally the Mises Institute. Catalan is a student at San Diego State University, and I've really enjoyed following his blogging because I identify a lot with him - a young guy, trying to strike out on his own on a blog, deeply interested in economics and the history of economic thought. But it's been getting hard to maintain interest. Post after post after post has been degenerating into an imputation of ideas to people he disagrees with - almost always Paul Krugman. I don't always agree with Krugman either, but I get frustrated with this scripted version of "what Krugman said" that the Austrian School works from. One of the things that they like to talk about is this "consumption myth" - that Krugman and Keynesians think all consumption is good and savings is always bad. They make off the cuff remarks about government always being a solution. Barney Frank said arguing with the LaRouche crowd is like arguing with a kitchen table. I would give somewhat more credit to the Austrian School: it's like arguing with a broken record for them.

Sorry if this bores everyone - it's sort of a niche interest of mine. As I said in a recent post I do think that the very insularity that has made the Austrian School so off-base and bizarre in many respects has also facilitated the development of a few very interesting ideas that we should capitalize on. Any other thoughts and suggestions are welcome.

Monday, April 5, 2010

Intellectual Arbitrage: A Keynesian-Austrian Synthesis?

"Arbitrage" describes a situation where someone takes advantage of a price differential to make a profit. For example, if the same TV were selling in New York City for $200 and in Chicago for $250, and the cost per TV of transporting them between the two cities was only $10, someone could buy TVs in New York for $200, sell them in Chicago for $250, and make a $40 profit. They'd be crazy not to keep selling them this way until the price differential was eliminated. The logic of arbitrage drives the so called "law of one price" in economics and the assumption that economic profits (as opposed to accounting profits, which are somewhat different) are always driven to zero by market forces.

The concept of arbitrage is useful more broadly, of course. It's applicable in any situation where a previously unexploited differential furnishes the opportunity for considerable gain. All this is simply an introduction to a very brief thought I had this morning on a potential intellectual synthesis. Some of the greatest advances in science - particularly social science, where competing theories are more likely to coexist than in natural science - occur as a result of the synthesis of two previously competing ideas. The history of philosophy is full of such syntheses as well.

This morning, checking my blog roll, I stumbled across a post that reconfirmed earlier thoughts I've had about the prospect for a Keynesian-Austrian synthesis while listening to a Roger Garrison lecture. At the Coordination Problem blog, Peter Boettke of George Mason University wrote this of a new Hayek resource online:

"It is well worth looking through the entire site and the reading list for both economics and politics. Friedman has been pushing for the epistemic turn in economics and politics since the founding of Critical Review in the 1980s, and during that time Jeff's work with the journal has gotten major intellectual recognition twice -- during the political science perestroika dispute over rational choice theory, and during the last year over the financial crisis. In both instances, the same Hayekian insight into human ignorance was a central element in his explanation for how we need to reorient economics and politics."

If you took out "Hayekian" in that last sentence, I could have sworn this post was by Prof. Skidelsky talking about the Keynesian revolution. Human ignorance and uncertainty drives both the Keynesian system and the Austrian system, albeit in somewhat different ways. There really is considerable common ground between Keynesians and the Austrian School of economics. There are gaping chasms separating the two, as well, believe me. For all that I enjoy reading the Austrians, there is no way I could ever attend a school like George Mason. They're epistemologically out of their gourds, there are some insights I consider completely wrong, and they're a very ideological bunch generally. But there are pearls of wisdom in the Austrian School and considerable common ground that gets ignored, I think, because of their other eccentricities.
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As I alluded to, I had this reaction before listening to Garrison's macroeconomics. I think of it whenever I hear an Austrian badmouth Joe Stiglitz, because I've always thought that the work that Stiglitz won the Nobel Prize for and the work that Hayek won his Nobel for are on a very similar wavelength. The hostility just seems so wasteful to me. I had this gut reaction about the potential for intellectual arbitrage a couple months ago when Boettke renamed his blog "Coordination Problem" in the first place (I can't find the initial name... I think it was simply "Austrian Economics Blog"). I did a double take when they announced that name because so called "coordination problems" are so central to Keynesian microfoundations. Why in the world would an Austrian blog take that name? Apparently, because they think in those terms too. I was first introduced to the idea of emergent order and a self-organizing economy by uber-Keynesian Paul Krugman's book on the subject. It was only years later that I even learned that the Austrian School cares deeply about those issues as well. Cafe Hayek's subtitle references the concept of "emergence" and they regularly post on the idea. Who knew? Similarly, the phenomenon I've always called "unintended consequences" or simply "counterfactuals" is the same as a concept that the Austrians feel like they own under the moniker "seen and unseen" (from a famous Fredric Bastiat piece).

Of course not everything will be reconciled, but I think there's a huge potential for arbitrage between the Austrian School of economics and Keynesian economics that is not being exploited. Keynesians barely pay attention to the Austrian School, because for the most part they're unaware of its existence. They feel that they have bigger fish to fry (and as a practical matter, they probably do). Austrians are very aware of the existence of Keynesians, but they're absolutely committed to the idea of some mortal-foe death match between the two camps. Since Keynesians generally don't bother engaging Austrians, the Austrians have a habit of imputing ideas to Kenyesians. Of course this isn't intellectually productive at all. The highly ideologically-tinged atmosphere of the Austrian School also tends to degenerate into accusing Keynesians of being socialists. And once you're branded a socialist, the opportunity for constructive dialogue is reduced considerably as well. Readers of this blog know I think there's a lot wrong with the Austrians, and I do enjoy mocking their eccentricities. But I keep coming back to them because it's a very interesting and very different perspective that I do think has a few things to offer.

I have a few very specific ideas for how one might go about synthesizing Keynesianism and the Austrian School that I'll probably try to write up at some point over the next year. I was curious if readers knew of any previous attempts at such a project. I know John Hicks had a healthy dose of respect for the Austrians, and both Keynesians and Austrians admire Wicksell - but I'm not really aware of any previous attempt besides that. I know some history of thought people and several Austrians regularly check in on this blog, so I'm counting on you - do you know of any examples?


UPDATE: Steve Horwitz makes an important point in the comment section of Coordination Problem. It is wrong to say (as I also did above) that Hayek got the Nobel prize for his work on knowledge and information. He got the price for his work on macroeconomics and social institutions. It was the prize lecture that was the opening salvo in Hayek's valuable work on knowledge.

Thursday, April 1, 2010

Pearls Before Swine and John Maynard Keynes

Animal Spirits: "Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal spirits—a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities." - The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936)

*****

Do-nothing long-run focused economics: "Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is past the ocean is flat again." - A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923)

In addition to the comforts of alcohol: "I should have drunk more champagne" - attributed last words before dying in 1946

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Mankiw on Taxes

There's been an interesting exchange in the blogosphere on taxes originating with this post from Greg Mankiw. Mankiw makes the reasonable version of Arthur Laffer's point when he writes:

"High tax rates tend to depress GDP. Looking at taxes as a percentage of GDP may mislead us into thinking we can increase tax revenue more than we actually can"

A fair point. But that's when things start to get weird. He follows up with:

"For some purposes, a better statistic may be taxes per person, which we can compute using this piece of advanced mathematics: Taxes/GDP x GDP/Person = Taxes/Person"

Basically, more productive, more advanced, wealthier countries will count as having more burdensome taxes than other countries, holding all else equal. This is inherent in his metric - a logical necessity of the metric that he thinks may be "better" under some circumstances. I really hope we learn that someone hacked into Mankiw's blog and posted this before Greg noticed. This is pretty weird, and unfortunate coming from someone like him. This was first brought to my attention when I saw the inflammatory title of Matt Yglesias's post on it in my blogroll. I very often disagree with Yglesias on economics, so I thought Yglesias must have read something wrong. I often agree with Brad DeLong, so when I saw it next from him on my blogroll, I got more curious. Then I scrolled down to read the original Mankiw post, and sure enough: weird, crazy, and makes you wonder about the Harvard Economics department.

*I actually don't wonder about the Harvard Economics Department. I have a great deal of respect for Mankiw, I often agree with him, and I'm sure this was just one of those posts that slipped out before he got the chance to think about it.

The Long Shadow of History

Gunnar Myrdal called it the "American Dilemma". The American idea of race is, like all understandings of "race", unique and historically contingent; and for America, the load-bearing pillar of "race" is the divide between Black and White. At various points the Irish, Poles, Jews, or Hispanics have had important roles to play as well. But these concerns have been more transitory and less fundamental than the "Black/White idea".

One of the most important reasons why the Black/White idea has been so immutable is that it has been irrevocably tied up with so much of the rest of our identity. The American idea of liberty can never rid itself of its relationship with chattel slavery. Not only did some of the greatest proponents of human liberty actually own slaves, but these proponents made clear in no uncertain terms their failing or at least their inconsistency on the question.

The Black/White idea was driven even deeper into American identity as George Washington's worries about sectional animosities between East and West were, within a generation, replaced with far greater sectional differences between North and South. While the East-West division that flared up in armed rebellion soon after independence was purely a struggle between white Americans, the later North-South division couldn't avoid entanglement with the White/Black idea. Whatever the causes of the Civil War (and I am one that thinks it's entirely appropriate to discount the extent to which many people claim it was simply a "war over slavery"), one thing remains absolutely clear: the power, entitlement, legislative dominance, and identity of the antebellum South was crucially dependent on the enslavement of black Americans.

This struggle, and repeated episodes afterwards from Appomattox to the Civil Rights Act, began to fuse racism and the Black/White idea to the concept of "states' rights". Never mind the fact that the famous abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison was also a secessionist (albeit for the North). The Confederacy beat him to it, and since then assertive states have been associated with racism. If history had gone slightly differently and Garrison had gotten his way, assertive state governments could have been associated with abolitionism. Calls for secession of the North also appeared when Texas - a slave state - enthusiastically joined the Union in 1845.

But history casts a long shadow, particularly the history of the Black/White idea as it relates to states' rights. As a result, Arkansas has remained on the sidelines of the legal fight over the health insurance mandate that is being waged by several state attorney generals. The sordid history of states' rights is especially sensitive for Arkansas, which defied the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education ruling, when Governor Faubus refused to integrate Little Rock Central High School in 1957. Faubus called up the Arkansas National Guard to prevent integration. After attempting to talk him down, President Eisenhower responded by sending the 101st Airborne into Little Rock, and federalizing the Arkansas National Guard (yes, that second one is unequivocally constitutional, Tea Partiers).

Many states have defied federal authority in the past, but Arkansas was one of the few states in recent history who has had the "burnished rows of steel" at the disposal of the federal government arrayed against their assertion of states' rights. Understandably, the state is not jumping at the chance to defy the federal government again (the fact that its current governor is a Democrat probably influences this as well, although he also cites this history).

I think all this baggage carried by "states' rights" is understandable and it should be acknowledged, but it's also very unfortunate. It hamstrings legitimate assertions of states' rights and valuable progress at the state level. The fact is, there is no inherent reason to believe that everything is best done by the federal government. The federal government doesn't make that sort of blanket claim, of course, but what is a state to do in the instances when the federal government does make that claim for itself? Often, fear or precedent ensure that the default solution is a federal solution. I think this is extremely unhealthy for our democracy. What's even more unhealthy is that the gut reaction of many people seems to be either to (1.) fully acknowledge the darker history of states' rights and insist that all modern assertions of states' rights are racist, or (2.) pretend that the darker history of states' rights doesn't even exist and assume that all assertion of state authority over federal authority is innocent, legitimate, and ideal. Neither of these positions are intelligent or helpful. Unfortunately, you usually hear one or the other.

Last year, I wrote about a specific case in Maryland, in the 1960s, where knee-jerk reactions to the idea of "states' rights" scuttled potentially valuable reform that is near and dear to my heart. You may want to take a look at that as well.

Note: Rockwell's iconic painting depicts an incident in

New Orleans, not the incident in Little Rock

Monday, March 29, 2010

Good Historical Precedent for the Mandate

I've had a couple of posts up recently on misuses of American history to justify political or ideological positions today. The other day I wrote specifically about a liberal abuse of history that attempted to justify the health insurance mandate (which readers know I have major reservations about, despite my strong support for other elements of health reform). This morning, I noticed that Brad DeLong links to Paul O'Rourke's much, much better example of historical precedent for an insurance mandate (DeLong was also the source of the less convincing example I critiqued earlier). The legislation in question comes from the early Republic - the Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen, of July 1798 (the Adams administration). The act laid a tax on all privately employed sailors, collected by their employers, of 20 cents a month (a lump sum payroll tax, essentially) to provide hospital care for the sailors. O'Rourke provides the full text of the law. Of course there are some differences - there is still no "mandate" per se (then again, there was nothing to mandate, as there was no health insurance at the time) - but the more fundamental point is the tax imposed on all sailors, whether they want the hospital care or not. This is the same mechanism that is being used to implement the mandate today.

I don't think this answers all the Constitutional questions. After all, I actually went in to the text of the Constitution to debunk the last attempt to justify the mandate, which I don't do here. I would think this one would be justified with the Article 1, Section 8 power to lay taxes and appropriate funds for the general welfare. One argument I could make is that this is really more of an example of a public option than it is a mandate (after all, no one is forced to purchase anything, they are simply taxed and provided a social service - just like Medicare). I think that's a valid argument to make about how far we should take this historical precedent. Nevertheless, I still think it is important to acknowledge, because this example is a lot sturdier constitutionally and as an analog to the current situation than the last one shared by DeLong about the militias.
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Some people talk as if the Constitution were just the Articles of Confederation with lower voting thresholds. All significant additional powers granted to the federal government are downplayed. We spin this story that the commerce clause and "necessary and proper" and the General Welfare clause are inventions of FDR in the 1930s, or at the very earliest perhaps Progressives and trustbusters a few decades earlier. This simply wasn't the case. The Constitution is not another Articles of Confederation and we need to take that seriously.

Friday, March 26, 2010

Daniel's Top Ten Books

Several prominent bloggers have been publishing a list of the top ten books that influenced them most. Recently, Greg Ransom at "Taking Hayek Seriously" has produced a similar interesting list of F.A. Hayek's biggest influences (many of which are available for free online). I thought this whole exercise was kind of dumb when people started doing it, but ever since whenever I've thought of a book I've liked I've had a nagging desire to publish a list, so I put most of this together this weekend. I'm still pretty young, and I hope my ideas are still being formed - so I hope this list changes over time. But for now, here it is, in no paritcular order:

1. The End of Laissez Faire, by John Maynard Keynes: I like to tell people that The End of Laissez Faire is a geneaology of Liberalism. Over the years I've been familiarized with tidbits of a lot of political philosophy, but this book pulled them all together for me and showed me the big picture: how the various strains of liberalism are connected, and how many intellectual movements in the late 19th century bastardized liberalism (primarily Marxism and laissez faire fundamentalism).

2. Micromotives and Macrobehavior, by Thomas Schelling: This showed up on a couple bloggers' lists, and I agree. I didn't really get the importance of macroeconomics before this book (which is pretty impressive, since it's not even about macroeconomics proper). Schelling opened my eyes to the pervasiveness of the "fallacy of composition"/"ecological fallacy" in economics. You simply cannot generalize from individual to group behavior.

3. Durable Inequality, by Charles Tilly: Strongly influenced the way I think about inequality and discrimination. I'm eternally grateful to Deirdre Royster (formerly of William & Mary) for introducing me to this book.

4. The Elusive Republic, by Drew McCoy: Shaped my understanding of the founding fathers. Convinced me that (1.) they viewed the world in a completely different way than we do today, (2.) they were not of one mind - there is no position of "the founders" on anything, and often individual founders changed their positions over time, and (3.) the Hamilton-Jefferson dichotomy we always think of today is caricatured almost to the point of uselessness.

5. Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, by Garry Wills: Shaped my understanding of Jefferson and human liberty. It goes line by line through the Declaration of Independence, and discusses the intellectual origins and background of each position taken in the document. It ends up being a history of the revolutionary period, an account of Jefferson's own thought, and an intellectual history of the Scottish Enlightenment all in one volume.

6. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, by John Maynard Keynes: Doesn't get everything right, but provides the basic framework for how I think about the economy. Keynes made many technical innovations on the classical model, but he also emphasizes the importance of caution and empiricism, as well as common sense in economic policymaking. Easily the greatest economist since Adam Smith. Possibly greater than Adam Smith (if for no other reason than Keynes innovates where Smith synthesizes... although Keynes synthesizes some too).

7. The Origins of Virtue, by Matt Ridley: I learned Dawkins through Ridley. This has powerfully shaped my understanding of evolution and the human condition, particularly as it applies to human social organization. I know evolutionary psychology isn't accepted in all quarters, and I don't take Ridley's arguments hook, line, and sinker. But I do think they are generally good arguments.

8. Marxism: For and Against, by Robert Heilbroner: A big influence on how I think about intellectual movements that I disagree with. Heilbroner demonstrates the right way to dispute a position without villifying the proponent of that position, and how to acknowledge good arguments while maintaining a more foundational disagreement. On top of all that, it simply helped me to understand Marxism better.

9. A Leap in the Dark, by John Ferling, and Washington's Secret War and The Perils of Peace, both by Thomas Fleming: These are all histories of the revolutionary period and aren't notable in and of themselves, but Ferling and Fleming both write about history in a way that has strongly influenced the way I think about history: specifically, they take seriously the fact that historical actors don't know what is going to happen in the future, and that this has an enormous impact on their decision making. It seems simple, but when it gets pointed out to you in specific instances, you realize how often we analyze things with 20/20 hindsight. More historians need to think like this. Ferling highlights this phenomenon more explicitly than Fleming (you can practically derive that thesis from his title - A Leap in the Dark).

10. Underwriting Democracy, by George Soros: Soros, for all the combustibility of his political and financial activities, taught me a lot about how humans think and how that shapes society - specifically, what he calls "reflexivity". It's not a concept original to him, but I think he explains it especially well (I believe Robert Merton has written a lot on it, and Soros specifically cites Kurt Godel and Karl Popper as his influences - he studied under Popper at the London School of Economics). The idea is essentially that markets and society in general tend towards disequilibrium and reorganization because prediction and action can lead to changes in market or social fundamentals that alter what is being predicted or acted upon. You can think of it as Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle applied to society. Others have remarked on it, I learned it first and best from Soros. Soros himself wrote about reflexivity more exlcusively in his 1987 classic, The Alchemy of Finance, which I haven't read. But he does devote a good third of Underwriting Democracy to the theory. Much of the rest of the book is about how he's supported civil society in Eastern Europe.