Sunday, March 7, 2010

Technological Singularities and Measuring Value

This week I came across this fascinating presentation by Robin Hanson, of the George Mason University Economics Department, on technological singularities and the possibility of experiencing another one by mid-century. He specifically considers the role of nanotech and AI in this singularity.

Hanson highlights four previous technological singularities: (1.) the evolution of brains, (2.) hunting, (3.) farming, and (4.) the industrial revolution. He charts out how estimated global production per capita grew tremendously at each stage, and then plateaued as the technological innovation fully defused and the prospect of exponential growth moderated. Hanson argues that it's possible we might go through another technological singularity - a prospect that seems all the more reasonable when past singularities are charted out on a log-time scale. As readers of this blog know, I'm quite optimistic about our development as a species and the break-throughs we'll have in the far (and not so far) future. Nevertheless, I do have one major reservation about Hanson's presentation, and it primarily has to do with his data.

The obvious criticism is that we only really have good data on global production after the last singularity - the industrial revolution - and for quite a bit of that period, the data is shady at best. It's not until the last half of the twentieth century that you have good data even on the developed world. Now, we have convincing proxies for earlier periods, and the task is made easier by the fact that they simply didn't produce as much back then (agricultural production accounts for the bulk of it, and knowing something about cultivation methods makes that relatively easy to estimate). But the criticism still stands.

But that's not my primary criticism. My primary criticism isn't methodological, it's conceptual. The biggest blind spot in Hanson's data work is that the way we conceive of value production now is not the way it has always been conceived. If we only count commodities that we consider commodities now, we're going to necessarily make earlier periods look more impoverished than they actually were. Value is subjective. We can conclusively demonstrate that the market economy made humanity more materially better off. And that is a very good thing. What's much harder to demonstrate is that it created more value. My guess is it did create more value, but probably less than Hanson's presentation might suggest. I'll let a selection from Keynes's General Theory explain what I mean:

"Ancient Egypt was doubly fortunate, and doubtless owed to this its fabled wealth, in that it possessed two activities, namely, pyramid-building as well as the search for the precious metals, the fruits of which, since they could not serve the needs of man by being consumed, did not stale with abundance. The Middle Ages built cathedrals and sang dirges. Two pyramids, two masses for the dead, are twice as good as one; but not so two railways from London to York. Thus we are so sensible, have schooled ourselves to so close a semblance of prudent financiers, taking careful thought before we add to the "financial" burdens of posterity by building them houses to live in, that we have no such easy escape from the sufferings of unemployment. We have to accept them as an inevitable result of applying to the conduct of the State the maxims which are best calculated to "enrich" an individual by enabling him to pile up claims to enjoyment which he does not intend to exercise at any definite time" (p. 131).


We see the period between the advent of farming and the advent of the industrial revolution as being an impoverished period. But what we really mean is that they were materially impoverished. In many ways, past ages may have been wealthier than us, in the sense that they produced more value, utility, or welfare per capita because of the way that their values were structured. We live in a world of diminishing returns. Some of these diminishing returns are technological and inescapable in any age: you will have to put in increased effort to produce more and more crops on a given plot of land, holding all else constant, no matter what age you live in. But some of these diminishing returns are psychological and self-imposed.

My wife is leaving for Brussels today for a conference. While she's there she's going to be visiting a few palaces and cathedrals. Tourist attractions like these bring in millions every year. How often are such attractions built today? When we build buildings today how often do we think of them as monuments for the ages? How often do we weigh the benefits that they will produce centuries into the future against the costs of building them now? Rarely. Occasionally, but rarely. That strikes me as a necessarily impoverishing attitude. Granted, not everyone in ancient Egypt and Rome made their investment decisions based on the benefits that would accrue to future epochs. Material poverty was so desperate that such decision making was reserved for an elite few: an elite that often relied on slave labor and confiscatory taxation to build their monuments. I'm not yearning for some idyllic past that never existed. But what I am doing is pointing out that the time horizon that we use to think about what is valuable and the sheer imagination that we bring to the question of what is valuable has been, in many ways, severely curtailed, both as a result of what Marx called the "fetishization of commodities", and because of our secularization, which removed one of the primary motivations for building monuments to the ages (the prospect of eternal life). It doesn't mean that the modern market society is bad. I'm a big fan.
What it means is that it will probably have to change if we want to maintain lasting value. At some point, as a species, we need to build for the ages again. And that doesn't mean some wealthy philanthropist looking a century into the future. That means a visionary looking a thousand years into the future, and dreaming about what human society will look like then, and investing in that.

I've gone far afield from Robin Hanson. I think his talk is very good. It lays out the technical interpretation of technological change from an economist's perspective, which I enjoyed. And I appreciate his optimism about the future. I think he has a very characteristically modern understanding of value creation (at least in this presentation) which could probably be augmented. But all in all, it's an excellent piece.

Thursday, March 4, 2010

Some History of Economic Thought Links

I came across two interesting links discussing the history of economic thought this morning that I thought might be worth sharing.

The first, from Mark Thoma, covers Adam Smith's version of laissez-faire. Everyone knows Smith was an ardent foe of mercantilism and a proponent of free trade, but for some reason that gets leveraged into the claim that Smith was some sort of proto-libertarian (as if libertarians are the only people that support free trade). That's not really true. Smith advocates things that I defend against modern libertarians, and he was active in the 18th century! Usually I give leeway to earlier writers. In a traditional agricultural economy I would probably be more libertarian too. I understand that when circumstances change so does the proper role of government. But even back then, Smith had a very modern view of the role of government, the importance of externalities and public goods, etc. It is a very classically liberal view of government - there is no fetishization of the state. But it's not a libertarian view. Mark Thoma channels Gavin Kennedy on these issues here.

The second link is from Brad DeLong, who extensively catalogue's Thomas Robert Malthus's views on "general gluts", or depressions. Malthus is most famous for his theory of population dynamics, which heavily influenced Charles Darwin. But he wrote more traditional works of political economy as well, including a protracted debate over the possibility of a "general glut". Most economists in Malthus's time believed that the economy naturally operated at a full employment level. Any economic downturns could be attributed to frictions or temporary miscalculations. Malthus (along with Sismondi and a few others) argued that economies could stay depressed for a very long time, operating in a sub-optimal equilibrium rather than simply struggling through a temporary friction. Of course, for this reason, Malthus is considered the premier proto-Keynesian. And during his lifetime, Keynes made it quite clear that Malthus was one of his inspirations. I would also recommend Lawrence Klein's discussion of all the "proto-Keynesians" in his book The Keynesian Revolution, which I am almost done reading. He does a good job not just explaining what the early theorists of general gluts thought, but how they fit into the Keynesian schema (i.e. - what parts of the Keynesian system they were missing that prevented them from producing a full model of underemployment).

And this seems as good a time as any to highlight the New School for Social Research's history of economic thought site, which is quite simply the most comprehensive and most in depth resource on the history of economic thought available on the internet today. It's like Wikipedia on steroids specifically geared towards the history of economic thought: not something I would ever cite, but it provides tremendous detail and background and it provides excellent links and source material for further study.

The Rev. Thomas Robert Malthus

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Collection of Posts on Socialism


I've seen several posts and sources - both new and old - on socialism recently which I thought were worth sharing collectively. What I like about these pieces is that they move beyond the Marxist-Leninist-Soviet socialism that a lot of Americans instinctively think of when they hear the word.

First is Bryan Caplan at Econlog on the Baader-Meinhoff gang, a decidedly Marxist-Leninist group operating in West Germany in the last quarter of the 20th century.

I also enjoyed Matthew Yglesias's discussion of George Orwell's socialism - an anti-totalitarian, anti-Leninist brand of socialism associated with the New Left in the post-war period. Yglesias's most salient point is the deep misunderstanding of Orwell's socialism by American conservatives.

And of course, no consideration of Orwell is complete without Christopher Hitchens, who discusses 1984 here and here. Listen to the very end - at the end he has an interesting discussion about which dystopian future is more likely: that of 1984 or Brave New World.

One of my favorite discussions of socialism is that provided in Keynes's The End of Laissez-Faire, available in it's entirety here. I like to think of this short book as a genealogy of liberalism. It does a very good job outlining how classical liberalism split into an individualistic and a communitarian branch. He goes into great detail on pre-Marxian socialism, and the sense in which modern (at the time of the writing, in 1926) laissez-faire and modern Marxist socialism in many ways bastardized the liberal tradition from which they both emerged.

Brad DeLong has a quick, interesting discussion of what about Marx is still important for modern, neoclassical economists to acknoweldge and respect.
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Finally, I recommend this discussion between Bryan Magee and Herbert Marcuse, about The Frankfurt School and Marcuse's socialism (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, and Part 5). Marcuse is one of the foremost socialist critics of Marxism. If "anti-Marxist socialism" sounds like an oxymoron to you, I suggest you listen to this series.
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For probably obvious reasons, I have a great deal more respect for the New Left and the anti-Marxist socialists than I do for Marxists, but I still have to offer this to you as well.

Friday, February 26, 2010

Big Numbers, Whaling, and Atmospheric Carbon

Whales in the atmosphere?!?!?

We have a hard time conceptualizing big numbers. Often, we simply have no frame of reference. A recent example has been a mind-boggling multi-trillion dollar federal deficit. I can't even really get my head around that, even though I hear these trillions and hundreds of billions quoted at work all the time. You'd think we were headed towards disaster, but actually it's not the current trillion dollar deficits that worry budget experts at all. Recently, a new $15 billion stimulus bill was passed. Did you have sticker-shock when you read about that? Well don't - the bill was less than 2% of last year's stimulus. That's a rounding error in Washington. These gigantic numbers can be an obstacle to an informed public precisely because we find it so hard to process what they mean.
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A good example from BBC News this morning is a report that over the last century, whaling may have released 100 million tons of carbon (from their rotting bodies and burned blubber) into the atmosphere. Scandalous isn't it? Not only can we have moral outrage at the inhumanity of killing whales - we can now be mad about the role of whalers in climate change! Well I had no idea how much 100 million tons of carbon was, so I did a little sleuthing.

First, let's annualize this. 100 million tons over a century of whaling is a million tons of carbon released a year. Apparently, in 2006, humans released 8.4 gigatons of carbon into the atmosphere. Apparently, the Earth can successfully recycle three of those gigatons, leaving 5.4 gigatons released by humans into the atmosphere every year (or at least that much from 2006 on) that stays in the atmosphere. So:
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Whaling contributes: 1,000,000 tons a year
All human activity contributes an additional: 5,400,000,000 tons a year

So whaling increases net additional human carbon emissions by 0.0185%. And that's probably a very high estimate for what is emitted by whaling today. I imagine most of the million tons of carbon from whaling in the last century was released much earlier, when we relied more heavily on whale oil and whaling methods were more crude.

I'm not a climate change skeptic - I think it's a very big problem. I just think it's interesting what makes the front page of the newspaper sometimes, and how easily we gloss over big numbers without really trying to understand how big they are. In fact, far from being callous about climate change by minimizing this whaling statistic, I'm actually trying to make a point that while this is an interesting study to report, BBC would probably better serve the public by detailing the source of the other 99.9815% of carbon that humans add to the atmosphere each year.
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*Note - I googled all these numbers very quickly. If there's anything inaccurate in what I've written I'd be really interested in hearing about it!

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Stockman and the Austrians

And since the Austrian School has come up a couple times recently, I thought I'd mention something intriguing that I stumbled across:

David Stockman, Reagan OMB director, supply-side high priest, and all around budget badass recently came out of the closet...

...the Austrian school closet, that is. He's praising what he calls "the Austrian masters" and getting on board with the Austrian views about money and fiat currency. Thankfully, Austrian school economists haven't played a major role in public administration since Joseph Schumpeter ran the central bank of Austria in the 1920s (and Schumpeter isn't nearly as off the wall as the rest of them, anyway). I suppose the other close-call was the well known Ayn-Randian, Alan Greenspan. But he was effectively excommunicated from that odd little cult long go.

Anyway, I just thought that was interesting. My pile of books I want to read is already massive, and now I think I need to add Stockman's The Triumph of Politics to it. I should also read this. It's a famous expose of Stockman from a 1981 issue of The Atlantic. Stockman was, in his words, "taken to the woodshed" for the his loose lips with the author of the article. Interesting stuff. Depressions do strange things when it comes to ideological realignment and soul searching.

Trying to Get in Touch with My Inner Keynes

It's no secret that I'm a Keynesian. I feel like I have eclectic interests, an open mind, and great respect for many non-Keynesian thinkers, but I am decidedly in that camp and have only found myself more firmly under the sway of the old Cambridge don since the beginning of the Great Recession. Moreover, I personally feel like I was ahead of the curve. I first read his magnum opus, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936) in 2006 - way before it was cool. It was this reading that confirmed my earlier suspicions about my own affiliation.

But lately I've been doing quite a bit of introspection on the nature of my inner Keynes, namely: am I a Post-Keynesian or a New-Keynesian? Specifically, do I think that nominal wage cuts are effective at fighting depressionary conditions? It's the sort of school of thought sub-sub-classification internecine struggle that seems somewhat appropriate to this blog (particularly now that I know we have at least a couple economics-inclined readers). However, like most who engage in these internecine struggles, I'm personally convinced of the importance of the question. Millions of livelihoods and perhaps trillions of dollars are on the line, after all! Why haven't I decided!

Well, because it's a very tough question. Standard theory says that wage cuts should raise the employment level, and some very smart people have highlighted rigid or sub-optimally high wages as the source of involuntary unemployment. That's the New Keynesian position, and if pressed that's what I'd call myself. It's a safe and respectable default. The problem with that is, standard theory often breaks down in unstandard times - and we're living through very unstandard times in the economy right now. Markets are gumming up and failing to function normally all over the place. It's important to recognize that it's not just a hard period - things are not really working how they're supposed to work. The government borrows around a tenth of GDP and interest rates on short-term government debt are bumping around at 0%?!?!? The money supply shoots through the roof and we're seeing exceptionally low inflation?!?!? For an economist, this is the equivalent of a Salvador Dali painting. But we've been here before, and one of the most prescient thinkers on these problems the last time we were here was John Maynard Keynes. And Keynes (1936) said that nominal wage cuts in depressions would worsen depression.

So what motivated this blog post? What do I have to share with you besides my own soul-searching? Well, there has been quite a bit of chatter on other blogs over this very question that I wanted to share. Because some of the recent posts reference back to it, we can start with a year-old op-ed by Paul Krugman, arguing the classic Keynes position on the issue. Krugman is interesting - he's always been in the New-Keynesian camp, but he's been sounding a lot like a Post-Keynesian lately. Bryan Caplan responded at that time. A recent heated exchange between Brad DeLong (New Keynesian) and Steve Horwitz (Austrian School) over a somewhat different (but related) question turned up this comment by DeLong on David Henderson's (ummm... I guess Austrian School) blog. This is when the real nominal wage discussion begins.

Henderson responds to DeLong's comment. Menzie Chinn (I suppose also a New Keynesian) responds to Henderson's head scratcher of an attempt at ad hoc empiricism. Caplan responds to Henderson and DeLong. And as usual, Scott Sumner makes me wonder if I have everything wrong and should just become an unrepentant Monetarist. Then again, Scott Sumner is sort of out in left field... by which I mean the parking lot. I don't mean that as an insult at all - he just has a very different perspective on things from most people.

So there's a bunch of links to wade through - and my guess is there will be more today. The other reason why I mention this is because the back-and-forth mentions the last time nominal wage cuts did decidedly lead us out of a recession: the 1920-21 Depression, to be exact. I'm currently about half to two thirds of the way through a paper critiquing the Austrian School interpretation of the 1920-21 Depression, so that caught my eye in a big way. Throughout the last year, several Austrians and libertarians have argued that the quick exit from the 1920-21 Depression vindicates the Austrian school and proves that active fiscal and monetary policy only makes depressions worse. I point out that the 1920-21 Depression was very unusual. It was a manufactured depression - the Federal Reserve created it. Moreover, they justified their quite deliberate actions with arguments that Keynes himself put forward in 1923. Depressionary conditions that necessitate a Keynesian response (liquidity trap, low interest rates, high savings, depressed aggregate demand) were not in force through 1920-21, so a Keynesian response was entirely unmerited. And the coverage the 1920-21 in the recent blog debate only drives home that point (which is nice... makes me more confident in my thesis) - if Keynesian depression conditions don't hold, then we shouldn't be surprised that wage cuts got us out of depression in that case. If Keynesian depression conditions did hold, then successful wage cuts would lead you to question Keynesian prescriptions. So anyway, as a result of this work I'm officially obsesssed with the 1920s now. It was a fascinating time. Perhaps look for more on that in the future.

By the way - I found a piece by F.A. Hayek on the 1920-21 depression and its aftermath that he wrote in 1925. If anyone knows of anything that Ludwig von Mises wrote about the post-war downturn, I would be very, very interested in hearing about it. I don't know von Mises very well.

Monday, February 15, 2010

Edmund Phelps Interview

Edmund Phelps, who is probably one of my favorite living economists, was recently interviewed on EconTalk by George Mason economist Russ Roberts. I admire Phelps because he really saved Keynes from the Keynesians when he provided an expectations-based explanation for the stagflation of the 1970s. Phelps's work on expectations and wage determination grew out of Keynes's very strong emphasis on uncertainty and expectations - an emphasis which was downplayed by many American Keynesians in the '50s and '60s. In this interview, Phelps mentions other economists - including Friedrich Hayek and Frank Knight - who also influenced his views on uncertainty and expectations. That's one of the most rewarding parts of this interview in particular: that it reveals the considerable common ground shared between the Austrian School and Keynes on these questions. It's unfortunate that the interviewer (Roberts) tries to highlight this as a Hayekian side of Phelps, but Phelps himself squarely acknowledges the influence of Keynes as well. Another important critique that Phelps makes of American Keynesians is that Keynesian economics doesn't not require a bloated public sector.

Many other interesting topics are covered in this interview. Two I would note are (1.) Phelps's anticipation of New Keynesian economics with his model of efficiency wages, and (2.) at the end of the interview he discusses recent work he has been doing on "the good life".

It was interesting to listen to this, having recently finished Keynes's Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) myself. As I was reading the Tract, I couldn't help but think "if Keynesians in the '50s and '60s had spent as much time reading this as they did reading Keynes's General Theory, Phelps probably wouldn't have had to make the innovations that he did in the '60s and '70s. And then, lo and behold, a week after finishing the book EconTalk interviews Phelps himself.

One other thing I'd like to point out about Phelps is that he is a strong proponent of job subsidies, something I have also taken great interest in recently. The Senate recently produced a new (smaller) stimulus bill that includes a small job subsidy that is roughly along the lines that Phelps suggests.

I should also note, for those of you that aren't aware, that Phelps was the recipient of 2006 Nobel Prize in Economics. His Nobel lecture can be found here.

Monday, February 1, 2010

Evolution and Economics

I wanted to share a series of three posts on evolution and economics, pointed out to me by a former professor.

It introduces evolutionary and behavioral economics, and discusses the resistance to these approaches. It also discusses the early behavioral foundations of Keynesian economics, and the continuation of this behavioral Keynesianism through guys like George Akerlof. It also discusses the reformalization of economics thanks to the New Classical school, and Milton Friedman's work on methodology.

Thursday, January 28, 2010

Threats to American Democracy

Two pieces in The Atlantic recently got me thinking broadly about threats to democracy as an institution in America. The first was this (somewhat melodramatic) response to the State of the Union by Andrew Sullivan, and the second was this article on "American decline narratives" in the most recent print edition of The Atlantic. I want to clarify that I don't think that our republic is collapsing. I firmly believe that we will not only continue to maintain our super-power status (albeit probably sharing it with others) over the decades to come, but that we will also shape the future of the human race in the same way that Rome's legacy reverberated through the centuries, long after the Italian peninsula devolved into a collection of squabbling city-states. However, I do think there are a few very real threats to American democracy. The first two are quite recent developments, emerging over the last decade or two. The second two are more long-standing, but still disconcerting.

1. The Filibuster and a Dysfunctional Congress

Under Senate rules, three-fifths of the Senate must vote to limit debate (cloture) before a bill is voted on. This amounts to a requirement that any legislation controversial enough to raise the ire of the minority would require 60 votes, rather than 51, to pass. It's not a completely unreasonable rule. It helps defend against the "tyranny of the majority" by requiring broader agreement - certainly a good thing. It prevents an overbearing majority leader from preventing Senators from saying their piece on a piece of legislation. All in all, it doesn't have to be a bad rule. But in the hands of the modern Senate, it has swiftly become not a defense against the "tyranny of the majority", but a tool for the tyranny of the minority. In the 1960s, no Senate term had more than 7 filibusters. That pace had increased by over seven-fold in the first decade of the 21st century, when no Senate term had less than 49 filibusters. The 110th Congress set a record of 112 filibusters against the Democratic majority, a huge spike in activity. While recent Republican filibustering has been most notable, the modern increase in the utilization of filibusters is unequivocally bipartisan. While the filibuster can certainly be justified in any given situation, it's modern use has hampered representative self-government. Judicious application of idiosyncratic rules is not undemocratic, but persistently applying a super-majority standard on legislation is. Trends in the confirmation of presidential nominees are comparable. According to the Alliance for Justice, every administration since the Carter administration has seen a lower percentage of its judicial nominees confirmed by the Senate than the previous administration. As of November, less than a quarter of Obama's nominees have been confirmed. Once again, taking a principled stand against judicial nominees is fine, but nobody can reasonably claim that Bush's nominees were less than half as qualified as Reagan's (91% confirmed vs. 44%), or that Bush's nominees were about twice as qualified as Obama's (44% vs. 23%). In the end these practices don't simply obstruct an opposing party; they obstruct American self-government.

2. Mandatory Expenditures in the Federal Budget

The year 2009 was the first in American history in which every dollar of federal revenue was dedicated before Congress voted on a single spending bill. Whether it went to Medicare, Social Security, interest on the debt, or prior defense appropriation bills, every dollar of federal revenue was allocated without a single vote from the Congress elected to office in the fall of 2008. Naturally, that didn't prevent the new Congress from continuing to appropriate money - they simply borrowed money to cover their expenses. Gene Steuerle has tracked the growth of mandatory spending through his "Fiscal Democracy Index", which is the percent of government revenue not allocated for mandatory programs. This index has declined markedly over the last several decades, and like the rise of the filibuster it is a bipartisan failure. Also like the filibuster, the problem isn't mandatory spending or entitlement programs per se; the problem is that these things have gotten so out of hand and out of proportion to our revenue collection that once again, they prevent us from governing ourselves. We collect taxes to pay for the projects and decisions of previous Congresses. That isn't self-government, that is the tyranny of the past. An increasing share of our budget also goes to interest payments to foreign creditors. There is nothing wrong with borrowing money from abroad. It is a practice that has gone on for centuries. But as it increases we lose our influence of our domestic policy making.

3. The Misuse of American History

One of the trends that has bothered me recently is the use of the Boston Tea Party as a symbol for the Tea Party movement, as well as the broader populist-libertarian fusion movement spearheaded by Ron Paul. I've previously opined on this phenomenon here, but in a nutshell my point is simply that the rallying cry "no taxation without representation" has effectively been truncated after the first two words, when the Founders had placed considerably more emphasis on the second two words. Many of the Founders did obviously embrace a much smaller government than we do now, but this observation is misleading for two reasons: (1.) many of them were not supporters of small government in the first place, particularly the Federalists, who included some of our most honored patriots. (2.) Social and economic life has changed considerably since the 18th century. New public goods have emerged and the characteristics of American civilization have changed. We do know that Thomas Jefferson was, in his lifetime, what we would now call a "libertarian". We have absolutely no way of knowing whether Thomas Jefferson, observing the conditions of the twenty-first century, would be anywhere close to being a libertarian today. His approach to public goods issues in his writings on publicly supported education suggest that he may have been staunchly opposed to modern libertarianism. Particularly in the cry "no taxation without representation", but repeatedly elsewhere, the Founders demonstrated that the crux of the American revolution was not necessarily small government, but representative government. This isn't to say that small government isn't an important part of American civilization. It was extremely important in the 18th century, and it still is an essential value today. Broadly speaking, all Americans still share the sentiment that "the government that governs best governs least". The point is, it must be the people who decide what those parameters on government are. Recent misuses of American history don't simply provide fringe political movements with cover for their ideologies: they purge our history of it's emphasis on self-government, just as the abuse of the filibuster prevents my Senators from representing me, and just as excessive mandatory spending prevents my representatives from appropriating my tax dollars.

4. The American Imperium

I had a very hard time finding good data to capture the extent of the American military empire, but I still believe this is worth noting. The first thing that I found very quickly was that the absolute number of troops stationed abroad is currently lower than it had been mid-century. With the end of the Cold War and Vietnam, our only substantial deployments are in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, I think there is still cause for concern. First, current military operations are considerably more capital-intensive than previous operations, which were quite labor-intensive. Therefore, deployment might not be the right metric. We are also on a war footing in Iraq and Afghanistan in a way that we weren't in Europe during the Cold War, and we started these wars in a way that we didn't in Korea or Vietnam. Another qualitative difference is our unequivocal military superiority, which far surpasses any advantage we previously had over the Soviet Union. If you add to this our proxy-powers (Israel, Egypt, etc.), the American military empire, spread out in over 700 international bases, is formidable. Once again, empire in and of itself isn't necessarily a bad thing. Our security umbrella over Western Europe (which arguably still exists) was a force for good that fostered democracy. Some of our territorial occupations are justified as a temporary means of stabilization after a necessary war. But empire nevertheless introduces risks. Overextension, the militarization of foreign policy, and unjust occupation of foreign territory can serve to weaken self-government here and abroad. Lethal force is an appropriate policy tool in certain circumstances, but it is a dangerous tool because it is also the primary method of squelching liberty and democracy. At least since the Enlightenment, human beings rarely willingly acquiesce to subjugation. It must be forced upon them. And the more we extend our military empire, the more likely we are to be the instrument of that subjugation.

Conclusion. None of these threats make the failure of American democracy inevitable. I personally think such a failure is highly unlikely. But that doesn't make these problems any less threatening. The point is, they have to be overcome. Some positive developments are already apparent. The Gang of 14 admirably prevented excessive dysfunction in the Senate for a brief period. No end is in sight to the rise in mandatory spending, but policy makers are definitely cognizant of the problem, and there has recently been discussion of more reasonable revenue policy. In addition, entitlement reform has been featured in health reform legislation. Our misuse of our own history is obviously a much harder trend to fight, and our military empire seems equally irreversible. Nevertheless, General McChrystal has recently indicated that he wants to begin negotiations with the Taliban, and President Obama has already drawn down troops in Iraq. Nothing is ever certain, and as I hope I've emphasized there is nothing inherently wrong in many of these trends. The problem is unsustainable excess in each of these areas. A solution is attainable, and worth fighting for because it will define the legacy of the United States of America for centuries, if not millenia, to come. Greek and Roman statesmen and thinkers still influence the way we live today: an absolutely humbling realization. And yet the American Republic is more expansive and powerful than Rome could have ever dreamed of being. We need to maintain an American Republic that will beget a civilization in 4010 A.D. that we can be proud of, just as Rome laid an admirable foundation for civilization today.

Saturday, January 9, 2010

Evolution and the Pitfalls of Teleological Thinking

Of Pelicans and Purpose

This morning, the Washington Post reported an incident where the Maryland Department of Natural Resources seemingly defied the forces of natural selection by saving pelicans that failed to fly south for the winter. My first reaction was the same as the article's title implied: "What exactly is the purpose of this? It's one thing to protect and rescue animals threatened by humans, but we shouldn't be rescuing animals who themselves fail to adapt". I very quickly thought better of that sentiment. Not out of any great sympathy for the pelicans, mind you. But because I realized that I made two primary mistakes: (1.) I wrote humans out of the evolutionary narrative, and (2.) I assumed that the death of this flock of pelicans was somehow an underlying "purpose" of evolution, such that avoiding that purpose would constitute an unnatural distortion of the natural order of things. I'll start with my second mistake first. This assumption of mine is at it's base a teleological argument - an argument that identifies a purpose or design for which a given thing (in this case natural selection) exists to achieve. I made the mistake of thinking "natural selection is meant to kill off those who will not adapt, so by preventing the fulfillment of this purpose the Department of Natural Resources is somehow violating evolution - or the purpose and design of evolution". This is the wrong way to think about it. Natural selection doesn't exist for any purpose or design. It is simply a description of what occurs. Organisms exist in an environment. If organisms are not adapted to survive in that environment, they will not survive. The organisms that do survive will be better adapted to survive in the environment. That is all natural selection is. It's really a tautology. There is no "purpose" to derive from it, and there is no agency involved either. Therefore, natural selection can't be "violated", simply because an animal that I thought shouldn't have survived ended up surviving.

As for my first mistake, I also wrote human beings out of the evolutionary narrative. I don't want to get too sentimental or hyperbolic, but I think it's safe to say that human beings are the pinnacle of natural selection (at least here on Earth). We've evolved a number of exceptional faculties that have allowed us to be fruitful and multiply; to fill the Earth and subdue it. One of these faculties is compassion, or altruism. We willingly do things for others, and we do so out of an emotional reaction of concern for their plights (sorry Ayn Rand - no thousand page novel or faux-philosophical exposition is going to change that). Moreover, our compassion and altruism is evolutionarily fit. We're not the only organisms to develop this sort of selfless disposition. Ants do as well, in case anyone feels too proud of themselves over the accomplishment. So how is it a "violation of natural selection," if a trait embedded in the human species by natural selection lead us to save a few stray pelicans? This isn't to say that the actions of the Department of Natural Resources don't have consequences. It's simply to say that when we think about those consequences, we need to think about it in a co-evolutionary way. Could the rescue effort hurt the pelican's chances of survival later? Sure. These pelicans have only demonstrated that they are capable of surviving if humans are there to rescue them. If they are allowed to breed with other pelican populations, future generations may be less capable of surviving without human aid. It's perfectly appropriate to identify that as a potential consequence. We just need to be careful when we assign either meaning, intention, or design to it.

Intention and Evolution
A good source for thinking about teleology and evolution is philosopher Daniel Dennett, who works with the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of biology. He is a strong critic of people who impute purpose to natural selection, or any sort of intentionality in evolution (i.e. - statements such as "X evolved Y to accomplish Z"). However, in looking things up for this post I realized that Dennett is more nuanced on these questions than he first appears. This is an interesting response by Dennett to two critics that is especially illuminating. I like this statement especially: "nothing without a great deal of structural and processing complexity could conceivably realize an intentional system of any interest"

His point isn't that intentional adaptation cannot occur, but simply that the natural selection that we have observed to date generally precludes it, and that any intentionality of any interest would have to be ridiculously complex. This raises two questions: one of intelligent design, and another of directed evolution (well, really one question, but I suppose with two actors). Dennett is an atheist, and so you would think he would slam the door on intelligent design. I think this piece is interesting because he actually insists on leaving that door open (i.e. - he refuses to be baited by the critic that demands Dennett "pick a side" on the teleological question). Nevertheless, of course he still expresses serious doubts. Just because he's open to the prospect of intentionality doesn't mean he thinks we've experienced intentional adaptation.

It also gets to the point of directed evolution, since most of the argument deals with issue or purposive adaptation (i.e. - "X evolved Z to accomplish Y"). Again, Dennett essentially rejects this sort of intentionality, but he doesn't entirely reject the possibility of it. This is another area where you better believe humans are going to (and have already) pioneered. We already intentionally evolve our environment. Rather than letting the characteristics of the species change in response to the pressures of the environment, we have changed the environment to better fit the characteristics of our species. That is innovative, but all sorts of organisms do that too. The ability to force your environment to adapt is an evolutionarily fit trait, after all. What is more exciting (and perhaps somewhat chilling) is the prospect that in the future we will direct our own evolution at the genetic level. This is fundamentally eugenics, and it's not something to be taken lightly. But it's also not something to be entirely written off. We have a bad history of eugenics in the past, but that shouldn't prevent us from thinking about directed evolution in the future. When directed evolution matures, perhaps I'll write another blog post about the need to be more open to a teleological perspective on evolution than I had been in the past.