Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Collection of Posts on Socialism


I've seen several posts and sources - both new and old - on socialism recently which I thought were worth sharing collectively. What I like about these pieces is that they move beyond the Marxist-Leninist-Soviet socialism that a lot of Americans instinctively think of when they hear the word.

First is Bryan Caplan at Econlog on the Baader-Meinhoff gang, a decidedly Marxist-Leninist group operating in West Germany in the last quarter of the 20th century.

I also enjoyed Matthew Yglesias's discussion of George Orwell's socialism - an anti-totalitarian, anti-Leninist brand of socialism associated with the New Left in the post-war period. Yglesias's most salient point is the deep misunderstanding of Orwell's socialism by American conservatives.

And of course, no consideration of Orwell is complete without Christopher Hitchens, who discusses 1984 here and here. Listen to the very end - at the end he has an interesting discussion about which dystopian future is more likely: that of 1984 or Brave New World.

One of my favorite discussions of socialism is that provided in Keynes's The End of Laissez-Faire, available in it's entirety here. I like to think of this short book as a genealogy of liberalism. It does a very good job outlining how classical liberalism split into an individualistic and a communitarian branch. He goes into great detail on pre-Marxian socialism, and the sense in which modern (at the time of the writing, in 1926) laissez-faire and modern Marxist socialism in many ways bastardized the liberal tradition from which they both emerged.

Brad DeLong has a quick, interesting discussion of what about Marx is still important for modern, neoclassical economists to acknoweldge and respect.
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Finally, I recommend this discussion between Bryan Magee and Herbert Marcuse, about The Frankfurt School and Marcuse's socialism (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, and Part 5). Marcuse is one of the foremost socialist critics of Marxism. If "anti-Marxist socialism" sounds like an oxymoron to you, I suggest you listen to this series.
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For probably obvious reasons, I have a great deal more respect for the New Left and the anti-Marxist socialists than I do for Marxists, but I still have to offer this to you as well.

Friday, February 26, 2010

Big Numbers, Whaling, and Atmospheric Carbon

Whales in the atmosphere?!?!?

We have a hard time conceptualizing big numbers. Often, we simply have no frame of reference. A recent example has been a mind-boggling multi-trillion dollar federal deficit. I can't even really get my head around that, even though I hear these trillions and hundreds of billions quoted at work all the time. You'd think we were headed towards disaster, but actually it's not the current trillion dollar deficits that worry budget experts at all. Recently, a new $15 billion stimulus bill was passed. Did you have sticker-shock when you read about that? Well don't - the bill was less than 2% of last year's stimulus. That's a rounding error in Washington. These gigantic numbers can be an obstacle to an informed public precisely because we find it so hard to process what they mean.
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A good example from BBC News this morning is a report that over the last century, whaling may have released 100 million tons of carbon (from their rotting bodies and burned blubber) into the atmosphere. Scandalous isn't it? Not only can we have moral outrage at the inhumanity of killing whales - we can now be mad about the role of whalers in climate change! Well I had no idea how much 100 million tons of carbon was, so I did a little sleuthing.

First, let's annualize this. 100 million tons over a century of whaling is a million tons of carbon released a year. Apparently, in 2006, humans released 8.4 gigatons of carbon into the atmosphere. Apparently, the Earth can successfully recycle three of those gigatons, leaving 5.4 gigatons released by humans into the atmosphere every year (or at least that much from 2006 on) that stays in the atmosphere. So:
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Whaling contributes: 1,000,000 tons a year
All human activity contributes an additional: 5,400,000,000 tons a year

So whaling increases net additional human carbon emissions by 0.0185%. And that's probably a very high estimate for what is emitted by whaling today. I imagine most of the million tons of carbon from whaling in the last century was released much earlier, when we relied more heavily on whale oil and whaling methods were more crude.

I'm not a climate change skeptic - I think it's a very big problem. I just think it's interesting what makes the front page of the newspaper sometimes, and how easily we gloss over big numbers without really trying to understand how big they are. In fact, far from being callous about climate change by minimizing this whaling statistic, I'm actually trying to make a point that while this is an interesting study to report, BBC would probably better serve the public by detailing the source of the other 99.9815% of carbon that humans add to the atmosphere each year.
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*Note - I googled all these numbers very quickly. If there's anything inaccurate in what I've written I'd be really interested in hearing about it!

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Stockman and the Austrians

And since the Austrian School has come up a couple times recently, I thought I'd mention something intriguing that I stumbled across:

David Stockman, Reagan OMB director, supply-side high priest, and all around budget badass recently came out of the closet...

...the Austrian school closet, that is. He's praising what he calls "the Austrian masters" and getting on board with the Austrian views about money and fiat currency. Thankfully, Austrian school economists haven't played a major role in public administration since Joseph Schumpeter ran the central bank of Austria in the 1920s (and Schumpeter isn't nearly as off the wall as the rest of them, anyway). I suppose the other close-call was the well known Ayn-Randian, Alan Greenspan. But he was effectively excommunicated from that odd little cult long go.

Anyway, I just thought that was interesting. My pile of books I want to read is already massive, and now I think I need to add Stockman's The Triumph of Politics to it. I should also read this. It's a famous expose of Stockman from a 1981 issue of The Atlantic. Stockman was, in his words, "taken to the woodshed" for the his loose lips with the author of the article. Interesting stuff. Depressions do strange things when it comes to ideological realignment and soul searching.

Trying to Get in Touch with My Inner Keynes

It's no secret that I'm a Keynesian. I feel like I have eclectic interests, an open mind, and great respect for many non-Keynesian thinkers, but I am decidedly in that camp and have only found myself more firmly under the sway of the old Cambridge don since the beginning of the Great Recession. Moreover, I personally feel like I was ahead of the curve. I first read his magnum opus, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936) in 2006 - way before it was cool. It was this reading that confirmed my earlier suspicions about my own affiliation.

But lately I've been doing quite a bit of introspection on the nature of my inner Keynes, namely: am I a Post-Keynesian or a New-Keynesian? Specifically, do I think that nominal wage cuts are effective at fighting depressionary conditions? It's the sort of school of thought sub-sub-classification internecine struggle that seems somewhat appropriate to this blog (particularly now that I know we have at least a couple economics-inclined readers). However, like most who engage in these internecine struggles, I'm personally convinced of the importance of the question. Millions of livelihoods and perhaps trillions of dollars are on the line, after all! Why haven't I decided!

Well, because it's a very tough question. Standard theory says that wage cuts should raise the employment level, and some very smart people have highlighted rigid or sub-optimally high wages as the source of involuntary unemployment. That's the New Keynesian position, and if pressed that's what I'd call myself. It's a safe and respectable default. The problem with that is, standard theory often breaks down in unstandard times - and we're living through very unstandard times in the economy right now. Markets are gumming up and failing to function normally all over the place. It's important to recognize that it's not just a hard period - things are not really working how they're supposed to work. The government borrows around a tenth of GDP and interest rates on short-term government debt are bumping around at 0%?!?!? The money supply shoots through the roof and we're seeing exceptionally low inflation?!?!? For an economist, this is the equivalent of a Salvador Dali painting. But we've been here before, and one of the most prescient thinkers on these problems the last time we were here was John Maynard Keynes. And Keynes (1936) said that nominal wage cuts in depressions would worsen depression.

So what motivated this blog post? What do I have to share with you besides my own soul-searching? Well, there has been quite a bit of chatter on other blogs over this very question that I wanted to share. Because some of the recent posts reference back to it, we can start with a year-old op-ed by Paul Krugman, arguing the classic Keynes position on the issue. Krugman is interesting - he's always been in the New-Keynesian camp, but he's been sounding a lot like a Post-Keynesian lately. Bryan Caplan responded at that time. A recent heated exchange between Brad DeLong (New Keynesian) and Steve Horwitz (Austrian School) over a somewhat different (but related) question turned up this comment by DeLong on David Henderson's (ummm... I guess Austrian School) blog. This is when the real nominal wage discussion begins.

Henderson responds to DeLong's comment. Menzie Chinn (I suppose also a New Keynesian) responds to Henderson's head scratcher of an attempt at ad hoc empiricism. Caplan responds to Henderson and DeLong. And as usual, Scott Sumner makes me wonder if I have everything wrong and should just become an unrepentant Monetarist. Then again, Scott Sumner is sort of out in left field... by which I mean the parking lot. I don't mean that as an insult at all - he just has a very different perspective on things from most people.

So there's a bunch of links to wade through - and my guess is there will be more today. The other reason why I mention this is because the back-and-forth mentions the last time nominal wage cuts did decidedly lead us out of a recession: the 1920-21 Depression, to be exact. I'm currently about half to two thirds of the way through a paper critiquing the Austrian School interpretation of the 1920-21 Depression, so that caught my eye in a big way. Throughout the last year, several Austrians and libertarians have argued that the quick exit from the 1920-21 Depression vindicates the Austrian school and proves that active fiscal and monetary policy only makes depressions worse. I point out that the 1920-21 Depression was very unusual. It was a manufactured depression - the Federal Reserve created it. Moreover, they justified their quite deliberate actions with arguments that Keynes himself put forward in 1923. Depressionary conditions that necessitate a Keynesian response (liquidity trap, low interest rates, high savings, depressed aggregate demand) were not in force through 1920-21, so a Keynesian response was entirely unmerited. And the coverage the 1920-21 in the recent blog debate only drives home that point (which is nice... makes me more confident in my thesis) - if Keynesian depression conditions don't hold, then we shouldn't be surprised that wage cuts got us out of depression in that case. If Keynesian depression conditions did hold, then successful wage cuts would lead you to question Keynesian prescriptions. So anyway, as a result of this work I'm officially obsesssed with the 1920s now. It was a fascinating time. Perhaps look for more on that in the future.

By the way - I found a piece by F.A. Hayek on the 1920-21 depression and its aftermath that he wrote in 1925. If anyone knows of anything that Ludwig von Mises wrote about the post-war downturn, I would be very, very interested in hearing about it. I don't know von Mises very well.

Monday, February 15, 2010

Edmund Phelps Interview

Edmund Phelps, who is probably one of my favorite living economists, was recently interviewed on EconTalk by George Mason economist Russ Roberts. I admire Phelps because he really saved Keynes from the Keynesians when he provided an expectations-based explanation for the stagflation of the 1970s. Phelps's work on expectations and wage determination grew out of Keynes's very strong emphasis on uncertainty and expectations - an emphasis which was downplayed by many American Keynesians in the '50s and '60s. In this interview, Phelps mentions other economists - including Friedrich Hayek and Frank Knight - who also influenced his views on uncertainty and expectations. That's one of the most rewarding parts of this interview in particular: that it reveals the considerable common ground shared between the Austrian School and Keynes on these questions. It's unfortunate that the interviewer (Roberts) tries to highlight this as a Hayekian side of Phelps, but Phelps himself squarely acknowledges the influence of Keynes as well. Another important critique that Phelps makes of American Keynesians is that Keynesian economics doesn't not require a bloated public sector.

Many other interesting topics are covered in this interview. Two I would note are (1.) Phelps's anticipation of New Keynesian economics with his model of efficiency wages, and (2.) at the end of the interview he discusses recent work he has been doing on "the good life".

It was interesting to listen to this, having recently finished Keynes's Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) myself. As I was reading the Tract, I couldn't help but think "if Keynesians in the '50s and '60s had spent as much time reading this as they did reading Keynes's General Theory, Phelps probably wouldn't have had to make the innovations that he did in the '60s and '70s. And then, lo and behold, a week after finishing the book EconTalk interviews Phelps himself.

One other thing I'd like to point out about Phelps is that he is a strong proponent of job subsidies, something I have also taken great interest in recently. The Senate recently produced a new (smaller) stimulus bill that includes a small job subsidy that is roughly along the lines that Phelps suggests.

I should also note, for those of you that aren't aware, that Phelps was the recipient of 2006 Nobel Prize in Economics. His Nobel lecture can be found here.

Monday, February 1, 2010

Evolution and Economics

I wanted to share a series of three posts on evolution and economics, pointed out to me by a former professor.

It introduces evolutionary and behavioral economics, and discusses the resistance to these approaches. It also discusses the early behavioral foundations of Keynesian economics, and the continuation of this behavioral Keynesianism through guys like George Akerlof. It also discusses the reformalization of economics thanks to the New Classical school, and Milton Friedman's work on methodology.

Thursday, January 28, 2010

Threats to American Democracy

Two pieces in The Atlantic recently got me thinking broadly about threats to democracy as an institution in America. The first was this (somewhat melodramatic) response to the State of the Union by Andrew Sullivan, and the second was this article on "American decline narratives" in the most recent print edition of The Atlantic. I want to clarify that I don't think that our republic is collapsing. I firmly believe that we will not only continue to maintain our super-power status (albeit probably sharing it with others) over the decades to come, but that we will also shape the future of the human race in the same way that Rome's legacy reverberated through the centuries, long after the Italian peninsula devolved into a collection of squabbling city-states. However, I do think there are a few very real threats to American democracy. The first two are quite recent developments, emerging over the last decade or two. The second two are more long-standing, but still disconcerting.

1. The Filibuster and a Dysfunctional Congress

Under Senate rules, three-fifths of the Senate must vote to limit debate (cloture) before a bill is voted on. This amounts to a requirement that any legislation controversial enough to raise the ire of the minority would require 60 votes, rather than 51, to pass. It's not a completely unreasonable rule. It helps defend against the "tyranny of the majority" by requiring broader agreement - certainly a good thing. It prevents an overbearing majority leader from preventing Senators from saying their piece on a piece of legislation. All in all, it doesn't have to be a bad rule. But in the hands of the modern Senate, it has swiftly become not a defense against the "tyranny of the majority", but a tool for the tyranny of the minority. In the 1960s, no Senate term had more than 7 filibusters. That pace had increased by over seven-fold in the first decade of the 21st century, when no Senate term had less than 49 filibusters. The 110th Congress set a record of 112 filibusters against the Democratic majority, a huge spike in activity. While recent Republican filibustering has been most notable, the modern increase in the utilization of filibusters is unequivocally bipartisan. While the filibuster can certainly be justified in any given situation, it's modern use has hampered representative self-government. Judicious application of idiosyncratic rules is not undemocratic, but persistently applying a super-majority standard on legislation is. Trends in the confirmation of presidential nominees are comparable. According to the Alliance for Justice, every administration since the Carter administration has seen a lower percentage of its judicial nominees confirmed by the Senate than the previous administration. As of November, less than a quarter of Obama's nominees have been confirmed. Once again, taking a principled stand against judicial nominees is fine, but nobody can reasonably claim that Bush's nominees were less than half as qualified as Reagan's (91% confirmed vs. 44%), or that Bush's nominees were about twice as qualified as Obama's (44% vs. 23%). In the end these practices don't simply obstruct an opposing party; they obstruct American self-government.

2. Mandatory Expenditures in the Federal Budget

The year 2009 was the first in American history in which every dollar of federal revenue was dedicated before Congress voted on a single spending bill. Whether it went to Medicare, Social Security, interest on the debt, or prior defense appropriation bills, every dollar of federal revenue was allocated without a single vote from the Congress elected to office in the fall of 2008. Naturally, that didn't prevent the new Congress from continuing to appropriate money - they simply borrowed money to cover their expenses. Gene Steuerle has tracked the growth of mandatory spending through his "Fiscal Democracy Index", which is the percent of government revenue not allocated for mandatory programs. This index has declined markedly over the last several decades, and like the rise of the filibuster it is a bipartisan failure. Also like the filibuster, the problem isn't mandatory spending or entitlement programs per se; the problem is that these things have gotten so out of hand and out of proportion to our revenue collection that once again, they prevent us from governing ourselves. We collect taxes to pay for the projects and decisions of previous Congresses. That isn't self-government, that is the tyranny of the past. An increasing share of our budget also goes to interest payments to foreign creditors. There is nothing wrong with borrowing money from abroad. It is a practice that has gone on for centuries. But as it increases we lose our influence of our domestic policy making.

3. The Misuse of American History

One of the trends that has bothered me recently is the use of the Boston Tea Party as a symbol for the Tea Party movement, as well as the broader populist-libertarian fusion movement spearheaded by Ron Paul. I've previously opined on this phenomenon here, but in a nutshell my point is simply that the rallying cry "no taxation without representation" has effectively been truncated after the first two words, when the Founders had placed considerably more emphasis on the second two words. Many of the Founders did obviously embrace a much smaller government than we do now, but this observation is misleading for two reasons: (1.) many of them were not supporters of small government in the first place, particularly the Federalists, who included some of our most honored patriots. (2.) Social and economic life has changed considerably since the 18th century. New public goods have emerged and the characteristics of American civilization have changed. We do know that Thomas Jefferson was, in his lifetime, what we would now call a "libertarian". We have absolutely no way of knowing whether Thomas Jefferson, observing the conditions of the twenty-first century, would be anywhere close to being a libertarian today. His approach to public goods issues in his writings on publicly supported education suggest that he may have been staunchly opposed to modern libertarianism. Particularly in the cry "no taxation without representation", but repeatedly elsewhere, the Founders demonstrated that the crux of the American revolution was not necessarily small government, but representative government. This isn't to say that small government isn't an important part of American civilization. It was extremely important in the 18th century, and it still is an essential value today. Broadly speaking, all Americans still share the sentiment that "the government that governs best governs least". The point is, it must be the people who decide what those parameters on government are. Recent misuses of American history don't simply provide fringe political movements with cover for their ideologies: they purge our history of it's emphasis on self-government, just as the abuse of the filibuster prevents my Senators from representing me, and just as excessive mandatory spending prevents my representatives from appropriating my tax dollars.

4. The American Imperium

I had a very hard time finding good data to capture the extent of the American military empire, but I still believe this is worth noting. The first thing that I found very quickly was that the absolute number of troops stationed abroad is currently lower than it had been mid-century. With the end of the Cold War and Vietnam, our only substantial deployments are in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, I think there is still cause for concern. First, current military operations are considerably more capital-intensive than previous operations, which were quite labor-intensive. Therefore, deployment might not be the right metric. We are also on a war footing in Iraq and Afghanistan in a way that we weren't in Europe during the Cold War, and we started these wars in a way that we didn't in Korea or Vietnam. Another qualitative difference is our unequivocal military superiority, which far surpasses any advantage we previously had over the Soviet Union. If you add to this our proxy-powers (Israel, Egypt, etc.), the American military empire, spread out in over 700 international bases, is formidable. Once again, empire in and of itself isn't necessarily a bad thing. Our security umbrella over Western Europe (which arguably still exists) was a force for good that fostered democracy. Some of our territorial occupations are justified as a temporary means of stabilization after a necessary war. But empire nevertheless introduces risks. Overextension, the militarization of foreign policy, and unjust occupation of foreign territory can serve to weaken self-government here and abroad. Lethal force is an appropriate policy tool in certain circumstances, but it is a dangerous tool because it is also the primary method of squelching liberty and democracy. At least since the Enlightenment, human beings rarely willingly acquiesce to subjugation. It must be forced upon them. And the more we extend our military empire, the more likely we are to be the instrument of that subjugation.

Conclusion. None of these threats make the failure of American democracy inevitable. I personally think such a failure is highly unlikely. But that doesn't make these problems any less threatening. The point is, they have to be overcome. Some positive developments are already apparent. The Gang of 14 admirably prevented excessive dysfunction in the Senate for a brief period. No end is in sight to the rise in mandatory spending, but policy makers are definitely cognizant of the problem, and there has recently been discussion of more reasonable revenue policy. In addition, entitlement reform has been featured in health reform legislation. Our misuse of our own history is obviously a much harder trend to fight, and our military empire seems equally irreversible. Nevertheless, General McChrystal has recently indicated that he wants to begin negotiations with the Taliban, and President Obama has already drawn down troops in Iraq. Nothing is ever certain, and as I hope I've emphasized there is nothing inherently wrong in many of these trends. The problem is unsustainable excess in each of these areas. A solution is attainable, and worth fighting for because it will define the legacy of the United States of America for centuries, if not millenia, to come. Greek and Roman statesmen and thinkers still influence the way we live today: an absolutely humbling realization. And yet the American Republic is more expansive and powerful than Rome could have ever dreamed of being. We need to maintain an American Republic that will beget a civilization in 4010 A.D. that we can be proud of, just as Rome laid an admirable foundation for civilization today.

Saturday, January 9, 2010

Evolution and the Pitfalls of Teleological Thinking

Of Pelicans and Purpose

This morning, the Washington Post reported an incident where the Maryland Department of Natural Resources seemingly defied the forces of natural selection by saving pelicans that failed to fly south for the winter. My first reaction was the same as the article's title implied: "What exactly is the purpose of this? It's one thing to protect and rescue animals threatened by humans, but we shouldn't be rescuing animals who themselves fail to adapt". I very quickly thought better of that sentiment. Not out of any great sympathy for the pelicans, mind you. But because I realized that I made two primary mistakes: (1.) I wrote humans out of the evolutionary narrative, and (2.) I assumed that the death of this flock of pelicans was somehow an underlying "purpose" of evolution, such that avoiding that purpose would constitute an unnatural distortion of the natural order of things. I'll start with my second mistake first. This assumption of mine is at it's base a teleological argument - an argument that identifies a purpose or design for which a given thing (in this case natural selection) exists to achieve. I made the mistake of thinking "natural selection is meant to kill off those who will not adapt, so by preventing the fulfillment of this purpose the Department of Natural Resources is somehow violating evolution - or the purpose and design of evolution". This is the wrong way to think about it. Natural selection doesn't exist for any purpose or design. It is simply a description of what occurs. Organisms exist in an environment. If organisms are not adapted to survive in that environment, they will not survive. The organisms that do survive will be better adapted to survive in the environment. That is all natural selection is. It's really a tautology. There is no "purpose" to derive from it, and there is no agency involved either. Therefore, natural selection can't be "violated", simply because an animal that I thought shouldn't have survived ended up surviving.

As for my first mistake, I also wrote human beings out of the evolutionary narrative. I don't want to get too sentimental or hyperbolic, but I think it's safe to say that human beings are the pinnacle of natural selection (at least here on Earth). We've evolved a number of exceptional faculties that have allowed us to be fruitful and multiply; to fill the Earth and subdue it. One of these faculties is compassion, or altruism. We willingly do things for others, and we do so out of an emotional reaction of concern for their plights (sorry Ayn Rand - no thousand page novel or faux-philosophical exposition is going to change that). Moreover, our compassion and altruism is evolutionarily fit. We're not the only organisms to develop this sort of selfless disposition. Ants do as well, in case anyone feels too proud of themselves over the accomplishment. So how is it a "violation of natural selection," if a trait embedded in the human species by natural selection lead us to save a few stray pelicans? This isn't to say that the actions of the Department of Natural Resources don't have consequences. It's simply to say that when we think about those consequences, we need to think about it in a co-evolutionary way. Could the rescue effort hurt the pelican's chances of survival later? Sure. These pelicans have only demonstrated that they are capable of surviving if humans are there to rescue them. If they are allowed to breed with other pelican populations, future generations may be less capable of surviving without human aid. It's perfectly appropriate to identify that as a potential consequence. We just need to be careful when we assign either meaning, intention, or design to it.

Intention and Evolution
A good source for thinking about teleology and evolution is philosopher Daniel Dennett, who works with the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of biology. He is a strong critic of people who impute purpose to natural selection, or any sort of intentionality in evolution (i.e. - statements such as "X evolved Y to accomplish Z"). However, in looking things up for this post I realized that Dennett is more nuanced on these questions than he first appears. This is an interesting response by Dennett to two critics that is especially illuminating. I like this statement especially: "nothing without a great deal of structural and processing complexity could conceivably realize an intentional system of any interest"

His point isn't that intentional adaptation cannot occur, but simply that the natural selection that we have observed to date generally precludes it, and that any intentionality of any interest would have to be ridiculously complex. This raises two questions: one of intelligent design, and another of directed evolution (well, really one question, but I suppose with two actors). Dennett is an atheist, and so you would think he would slam the door on intelligent design. I think this piece is interesting because he actually insists on leaving that door open (i.e. - he refuses to be baited by the critic that demands Dennett "pick a side" on the teleological question). Nevertheless, of course he still expresses serious doubts. Just because he's open to the prospect of intentionality doesn't mean he thinks we've experienced intentional adaptation.

It also gets to the point of directed evolution, since most of the argument deals with issue or purposive adaptation (i.e. - "X evolved Z to accomplish Y"). Again, Dennett essentially rejects this sort of intentionality, but he doesn't entirely reject the possibility of it. This is another area where you better believe humans are going to (and have already) pioneered. We already intentionally evolve our environment. Rather than letting the characteristics of the species change in response to the pressures of the environment, we have changed the environment to better fit the characteristics of our species. That is innovative, but all sorts of organisms do that too. The ability to force your environment to adapt is an evolutionarily fit trait, after all. What is more exciting (and perhaps somewhat chilling) is the prospect that in the future we will direct our own evolution at the genetic level. This is fundamentally eugenics, and it's not something to be taken lightly. But it's also not something to be entirely written off. We have a bad history of eugenics in the past, but that shouldn't prevent us from thinking about directed evolution in the future. When directed evolution matures, perhaps I'll write another blog post about the need to be more open to a teleological perspective on evolution than I had been in the past.

Assault of Thoughts - 1/9/10

"Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking" -JMK

- Andrew Sullivan documents the National Review Online's positions on various detention techniques, and deconstructs Jonah Goldberg's claim that conservatives don't support what went on at Abu Gharib.

- John Ferling writes about seven myths of the American Revolution in the Smithsonian. I haven't read this article yet, but Ferling is very good.

- Eric Rauchway debunking New Deal denialism. A very good read - this is actually an even more positive read on the New Deal than I'm used to hearing.

- A good post by Evan on our sister-blog about disciplinary boundaries - this one dealing with theology.

- Roger Farmer on the Natural Rate of Unemployment. Farmer has a new book coming out in March on this, which I am very much looking forward to (if I can find the time to read it).

- Scott Fullwiler on Milton Friedman's "helicopter drop" of money, and why it's essentially a fiscal operation. I haven't read the post in it's entirety yet, but the first paragraph summarizes the basic argument. This is a new blog that I follow - they're "post-Keynesians", which some people argue is the school of thought that is most faithful to Keynes himself. They don't play the games that New Keynesians (like Mankiw, Krugman, and Stiglitz do) with rational agents. I'm withholding judgement for now - it's just interesting to get a peak into their world.

- Lots on Tim Geithner, the New York Fed, AIG, and whether he should leave the administration. Brad DeLong sort of comes to Geithner's defense. I'm not particularly bothered by this either - or put it this way: I have a couple reasons why I wouldn't rush to judgement. If you're curious, feel free to ask me why.

- I was reading some of Keynes's General Theory this week and I came across a positive reference to Silvio Gesell - a 19th century amateur economist and social activist with some really strange and interesting views on money. Keynes has a few quibbles but generally likes him. I of course haven't familiarized myself with Gesell yet, but I thought he sounded interesting and the full text of his book The Natural Economic Order is here.

Friday, January 8, 2010

Philosophical Musing 2: Brain-dump on the Nature of Time

***This is the second in a series I call "philosophical musings".
It's meant to be speculative and exploratory - enjoy***
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On and off this fall I've been extremely interested in the nature of time. The immediate interest was sparked by a few things. First, I've been refocused on the work of John Maynard Keynes as a result of the financial crisis. Time is very important for him for several reasons: (1.) the uncertainty of the future underpins his liquidity preference theory of the interest rate and investment, (2.) his differentiation between the long and the short run (not the first to do this, but one of the most emphatic about the importance of it, and (3.) despite his quip that "in the long run we're all dead", Keynes is very preoccupied what he elsewhere called the "economic possibilities for our grandchildren" - social organization in the far future. In addition to Keynes, I also have a personal interest in human social organization in the very long run: space colonization, further political unification on Earth, changes to the structure of production along the lines that Keynes was concerned with, etc. I'm particularly interested in the problems that the very long-run poses - namely that market actors don't respond to far distant incentives. The state may act on these incentives, but elected officials can have notoriously short-run planning horizons as well. So the question is - given the vista of possibilities in our distant future, how do we prepare, given the extent to which we are anchored in the present? And finally, my very basic introduction to Martin Heidegger's work, through my brother, has piqued my interest in time as well. In Heidegger's ontology, what it meant "to be" was crucially dependent on a Being's existence in time. As Heidegger says: "The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Dasein [Being] is grounded in temporality". Moreover, Heidegger sees a purposiveness or intentionality as being central to our understanding of being, and this intentionality essentially means the use of an object in time. For example, pre-Heidegger you might ask "what is the reality, the 'thing-in-itself' of this hammer, independent of my perception of the hammer". Heidegger points out that the ontological significance of these objects is our intentions for them in time. He says "I experience this hammer as something that I use to hit nails - that is my phenomenological experience - and then maybe later I consider it's essential reality". So the temporal intentionality that pervades our experience has to be meaningful when we ask "what is this hammer"?, because it is temporal experience and intentionality that define our phenomenological experience of the hammer. I know that's quite an introduction, and Keynes and Heidegger will both show up below as well, but this post will basically be a collection of bulleted thoughts and links on things I've stumbled across regarding the nature of time.
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-- First, this post was most immediately motivated by something I read in The Watchmen, a graphic novel about a group of superheroes that was recently made into a movie. Dr. Manhattan, a physicist disembodied in an experiment gone awry, experiences reality in a very unique way. Time is not unidirectional for him, he can make quantum leaps across the universe, and he can understand and reform objects at the atomic level. Midway through the story he finds himself on Mars (I won't say why - it's a major plot theme), and he muses:
"Through my blue fingers, pink grains are falling, haphazard, random, a disorganized stream of silicone that seems pregnant with the possibility of every conceivable shape. But this is illusion. Things have their shape in time, not space alone. Some marble blocks have statues within them, embedded in their future." I read that and thought "I've really been entranced by time for too long - I think this needs to be a second 'philosophical musing'."

-- I found these very interesting - it's a series on the philosophy of time that relies heavily on physics, which is nice. Here are parts one, two, and three.

-- This is William Lane Craig discussing the "tensed theory of time". This is basically about how we divide time into "tenses" - past, present, and future. What constitutes the "present", exactly. And whether we can objectively divide time this way [a side note - I was surprised to find out Evan isn't particularly impressed with William Lane Craig. I'm not sure exactly why - I thought he was pretty good, although I didn't agree with everything he said].

-- An entire semester of lectures on Heidegger by Hubert Dreyfus, who I suppose is considered the world's foremost expert on Heidegger (certainly one of them at least). I haven't listened to this at all yet, but I have heard other interviews of Dreyfus about Heidegger. So eat your heart out - I imagine the only way to get a more thorough treatment would be to read Heidegger's Being and Time yourself. I guess I'll say here that one of the things that interests me most about Heidegger is how he makes temporality central to reality, and the applications this might have to political or social philosophy. A lot of Anglo-American political philosophers take a "de-temporalized" view - Anglo-American philosophy is notoriously de-contextualized in general. When it comes to political philosophy, think of a Hobbesian state of nature or a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance". There is no (1.) temporal context, and more importantly to me no (2.) recognition of the importance of political and social institutions for deliberately creating a future. Society is or should be timeless for most of these Anglo-American conceptualizations. Heidegger is nice because he breaks out of that: history is important and intentions for the future are important.

-- A Keynes quote I've always liked about time: "The social object of skilled investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance which envelope our future". Keynes's system is dependent on uncertainty about the future, which causes fluctuations in liquidity preference and the propensity to invest.

-- A Scientific American piece about why we experience time in one direction.

-- This is a one-pager I wrote around Thanksgiving about space-time and value theory. Very speculative - sort of a "why do we think about things in this way" piece. Nothing came of it and I'm guessing nothing will.

-- Finally, it's worth noting another reason why time has been on my brain lately - I'm taking a partial differential equations course this Spring (starting next week actually), so time will probably come up a lot there. Differential equations are often used to model dynamic systems of variables: in other words, the interaction and behavior of variables over time. One of the most classic dynamic systems to model, for example, is the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model, where you look at the oscillation of something like the rabbit population and the fox population over time.