Saturday, January 9, 2010

Assault of Thoughts - 1/9/10

"Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking" -JMK

- Andrew Sullivan documents the National Review Online's positions on various detention techniques, and deconstructs Jonah Goldberg's claim that conservatives don't support what went on at Abu Gharib.

- John Ferling writes about seven myths of the American Revolution in the Smithsonian. I haven't read this article yet, but Ferling is very good.

- Eric Rauchway debunking New Deal denialism. A very good read - this is actually an even more positive read on the New Deal than I'm used to hearing.

- A good post by Evan on our sister-blog about disciplinary boundaries - this one dealing with theology.

- Roger Farmer on the Natural Rate of Unemployment. Farmer has a new book coming out in March on this, which I am very much looking forward to (if I can find the time to read it).

- Scott Fullwiler on Milton Friedman's "helicopter drop" of money, and why it's essentially a fiscal operation. I haven't read the post in it's entirety yet, but the first paragraph summarizes the basic argument. This is a new blog that I follow - they're "post-Keynesians", which some people argue is the school of thought that is most faithful to Keynes himself. They don't play the games that New Keynesians (like Mankiw, Krugman, and Stiglitz do) with rational agents. I'm withholding judgement for now - it's just interesting to get a peak into their world.

- Lots on Tim Geithner, the New York Fed, AIG, and whether he should leave the administration. Brad DeLong sort of comes to Geithner's defense. I'm not particularly bothered by this either - or put it this way: I have a couple reasons why I wouldn't rush to judgement. If you're curious, feel free to ask me why.

- I was reading some of Keynes's General Theory this week and I came across a positive reference to Silvio Gesell - a 19th century amateur economist and social activist with some really strange and interesting views on money. Keynes has a few quibbles but generally likes him. I of course haven't familiarized myself with Gesell yet, but I thought he sounded interesting and the full text of his book The Natural Economic Order is here.

Friday, January 8, 2010

Philosophical Musing 2: Brain-dump on the Nature of Time

***This is the second in a series I call "philosophical musings".
It's meant to be speculative and exploratory - enjoy***
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On and off this fall I've been extremely interested in the nature of time. The immediate interest was sparked by a few things. First, I've been refocused on the work of John Maynard Keynes as a result of the financial crisis. Time is very important for him for several reasons: (1.) the uncertainty of the future underpins his liquidity preference theory of the interest rate and investment, (2.) his differentiation between the long and the short run (not the first to do this, but one of the most emphatic about the importance of it, and (3.) despite his quip that "in the long run we're all dead", Keynes is very preoccupied what he elsewhere called the "economic possibilities for our grandchildren" - social organization in the far future. In addition to Keynes, I also have a personal interest in human social organization in the very long run: space colonization, further political unification on Earth, changes to the structure of production along the lines that Keynes was concerned with, etc. I'm particularly interested in the problems that the very long-run poses - namely that market actors don't respond to far distant incentives. The state may act on these incentives, but elected officials can have notoriously short-run planning horizons as well. So the question is - given the vista of possibilities in our distant future, how do we prepare, given the extent to which we are anchored in the present? And finally, my very basic introduction to Martin Heidegger's work, through my brother, has piqued my interest in time as well. In Heidegger's ontology, what it meant "to be" was crucially dependent on a Being's existence in time. As Heidegger says: "The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Dasein [Being] is grounded in temporality". Moreover, Heidegger sees a purposiveness or intentionality as being central to our understanding of being, and this intentionality essentially means the use of an object in time. For example, pre-Heidegger you might ask "what is the reality, the 'thing-in-itself' of this hammer, independent of my perception of the hammer". Heidegger points out that the ontological significance of these objects is our intentions for them in time. He says "I experience this hammer as something that I use to hit nails - that is my phenomenological experience - and then maybe later I consider it's essential reality". So the temporal intentionality that pervades our experience has to be meaningful when we ask "what is this hammer"?, because it is temporal experience and intentionality that define our phenomenological experience of the hammer. I know that's quite an introduction, and Keynes and Heidegger will both show up below as well, but this post will basically be a collection of bulleted thoughts and links on things I've stumbled across regarding the nature of time.
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-- First, this post was most immediately motivated by something I read in The Watchmen, a graphic novel about a group of superheroes that was recently made into a movie. Dr. Manhattan, a physicist disembodied in an experiment gone awry, experiences reality in a very unique way. Time is not unidirectional for him, he can make quantum leaps across the universe, and he can understand and reform objects at the atomic level. Midway through the story he finds himself on Mars (I won't say why - it's a major plot theme), and he muses:
"Through my blue fingers, pink grains are falling, haphazard, random, a disorganized stream of silicone that seems pregnant with the possibility of every conceivable shape. But this is illusion. Things have their shape in time, not space alone. Some marble blocks have statues within them, embedded in their future." I read that and thought "I've really been entranced by time for too long - I think this needs to be a second 'philosophical musing'."

-- I found these very interesting - it's a series on the philosophy of time that relies heavily on physics, which is nice. Here are parts one, two, and three.

-- This is William Lane Craig discussing the "tensed theory of time". This is basically about how we divide time into "tenses" - past, present, and future. What constitutes the "present", exactly. And whether we can objectively divide time this way [a side note - I was surprised to find out Evan isn't particularly impressed with William Lane Craig. I'm not sure exactly why - I thought he was pretty good, although I didn't agree with everything he said].

-- An entire semester of lectures on Heidegger by Hubert Dreyfus, who I suppose is considered the world's foremost expert on Heidegger (certainly one of them at least). I haven't listened to this at all yet, but I have heard other interviews of Dreyfus about Heidegger. So eat your heart out - I imagine the only way to get a more thorough treatment would be to read Heidegger's Being and Time yourself. I guess I'll say here that one of the things that interests me most about Heidegger is how he makes temporality central to reality, and the applications this might have to political or social philosophy. A lot of Anglo-American political philosophers take a "de-temporalized" view - Anglo-American philosophy is notoriously de-contextualized in general. When it comes to political philosophy, think of a Hobbesian state of nature or a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance". There is no (1.) temporal context, and more importantly to me no (2.) recognition of the importance of political and social institutions for deliberately creating a future. Society is or should be timeless for most of these Anglo-American conceptualizations. Heidegger is nice because he breaks out of that: history is important and intentions for the future are important.

-- A Keynes quote I've always liked about time: "The social object of skilled investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance which envelope our future". Keynes's system is dependent on uncertainty about the future, which causes fluctuations in liquidity preference and the propensity to invest.

-- A Scientific American piece about why we experience time in one direction.

-- This is a one-pager I wrote around Thanksgiving about space-time and value theory. Very speculative - sort of a "why do we think about things in this way" piece. Nothing came of it and I'm guessing nothing will.

-- Finally, it's worth noting another reason why time has been on my brain lately - I'm taking a partial differential equations course this Spring (starting next week actually), so time will probably come up a lot there. Differential equations are often used to model dynamic systems of variables: in other words, the interaction and behavior of variables over time. One of the most classic dynamic systems to model, for example, is the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model, where you look at the oscillation of something like the rabbit population and the fox population over time.

Wednesday, January 6, 2010

Philosophical Musing 1: Historical Determinism, Epistemology, and Total War

***This will be one in a series of probably three "philosophical musings" posts from me. They've been slowly written over the last month and a half or so. This one frames the total war of the first half of the 20th century as an important historical singularity that was made inevitable by the epistemological projects that emerged from the Enlightenment.***
A couple weeks back, I worked through this documentary on the Spanish Civil War, which is especially rewarding because it is interview-heavy. It, along with a lot of thinking I've been doing over the last year on the inter-war economy, has helped to focus my attention on broader, more fundamental questions about the period from 1914 to 1945 - quite possibly the most catastrophic and revolutionary period in human history.

Although we present WWI and WWII in light of "making the world safe for democracy", to a large extent this was not the point or purpose of the wars at all. To a large degree, this extended war was a war between communism and fascism. Fascism lost, liberals became quickly disillusioned with communism, and the Cold War slowly wore communism down as well. I think instinctively we don't like this understanding of the wars. Great wars should have "good guys" and "bad guys" and the "good guys" should win, right? The point that the defining conflict of the 20th century was a conflict between two "bad guys" comes across as somewhat surprising.

I want to argue that this interpretation should not be a surprising thing at all. In a lot of ways, total war was pre-ordained at the Enlightenment, which released the forces of Reason. Reason applied to society constructs social mega-programs built from considerably smaller logical axioms. Undue faith in our reason leads us to trust these mega-programs, which are iterated synthetic a priori propositions: "true" propositions which are not axiomatic but which are also considered "a priori" because they are true independent of experience. These rational mega-programs are what we also know as the "-isms": communism, fascism, libertarianism, syndicalism, anarchism, etc. All are thrust upon society with absolute confidence in their own self-evidence. They are not tested or evolved - they are deduced - that is their hallmark: logical deduction. This is the spawn of unchecked Reason.

In societies where Empiricism dominated or at least competed vigorously with Rationalism, these "-isms" did not take hold. The value of a mega-program had to be demonstrated, so change was slower and planning was less grandiose. The political, economic, and social systems of Empiricist societies evolved, and were generally conservative and relatively undisruptive.

I think it's reasonable to suggest that from the outset global, total war was an inevitable result of the rise of Reason. Reason results in social mega-programs and complete faith in the value of these mega-programs. Since the logical faculties of human beings are bound to fail or vary, a myriad of these self-confident mega-programs could have been expected to emerge, and indeed did emerge. In this sense, Reason is very likely to be a divergent epistemological endeavor, whereas empiricism can be thought of as a convergent epistemological endeavor (this is quite a claim, I know - at first glance you would assume that experience would vary much more widely between individuals than logic would - I don't think this is true, although I can't really prove it here... I'm thinking along the lines of "the wisdom of crowds" type argument).

If, back in 1700 or so, we had to predict what would happen in the far future given the emerging landscape of epistemology, what would we conclude? I would argue that we would conclude that Empirical societies would slowly change and evolve into more efficient societies. They would try out new forms of organization, evaluate the adjustments they make, and proceed forward from there. The outcomes can be expected to be roughly as variable as human experience is. In societies where Reason dominates, we can imagine social theorists not moving incrementally, but designing and promoting programs constructed from basic axioms of human behavior. Whereas in empirical societies, a program of social organization may take decades of incrementalism to evolve, in rational societies, a philosopher dedicated to the task of designing a program of social organization could produce his tailor-made program in under a decade. So, back in 1700 we could expect socieites grounded in Reason to produce a number of mega-programs that involved a radical alteration of social organization. These mega-programs would appear paradoxical to the empiricist, because they are (1.) entirely untested, and yet (2.) vigorously believed in.

Given a basic assumption that human collectives can be extremely violent, I think someone in 1700 could have concluded that the Enlightenment and the rise of Reason necessitated:

1. The emergence of several different mega-programs for social organization grounded in Reason and a unique, internally consistent deductive logic,

2. Which are both untested and attract exuberant devotees, and that

3. That the incompatibility of these mega-programs will lead to conflict between the devotees of the mega-programs, so that

4. As soon as technology allows, and as soon as a critical mass of states capitulate to the various mega-programs, a total war between the logically deduced mega-programs will errupt

Contingent on the presence of a decently large population of Empirical societies, the early 18th century observer might also conclude that:

5. The empiricists will be left to pick up the pieces, because empirical social organizations will always be more robust than logically-deduced social organizations. Therefore, any rationalists allied with the empiricists will share victory, but will themselves slowly be superceded by the empiricists.

We think of the world wars just another spectacular episode in the march of human history. The earliest we date the "inevitability" of WWII is November 11th, 1918. The earliest that we date the "inevitability" of WWI is perhaps German unification and the inauguration of the Second Reich under Bismark in 1871. I argue that we should have seen this coming much, much earlier than that. History is a series of choices by human beings, and human choice is dictated by the way we understand and interpret our world. As soon as Reason emerged in the modern world as a major and pervasive force for understanding the world, a global, total war was inevitable (clearly Reason pre-dates the enlightenment, but it seems to me it was kept in check by revealed religion before the modern era). The world wars were not another episode in history: they were a pre-determined historical singularity, necessitated by the epistemology of the Enlightenment. The precise actors and battles may not have been pre-determined, but the forces driving the conflagration were.

I've presented this largely as a modern drama: an internicine struggle among rationalists, as well as a contrast between rationalists and empiricists. Looking forward, what I think is significant is that modernism is not a foregone conclusion at all. First and foremost, pre-modern thought patterns have reasserted themselves in the age of holy terror. While the pre-modern factions in Islam that have lately resisted the West and sought to establish a new caliphate are the most prominent example, other (admittedly less problematic) examples abound as well. Christian Fundamentalism holds considerable sway in no less a polity than the United States. By "Christian Fundamentalism" I don't simply mean "Christian Conservatism," which can be entirely benign and often even beneficial. I'm refering to fundamentalism, which brooks neither logic nor experience as the primary path that humans must travel to find truth. In the former Soviet Union, many societies are reverting to their pre-Rationalist days, before the Communist mega-program, to the tsarism of a bygone era. This is also true of much of Africa, which, after throwing off the oppressive yoke imperialism (or more accurately, after having this yoke removed for them by a repentant imperialist) have not embraced constitutional democracy, but instead have relied on strongmen, warlords, and tribalism. And of course in other regions, Rationalism has not yet even been tempered. Marxism still dominates much of South America. Fortunately, East Asia has joined the empiricist camp with gusto, and even China and India are tentatively following in the footsteps of Japan, Korea, and Australia. On top of this re-emergence of pre-modernism, there is also the looming specter of post-modernism, which I honestly can't make heads or tails of in this schema.

This is one view of modern history, one that I find relatively convincing and meaningful. It doesn't answer every question, but I think it sheds new light on the world wars and the Cold War. These are epochal events, pre-ordained for centuries. We got through them. Thinking in these mega-epistemological-trend terms may be a useful guide for the future.

Or by promoting this view of modern history, perhaps I'm just setting up the prologue to a Rationalist mega-program of my own! In case that's what I'm inadvertently doing, I'll end on this entreaty: err on the side of evidence, experience, and caution.

Tuesday, January 5, 2010

Assault of Thoughts

A lot of major blogs have "link dump", end of the day wrap ups. At the end of a work day, the blogger generally posts a bunch of interesting links without much commentary. I assume this is the material that they've read and thought was important, but either didn't have much time to comment on, or anything much more to add. I find myself in this situation a lot too. I also try to keep what I post on here and on Facebook more general in nature, so I don't always get to comment on the more nuanced things that I think about (and often I don't feel fully up to the task of commenting on them anyway). So I'm going to start the "link dump" practice. Hopefully it will also keep activity at a steadier pace on here.

I've also noticed that these regular "link dumps" often have catchy titles... so mine will be "Assault of Thoughts". Literally speaking, it seems appropriate enough - I'm just going to be throwing a bunch of material at you. It comes from perhaps my favorite John Maynard Keynes quote: "words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking".

So for now:

- Yglesias links Mike Mandel's thoughts on the net national savings rate

- An Austrian School of Economics blogger and I spar over the liquidity trap, an idea that's been hogging a lot of my brain cells reccently

- Extended Taylor Rule bitching by John Taylor

- Krugman discussing the "depression within a depression" of 1937

- A less common argument for quantitative easing by the Fed

- Arnold Kling on Bernanke's speech to the AEA meeting in Atlanta: Bernanke defends low rates in the early 00's, and Kling agrees. Bernanke's position was not surprising to me, Kling's was. Apparently Krugman agrees too.

Guantanamo Prisoners

Andrew Sullivan points out an incredible resource: a full list of all 779 detainees at Guantanamo Bay. For those of you not interested in purchasing a book on this, a great deal of information is available here, here, here, and here. All prisoners are listed on these links with their country of origin and release date (for those that have been released). Most prisoners also have links associated with them to earlier posts on the author's blog, or relevant news items. This obviously isn't comparable to the Gulags or anything like that. We can't forget that these prisoners were captured precisely because there was reason to believe they were committing heinous crimes against the U.S. and against humanity. They needed to be imprisoned and interrogated. At the same time, a lot of what happened at Guantanamo does soil the reputation of the U.S., and went beyond what was needed to effectively prosecute the War on Terror. Indeed, some of the harsher methods used at Guantanamo made the fight against terrorism less effective; this was the very basis for most of the opposition.

The prison's operation was also of dubious constitutionality and legality. What is the purpose of fighting an enemy that is trying to destory our institutions if we abandon those institutions ourselves? Guantanamo's legacy is complex. I have a lot of reservations about what went on (and is going on) there, although I don't have a problem with it's mere existence. This complexity requires sober deliberation, and sober deliberation requires access to information. This compilation of information on the detainees is ample fodder for the sort of deliberation we need. Let's learn who these men were.

Wednesday, December 16, 2009

The Boston Tea Party

Eleven score and sixteen years ago today, a rowdy bunch of Bostonians dumped 342 chests of tea into Boston Harbor, to protest the Tea Act of 1773. Their cry of "no taxation without representation" helped to catapult murmurs of colonial dissatisfaction into full-scale resistance to British rule, which of course would eventually culminate in armed resistance during the American Revolution.

One of the most unfortunate things for me about how the Boston Tea Party has been remembered is how the recent "Tea Parties" have mangled the purpose of the movement. Many today are satisfied with truncating "no taxation without representation" after the first two words, when arguably it was the last two words that were most important to the colonists.

The Tea Act of 1773 actually made tea cheaper for the colonies. While previously existing duties on tea remained intact, the Tea Act effectively eliminated the need for British middlemen that the East India Company had to trade through to bring tea to the colonies. This lowered the price of tea in the colonies considerably, allowing the East India Company to undercut tea smugglers.

The problem was that the Townshend duties remained on the (cheaper) tea - duties which had been imposed since 1767. Colonists vehemently opposed these duties for two reasons. First, they were not represented in the Parliament that levied the tax (hence, "no taxation without representation"). That tax wasn't crushing, but the colonists had no role in imposing the tax, and they had no way to redress their grievances about the tax. Second, the Townshend revenue was used specifically for the purpose of keeping the colonies dependent. Previously, colonial assemblies (where the colonists did have representation) paid the salaries of colonial officials and judges. These officials and judges were therefore dependent on the people. After 1767, however, many of these colonial officials and judges were paid from the Townshend revenues. The Townshend Act therefore forced Americans to pay taxes that they did not assent to, to pay the salaries of public servants that the colonial assemblies no longer had control over. The concern was that their freedom and right to self-governance was taken from them quite deliberately.

The tax itself was virtually irrelevant. The issue was self-government, freedom, and representation. I personally find it incredible that the Glenn Beck/Ron Paul/"Tea Party" crowd has actually convinced themselves that (1.) their recent concerns have anything to do with the legacy of the Boston Tea Party or the Founders in general, and (2.) that somehow everyone that disagrees them has abandoned the legacy of the Founders.

I find it perfectly conceivable that some of the Founders would be surprised at how large government is today, as well as surprised at the taxes we levy. However, given the social and economic changes that have transpired since the time of the Founders they may have found it perfectly appropriate. Regardless, none of them would deny that the American people have decided how the American people are to be governed.
The claim that we are somehow exposed to the risk of "tyranny" trivializes the experiences of those who actually suffered under tyranny, who didn't have an opportunity to decisively elect the man or woman of their choosing (as we have elected Barack Obama), and who didn't have the opportunity to elect their own representatives in the legislature (as we have for centuries). Honestly, when I hear someone suggest that by disagreeing with them you're trampling on the legacy of the Founders it turns my stomach. It's one thing to find solace and inspiration in the Founders to support your own views, today. That's fine. But to insult someone else by claiming that legacy for yourself - and doing it in such a mangled way - is very unfortunate.

Friday, December 11, 2009

The Limits of Monetary Policy (or, "Why DeLong, Krugman, Yglesias, and Sumner are Wrong")

For those of you not connected into the economics blogosphere, the Federal Reserve has been facing a tidal wave of criticism lately. There's the Ron Paul "end the Fed" crowd, of course, but there is also a rising tide of critics arguing that the Fed isn't doing nearly enough to solve the unemployment problem.

The criticism is logical enough: the Fed itself predicts extremely low inflation, with almost no inflationary pressure to speak of, combined with extremely high unemployment for several years to come. We're talking about a decade to get back to 5% unemployment, as I understand it. The Federal Reserve argues, however, that it's largely tapped out. It has lowered interest rates as far as it can and it doesn't have many tools left. Several commentators (from both sides of the aisle, but mostly from the left) are astounded:


To be fair, their incredulity is understandable. Bernanke himself is famous for promoting the idea of unconventional monetary policy and praising the "quantitative easing" that the Bank of Japan engaged in in the 1990s. Joe Gagnon, at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, has made waves by proposing exactly what Bernanke promoted back then - several trillion dollars worth of asset purchases to make monetary policy even more accomodating. Right now, with interest rates at 0%, there is no "traditional" way for the Fed to be more expansionary. Purchasing a ton of assets would pump more money into the economy by putting money into the hands of the current asset holders.

So I've thrown the critics several bones. I've said their criticism is "logical enough", and that their "incredulity is understandable". But ultimately, I think the relentless demand for Bernanke to engage in vigorous quantitative easing is highly misplaced. When the Fed lowers interest rates, lowers reserve requirements (requiring firms to hold less reserves allows them to expand credit more easily, which expands the money supply), or expands it's own balance sheet through normal open market operations, monetary policy keeps market distortions to a minimum. Everyone faces the same interest rate and everyone faces the same reserve requirements. Competition picks the winners, the Fed simply sets the macro-trajectory for the economy.

"Quantitative easing" is different; it involves an aggressive expansion of the Fed balance sheet by purchasing all sorts of assets (including government bonds). The problem with this is that the Fed ends up "picking winners". Specific market players get an artificial leg-up. These activities pose a serious risk of distorting market activity and market signals. As a rule of thumb, that's a very bad thing. In exceptional circumstances - such as a liquidity trap - it may be worth the risk.

But even if we determine that it is worth the risk in a liquidity trap, who should take that risk in a free society? I would argue that an elected, representative body should engage in those activities - not an appointed board of a central bank. If we're going to engaging in potentially distortionary measures, it needs to be done in the open, and people need to be accountable for these decisions. This is fundamentally what fiscal stimulus (i.e. - deficit spending from the government) does. It's an attempt to "soak up" the extra savings that are causing the economy to stall out, but it's an attempt that bears a real risk of "picking winners". What winners are Congress and the Obama administration picking? Infrastructure. Green jobs. Home-owners. Car buyers. Education. Some of these choices may be good, some may be bad. The point is "we the people" are making these choices, not a central bank.

I have a great deal of respect for the Fed, and I think they have a hugely important role to play in this crisis. I don't even begrudge Ben Bernanke the quantitative easing he's engaged in thus far as an extreme emergency measure. But to insist that this become the order of the day - that this is how we should wage an extended fight against depression - seems very dangerous to me. I do think the Fed is largely tapped out as far as what it can do - not because they can't do more, but because they shoudln't do more. It's time for Congress to step up.

Two additional thoughts:
(1.) Willem Buiter seems to agree with me. I ran across this after I formulated my thoughts (mostly in response to Yglesias's series of posts), but I'm happy to see he agrees with me, and
(2.) I have lots of lingering reservations about quantitative easing that I may comment on in the future. As a teaser, I'll just say it strikes me that quantitative easing risks prolonging a liquidity trap. The Fed is increasing the supply of loanable funds available to institutions that want to borrow, which should drive down the real interest rate - when what we want to do is drive it up (so that the interest rate floor is no longer binding). The only redeeming quality of quantitative easing, it seems to me, is that it may create inflation which would also make the nominal interest rate floor non-binding. I'm still noodling over this - but those are my initial thoughts. This seems to me to be a classic example of what Keynes meant when he said that Roosevelt's policies were like "a slim man trying to get fatter by buying a bigger belt".

Thursday, December 10, 2009

My own email from CRU (this one was not hacked)

A few days ago I sent an inquiry to East Anglia University. I had been getting information that the "destroyed" data wasn't destroyed at all - it was just housed on a central government server. Which, to put it mildly, is a complete non-issue. I had heard the research unit at East Anglia made a statement to this effect in response to requests, but I couldn't find it online. So I wrote:

"Hi - I was wondering if you had a press release or link on your website explaining that the raw data that CEI is so concerned about is actually being housed at NOAA. I'm trying to respond to questions from readers on my blog about this, and I've heard you quoted in articles suggesting that the raw data is still available - but it would be much better to see a statement to that effect on your website. Thanks"

I got this response today:

Thank you for your message and many apologies for not getting back to you more quickly. The University of East Anglia will make all the data accessible as soon as they are released from a range of non-publication agreements. Publication will be carried out in collaboration with the Met Office Hadley Centre. Please see our statement at http://www.uea.ac.uk/mac/comm/media/press/2009/nov/CRUupdate for more information. As you may be aware, the University of East Anglia (UEA) has announced that Sir Muir Russell KCB FRSE will head an independent review into allegations that arose from a series of hacked e-mails from the Climatic Research Unit (CRU). Colleagues in CRU have confirmed their commitment to the quality and veracity of the science that relates to global warming. Their academic standing is a matter of public record and their work has been extensively peer-reviewed. The hacking is subject to a police investigation with which the University and its staff are fully cooperating. You will find all current information at www.uea.ac.uk/mac/comm/media/press/CRUstatements These pages will be updated with news as it is available.

Just thought people might be interested in the update. My understanding was that all their station data is (and has always been) available here. Now - how much do you want to bet the guys at Cato and CEI that were pestering them for this data will never actually look at or analyze it?

In other Climategate news, Ezra Klein had a great piece yesterday on the more mundane climate research that is going on. And guess what - it all points to a warming planet. Maybe the bigshots are hyperbolic and deceptive, but you can't seriously think everyone drawing these conclusions is pulling the wool over our eyes.

My feeling on climate change is that human produced carbon is warming the Earth at a pace faster than normal processes operate. It seems to me there's very little doubt that we're heading for a warmer planet, and that we are making that happen. Does that mean Florida will be under water, crops will fail, and billions will die? I suppose "it could happen", but I don't think we have any evidence to convince us that we're facing doomsday. But we are facing significant change. Given my economics training, I recognize that we burn more carbon than we should because we don't bear the costs of burning that carbon. When you don't bear all the costs and benefits of a choice, you won't make the optimal choice - and when somebody else bears the costs of your consumption you're going to consume more of that product than is optimal. For that reason, I think cautiously embracing policies like a carbon tax or cap and trade is an eminently reasonable thing to do. However, humans also have a tendancy to innovate our way out of problems. So I don't think draconian measures now are justified, because twenty years from now (when collectively we'll be considerably smarter) we may have an even better, and a much less painful solution.

So I don't like to think of myself as an "alarmist", but I'm not apathetic either, and I try not to second guess the people who have spent their lives working on this.

Enjoy the email and the links.

Tuesday, December 1, 2009

North Korea and Inflation

The market is just a network of social relations - social relations which are orchestrated by prices which signal individual abilities, individual needs, individual hopes, and individual ambitions. Make the signals meaningless and social interaction becomes impossible. Induced inflation distorts those signals. Hyper-inflation destroys them. North Korea unleashed this weapon today in an attempt to destroy fledgling private markets.

I've spoken at times on the value of low, constant inflation in a modern economy. I've been meaning to talk about this in more detail, with reference to "inflationist" movements in early America, and in the late nineteenth century. A lot of these sorts of ideas are grounded in the work of Keynes, and consistent with more recent monetarist theories. But it's important to distinguish the argument for a low, constant level of inflation (as opposed to violent inflationary and deflationary episodes) from the argument for high spikes in inflation as a confiscatory tool. Keynes spoke to inflation as a weapon of the state in the months after World War I:

"By a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens. By this method they not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily; and, while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some. The sight of this arbitrary rearrangement of riches strikes not only at security, but at confidence in the equity of the existing distribution of wealth. Those to whom the system brings windfalls, beyond their deserts and even beyond their expectations or desires, become 'profiteers,' who are the object of the hatred of the bourgeoisie, whom the inflationism has impoverished, not less than of the proletariat. As the inflation proceeds and the real value of the currency fluctuates wildly from month to month, all permanent relations between debtors and creditors, which form the ultimate foundation of capitalism, become so utterly disordered as to be almost meaningless; and the process of wealth-getting degenerates into a gamble and a lottery. Lenin was certainly right. There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose."

- John Maynard Keynes, 1919

Health Reform and Premiums

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently released estimates for the Senate health bill, and what they've said about premiums has caused some argument among the experts. And by "argument", I mean they take entirely opposite views on what direction the CBO suggests premiums are moving in. Gruber, Krugman, and Yglesias all contend that premiums will actually go down. The CBO report itself seems to say in several places that premiums will go up. What's going on? Gruber, Krugman, and Yglesias's claim should sound strange to people. The Senate bill is sort of like Massachusetts health reform writ large, and we didn't see premiums decline there.

I think Megan McArdle is largely on target in her explanation of what's going on, and she is firm but fair with the dissenters. Basically, if you look at the same type of plan before and after reform the premiums are reduced - that's what Krugman and Gruber are emphasizing. That means something for sure, but there's a reason why the CBO didn't highlight that. If people were free to choose what health insurance they wanted, it would be meaningful to have the same plan have lower premiums as a result of reform.

The problem is, they aren't free to choose (to borrow a Milton Friedman line). A slew of mandates are included in reform, not the least of which being the mandate to simply have insurance. So risk pools are wider, which does provide the opportunity to furnish the same insurance for less money. But if you're not allowed to buy the same insurance, what does that matter? If everyone had the same options available to them that they did before the reform, I would say look at how the premium of different types of plans change before and after reform. But they don't have the same options - they are forced to buy more. So looking at the change in the same plan is meaningless - instead you have to look at the change in the premiums people will actually end up paying.

And that is supposed to increase. And we shouldn't be surprised - as I've said for a while now, the mandate dumps tens of millions of people into the insurance market. You can't have a demand shock like that and reasonably expect a drop in prices. It just doesn't pass the smell test. Does this mean it's a bad bill? Well it's at the top of the list of arguments you would make for why it's a bad bill. I think your ultimate position on the bill itself is going to have to be based on more than that. The bill does a lot of other things that I think are good. The mandate, in my mind, is a very bad idea. But if premiums continue to climb the mandate can always be adjusted later. The question for people (who feel the way I do on the mandate) is - are all the Medicare reforms, all the advances in tax policy, all the expansions of Medicaid, the exchange, etc. still better than the status quo even if they're burdened with an odious mandate? That's a question that people have to answer for themselves. I think on balance we need to do something, and I'd prefer we didn't jump into an expansive public option. This seems like the best way to do that. The problems associated with the mandate seem smaller to me than the problems associated with doing nothing. But reasonable minds may disagree.