tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post7670856669274931827..comments2024-03-27T03:00:27.024-04:00Comments on Facts & other stubborn things: Brad DeLong is making a real monkey of himselfEvanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12259004160963531720noreply@blogger.comBlogger37125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-53834146359705413792013-01-10T13:17:23.610-05:002013-01-10T13:17:23.610-05:00"Unknown" writes: "For someone, lik..."Unknown" writes: "For someone, like Nagel, who thinks that thought and perception are somehow intrinsic to reality and extrinsic to brains" <br /><br />I'm not sure Nagel really thinks they are "extrinsic to brains". His views on the relationship between minds and brains are pretty subtle. Some of his papers on the subject can be downloaded at his website:<br /><br />http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/object/thomasnagel<br /><br />I'm not quite sure what you mean by "extrinsic" so I don't want to claim for sure that Nagel would disagree with it.<br /><br />Also, I don't think that Nagel claims that reason or intuition is infallible. I disagree with his pessimism about an evolutionary explanation the historical origin of our power to reason, even while agreeing with him that this power is part of an ability to (fallibly and partially, to be sure---and note that Nagel himself explicitly uses the qualifier "fallibly" in places) get in touch with objective reality. (It's a darned useful power, even though Nagel is not as impressed with its usefulness, in an evolutionary context, as I think he should be.)<br /><br /><br /><br />Howard Barnumhttp://winephysicssong.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-77859383599510983352012-11-28T21:00:30.787-05:002012-11-28T21:00:30.787-05:00@ Current
Sweet dreams . . . @ Current<br /><br />Sweet dreams . . . Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11677815746117897839noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-48538255705685865452012-11-28T20:38:57.457-05:002012-11-28T20:38:57.457-05:00Humans can understand some elements of their weakn...Humans can understand some elements of their weaknesses. For that reason they can conceive of stronger intellects than themselves, even if they don't embody them or they don't exist. So, they can conceive of a difference between a closer picture of reality and the one they see. That's all that's needed here.<br /><br />It may be true that a human and some other creature both respond in fundamentally mechanical ways to inputs, but come to different conclusions. That doesn't affect types of reason or logic that apply to a problem regardless of the actor. "Logic" (or "Reason" or whatever) is an aspect of a proposed solution to a carefully formed problem, it's nothing to do with that solver. It doesn't require believing anything incredible about existing lifeforms.<br /><br />I hate it when you lot talk about philosophy. I now agree with Greg Hill about something! I'm going to sleep and I'm going to spend tomorrow persuading myself that I'm wrong.Currenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08645195276844244481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-85635324419369725662012-11-28T18:48:44.905-05:002012-11-28T18:48:44.905-05:00@ PrometheeFeu
You can find the audio here: htt...@ PrometheeFeu<br /><br />You can find the audio here: http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/AudioRecordings.html<br /><br />Here's a paper entitled "Some Wittgensteinian Reservations about Neuroeconomics," which covers some of this terrain from my point of view: http://works.bepress.com/greg_hill/2/<br /><br />And here's another one entitled "Neuroscience at the Playhouse," which might be of interest: http://muse.jhu.edu/login?<br />auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/philosophy_and_literature/v036/36.1.hill.html<br /><br />Best, GregAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11677815746117897839noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-9905614747124766552012-11-28T17:15:06.147-05:002012-11-28T17:15:06.147-05:00Yes. I think Brad does not find that to be a compe...Yes. I think Brad does not find that to be a compelling distinction. And I am inclined to agree with him.<br /><br />If you do have a link to such an audio recording, I would love to hear it. I have a full-time job so unfortunately, I can't spend as much time reading articles as I wish I could. Alternatively, if you want to present some of the more persuasive arguments, shoot. I'm sure we'll all be happy to read.PrometheeFeuhttp://prometheefeu.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-72465574644243032602012-11-28T16:54:44.443-05:002012-11-28T16:54:44.443-05:00@PrometheeFeu: I should've been clearer, but t...@PrometheeFeu: I should've been clearer, but the point I wanted to make is that explaining why someone did something in terms of his reasons is different than explaining some piece of behavior as the outcome of a chain of causes. And to say that "the process of reasoning is just another name for various stimuli being applied to his jumped up monkey brain" seems to obliterate this distinction. <br /><br />I don't deny that there are many scientists, many neuroscientists in particular, who would like to abolish this distinction along with the rest of folk psychology, but these arguments are open to strong objections. See, e.g., M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003), and if you can find it, an audio recording of Bennett and Hacker debating Daniel Dennett and John Searle about these issues.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11677815746117897839noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-26173549625743364872012-11-28T09:53:23.909-05:002012-11-28T09:53:23.909-05:00@Greg: Why "also seem committed to the propos...@Greg: Why "also seem committed to the proposition"? Those two propositions are identical.PrometheeFeuhttp://prometheefeu.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-27014079379415443062012-11-28T07:21:12.395-05:002012-11-28T07:21:12.395-05:00Just because we have evidenced the ability to form...Just because we have evidenced the ability to form complex conceptual, social and linguistic products, does not mean that we will ever have the right to claim ownership of objective truth.<br /><br />There is no good answer to this conundrum; trying to claim otherwise is hubris.<br /><br />Your gnawing at this particular philosophical bone is a waste of your own time and that of others.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-14835603839192932502012-11-28T07:08:25.970-05:002012-11-28T07:08:25.970-05:00Nagel's awe at the wonder of conscious reasoni...Nagel's awe at the wonder of conscious reasoning is certainly his prerogative, but; his awe no more deserves attention than the awe of a baby-just-turned-toddler cupping his freshly minted faeces. <br /><br />The toddler may think his faeces are the pure gestalt of a sacred covenant with the universe, and that their texture and his experience of it are an incontestable ode to his sublimation of the cosmos' truths.<br /><br />Or, he could a juvenile man-monkey with a handful of faeces, and any neuron-fired thoughts he does or does not have before he puts his hand in his mouth are as meaningless as any other complex physical process both he and his faeces are a product of.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-74399800913225969952012-11-28T03:56:23.757-05:002012-11-28T03:56:23.757-05:00@PrometheeFeu:
I agree that Brad seems to be clai...@PrometheeFeu:<br /><br />I agree that Brad seems to be claiming that "the process of reasoning is just another name for various stimuli being applied to his jumped up monkey brain." But those who hold this view also seem to be committed to the proposition that a person reasoning his way to a conclusion is just another name for the person being caused to reach this conclusion by the impingement of various inputs on his jumped up monkey brain.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11677815746117897839noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-41133745519602976372012-11-28T01:39:34.949-05:002012-11-28T01:39:34.949-05:00@Greg Hill:
I think Brad means that the process o...@Greg Hill:<br /><br />I think Brad means that the process of reasoning is just another name for various stimuli being applied to his jumped up monkey brain. On the other hand, being poked in the ribs and wanting to ask a question are two completely different things.PrometheeFeuhttp://prometheefeu.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-82238077736477986022012-11-28T01:33:41.793-05:002012-11-28T01:33:41.793-05:00I for one remain unpersuaded either way of TATOR o...I for one remain unpersuaded either way of TATOR or JUML (jumped up monkey logic). In other words, I have yet to see an observable difference between the two hypothesis. Really Brad, I was just saying that your argument doesn't refute TATOR. Not that TATOR is true.PrometheeFeuhttp://prometheefeu.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-82165656928084750612012-11-28T00:24:26.491-05:002012-11-28T00:24:26.491-05:00I'm a little unclear on what you're saying...I'm a little unclear on what you're saying. If Nagel develops certainty that he is correctly seeing TATOR by talking to other people, people that look like just like him to his perceptions, how can that make him sure that they're both accessing TATOR, rather than expressing views which cohere to the same Darwinian heuristic? <br /><br />I bring up the issues with logic/math not to imply that I think that they're bothersome for logicians or mathematicians, but only to point out that there are other equally(or more) accurate and consistent alternatives to the interpretations of math, geometry, and logic. As an example, let's take the case of general relativity. Our intuition suggests a euclidean metric for space, but general relativity suggests that this is not an accurate metric. <br /><br />For someone, like Nagel, who thinks that thought and perception are somehow intrinsic to reality and extrinsic to brains, I would think this would be deeply troubling. If we perceive objective reality and are even necessary to it, why do we see it in the "wrong" way?<br /><br />But for a neo-darwinist, it is simple. The reason we use a euclidean approximation is because our mental capabilities are constrained by the computational power of brains. If we had to solve the nigh intractable GR equations every time we had to determine whether to dodge left or right, we would be tiger food long before we get an answer. It seems that evolution explicitly favored practicality AND inaccuracy over the objective nature of reality. <br /><br />The really worrisome problem for people like Nagel comes with the follow up question. If something as simple as how we perceive the distance between objects is less accurate than practical, what other aspects of our reason have been shaped in favor of inaccuracy?<br /><br />p.s. I would argue that Godel is genuinely problematic, but the argument is not germane to the topic.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00660105508192684771noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-3224764226572384822012-11-28T00:16:57.345-05:002012-11-28T00:16:57.345-05:00Don't you see a difference between 1) a studen...Don't you see a difference between 1) a student raising her hand in order to ask a question, and 2) a student's arm going up as a reflex reaction to a classmate poking her in the ribs?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11677815746117897839noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-5319988908477865802012-11-28T00:15:55.074-05:002012-11-28T00:15:55.074-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11677815746117897839noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-29748080278753955602012-11-27T23:31:02.650-05:002012-11-27T23:31:02.650-05:00Why would you think here is a difference? When you...Why would you think here is a difference? When you walk, is it because the muscles in your legs contrac and expand, or because of neurochemical processes?bradhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04548019979157668776noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-20636986943522668322012-11-27T21:55:01.320-05:002012-11-27T21:55:01.320-05:00There are many problems in all of these discussion...There are many problems in all of these discussions that likely results in people talking past each other. Need to clearly distinguish: <br />(1) questions of metaphysics (e.g., metaphysical necessity vs. metaphysical contingency; metaphysical realism vs. idealism, etc.);<br />(2) questions of epistemology (e.g., a priori justification vs. a posteriori justification; concept of "knowledge", concept of "truth", etc.);<br />(3) questions of perception (direct realism, sense data theory, adverbialism, representational principle,etc.).<br /><br />Consider Timothy Williamson's claim and how one's position would be effected by a stance (for or against) on this issue: "One can know something without being in a position to know that one knows it." Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits at 114. Humehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00471731654454581518noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-36540670506264857082012-11-27T21:34:25.040-05:002012-11-27T21:34:25.040-05:00Re: "Does Gene Callahan have any idea what he...Re: "Does Gene Callahan have any idea what he is committing himself to in endorsing Thomas Nagel's claim to have transcendent access to objective reality?" Rather than defending Mr. Callahan, I ask you, Brad (whose blog is my first destination each morning), whether you arrive at your conclusions by a process of reasoning or are driven to them by the impact of various stimuli (inputs) upon your jumped up monkey brain (because I think your acceptance of the Science cum Hume cum Darwin view ultimately commits you to the latter view.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11677815746117897839noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-61892411894804357862012-11-27T21:09:41.816-05:002012-11-27T21:09:41.816-05:00To M. C. Hammer, everyone looks like a Nagel.
Sor...To M. C. Hammer, everyone looks like a Nagel.<br /><br />Sorry. ;)Minnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-20377941158310356902012-11-27T20:43:57.155-05:002012-11-27T20:43:57.155-05:00Re: "just because Brad De Long does not alway...Re: "just because Brad De Long does not always use his TATOR correctly does not mean that he does not have TATOR. Just that he is fallible" Alas! If you have access to TATOR but because of your fallibility never know whether you are using your TATOR or your error rate and me and jumped up monkey logic, that is observationally indistinguishable from not having any TATOR at all. Thus I fail to see what your point might be--due to my jumped up monkey nature, of coursebradhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04548019979157668776noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-39148101558641811492012-11-27T20:32:48.413-05:002012-11-27T20:32:48.413-05:00As far as mathematics and logic, I don't see t...As far as mathematics and logic, I don't see those problems as problems. Sure, if you think math describes the world, those can be problems, but that's really an empirical question. If you see logic and mathematics as sets of rules, non-Euclidian geometry is just another set of rules. Godel's incompleteness theorem is just a cool way that the rules interact in unexpected ways. Just because a set of axioms doesn't describe the world or match intuitive logic or whatever doesn't mean that that set of axioms isn't real.PrometheeFeuhttp://prometheefeu.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-83287998515425943532012-11-27T20:27:15.708-05:002012-11-27T20:27:15.708-05:00Mind you, I'm agnostic on whether there is suc...Mind you, I'm agnostic on whether there is such a thing as objective reality and skeptical that we have transcendent access to it. I just have a compulsive need to jump on arguments which I think are bad. I'm seeing a therapist. ;-)PrometheeFeuhttp://prometheefeu.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-78097600439280812542012-11-27T20:23:42.779-05:002012-11-27T20:23:42.779-05:00I don't think Thomas Nagel can ever know for s...I don't think Thomas Nagel can ever know for sure that he is correctly using his TATOR. But that is not to say he does not have TATOR. It just means that he needs to talk to other people who also have TATOR. The more other such people he talks to and the more of them check his work, the greater the confidence he can have that he successfully used his TATOR.<br /><br />This is as far as I am taking the comparison to logic or arithmetic. I don't know per say that 2x=4 => x=2. I merely have a strong believe that when solving that equation I did the math correctly. However, it is possible that I made a mistake and so the more math-capable people check my work, the more I become confident that I solved the equation correctly.<br /><br />This doesn't prove that the TATOR hypothesis is correct. But I think it does effectively refute Brad De Long's argument. Just because Brad De Long sometimes makes arithmetic errors does not mean he cannot do math. (much less that nobody can do math) It just means he is falliable. Similarly, just because Brad De Long does not always use his TATOR correctly does not mean that he does not have TATOR. Just that he is fallible.PrometheeFeuhttp://prometheefeu.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-61307665736631985442012-11-27T17:06:58.225-05:002012-11-27T17:06:58.225-05:00Maybe I'm wrong here, but I don't think th...Maybe I'm wrong here, but I don't think that Nagel's objective truth argument is really about platonic forms like logic. It is more a response to Hume's questions, how do I know the color of the 101st goose? or how do I know that you see color the same way that I do? Questions about how sensory perceptions enter human consciousness and how we know them.<br /><br />When it comes to logic and geometry there are theoretical problems that were known long before Nagel. Problems that make it quite problematic to assert them as objective. With logic we have Godel's theorem.(Some valid logical statements can be neither true or false, undermining the basic assumptions of logic) We have alternative axioms. (How do we know that our intuitive logic is the objectively true logic?) For geometry we have non-euclidean metrics. (How do we know that our intuitive grasp of geometry is correct? Answer: It isn't. It is an approximation that works well over short(ie human scale) distances. We're pretty sure that the geometry of reality is decidedly non-euclidean.)<br /><br />TATOR would mean that the conscious impressions/representations of objects in the world are correct. But reasoning from reality, I can conclude(with probability, not certainty) that impressions formed by objects on my senses are often wrong, because evidence from my senses is often contradictory. (See optical illusions, color blindness, 4-color vision, non-pathological cognitive failures, pathological cognitive failures, and the day to day variance in cognitive function that humans experience due to periodic tiredness or sickness.) If I was getting objective reality, unmediated through some very fallible meat, I wouldn't get so much variance in my perceptions of what are (probably) the same objects in physical world.<br /><br />Or taking another tack. So maybe Thomas Nagel isn't always right, but how does he *ever* know if he is accessing TATOR? or if he is making a logic error? To assert that TATOR is necessarily correct, you would have to have access to TATOR at the time that the time that you inferred that you have access to TATOR and know that you have access to TATOR at that time. It leads to some hucksterish silliness where every time there is a mistake or revision you need to say "Well it turns out that I didn't have access to TATOR last time that I said I did, I was just making a mistake, but this time I do, and this time, I really, really mean it." Really Nagel? Really?<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00660105508192684771noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1740670447258719504.post-83788888905240689132012-11-27T16:16:30.987-05:002012-11-27T16:16:30.987-05:00I haven't read the current Nagel book, but I&#...I haven't read the current Nagel book, but I've read a number of them. "The View From Nowhere" is astonishingly good, and it turns on the issue of metaphysical realism that seems to have everyone going right now. Metaphysical realism, as I understand it, is the view that objective reality may or may not be graspable by our conceptual schemes. Thus, quantum mechanics may (or may not) be the final word for us, and - even if it is - our inability to make it make sense (Einstein comes immediately to mind) may reflect the limitations of the human cognition apparatus. <br /><br />I think Nagel's later work can be seen as attempting to draw out the implications of this view.<br /><br /> Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com